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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

NOAH G. HILLEN, in his capacity as
Personal Representative of the Estate of
Victoria H. Smith,

Supreme Court Case No. 47687

Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

DAVID GIBSON, an individual, dba
BLACK DIAMOND COMPOST
PRODUCTS,
Defendant-Appellant.

CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, in and for the County of Ada.
HONORABLE STEVEN HIPPLER

VERNON K. SMITH

RANDALL A. PETERMAN

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT

BOISE, IDAHO

BOISE, IDAHO
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ADA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE NO. CV01-19-10368
Ü
Ü
Ü
Ü
Ü

Noah Hillen
Plaintiff,
vs.
David Gibson
Defendant.

Location:
Judicial Officer:
Filed on:
Appellate Case Number:

Ada County District Court
Hippler, Steven
06/07/2019
47687-2020

CASE INFORMATION
Case Type:

AA- All Initial District Court
Filings (Not E, F, and H1)

Case 01/02/2020 Appealed Case Status: Supreme Court Appeal
Case Flags: Clerk Alert
DATE

CASE ASSIGNMENT
Current Case Assignment
Case Number
Court
Date Assigned
Judicial Officer

CV01-19-10368
Ada County District Court
06/07/2019
Hippler, Steven

PARTY INFORMATION
Plaintiff

Hillen, Noah G.

Defendant

Gibson, David R.

DATE
06/07/2019
06/07/2019

06/07/2019

06/07/2019
06/07/2019

06/18/2019

06/28/2019
06/28/2019

Lead Attorneys
Peterman, Randall A.
Retained
208-388-1228(W)
Smith, Vernon Kenneth, Jr
Retained
208-345-1125(W)
EVENTS & ORDERS OF THE COURT

INDEX

New Case - District Civil

•
•

Complaint Filed
Verified Complaint for Ejectment and Other Relief
Summons Issued
and Filed
Civil Case Information Sheet

Summons
Gibson, David R.
Served: 06/11/2019

•
•

Affidavit of Service
(6/11/19)
Notice of Appearance

II Civil Case Information Sheet
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CASE SUMMARY
CASE NO. CV01-19-10368
07/03/2019

07/05/2019

07/11/2019

07/11/2019

08/05/2019

08/05/2019

08/05/2019

08/05/2019

08/14/2019

08/14/2019

08/16/2019

08/16/2019

09/12/2019

09/18/2019

09/20/2019

09/20/2019

•
•
•

Notice
Three Day Notice of Intent to Take Default
Answer
Answer to Verified Complaint
Notice
of Status Conference

Other Documents
Peterman, Randall A.
Unserved
Smith, Vernon Kenneth, Jr
Unserved

•
•
•
•

Motion
for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings
Memorandum In Support of Motion
for Partial Judgment
Declaration
of Noah G. Hillen
Notice of Hearing
Notice of Hearing

CANCELED Status Conference (3:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Hippler, Steven)
Vacated

•

Stipulation
for Scheduling and Planning

•

Order
Governing Proceedings and Setting Trial (Jury Trial)

Order
Peterman, Randall A.
Unserved
Smith, Vernon Kenneth, Jr
Unserved

•
•

Memorandum
in Opposition to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, and Response to Motion to Certify
Judgment
Reply to Memorandum
in Support of Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings

Hearing Scheduled (2:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Hippler, Steven)
on Pleadings & Motion to Certify Judgment Under I.R.C.P. 54(B)

•

Court Minutes (Judicial Officer: Hippler, Steven )
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CASE SUMMARY
CASE NO. CV01-19-10368
10/02/2019

10/02/2019

•
•

Memorandum
Decision and Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings
Judgment

10/02/2019

Order
Peterman, Randall A.
Unserved
Smith, Vernon Kenneth, Jr
Unserved

10/02/2019

Order
Peterman, Randall A.
Unserved
Smith, Vernon Kenneth, Jr
Unserved

10/02/2019

Final Judgment (Judicial Officer: Hippler, Steven)
Foreclosure - Property
Date of Order: 10/02/2019
Awarded To: Noah Hillen
Awarded Against: David Gibson
Comment: vacate and surrender immediately

10/02/2019

Case Closed

10/03/2019

10/03/2019

10/04/2019

10/14/2019

10/16/2019
10/16/2019

10/29/2019

10/29/2019

11/14/2019

•

Amended
Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Judgment on the
Pleadings

Notice of Hearing
Peterman, Randall A.
Unserved
Smith, Vernon Kenneth, Jr
Unserved

•
•
•
•
•
•

Writ Issued
of Assistance - Ada county
Motion
Rule 59(e) Motion to Alter or Amend
Memorandum of Costs & Attorney Fees

Declaration
of Alexander P. McLaughlin
Motion
Defendant's motion in opposition to plaintiff's memorandum of attorney's fees and costs
Memorandum In Support of Motion
Defendant's memorandum in opposition to plaintiff's memorandum of attorney's fees and costs

•

Notice of Hearing
(12/17/2019 @ 2:30 PM) Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment
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11/14/2019

11/15/2019

11/29/2019

12/06/2019

•
•
•
•

Notice of Hearing
(12/17/2019 @ 2:30 PM) Motion in Opposition to Attorneys Fees and Costs
Response
to Defendant's Motion in Opposition
Memorandum In Support of Motion
Memorandum In Support of Motion to Amend Judgment
Memorandum
Decision and Order on Defendant's Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment and Motion to
Disallow Costs and Attorney Fees

12/06/2019

Order
Peterman, Randall A.
Unserved
Smith, Vernon Kenneth, Jr
Unserved

12/17/2019

CANCELED Motion Hearing - Civil (2:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Hippler, Steven)
Vacated
Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment and Motion in Opposition to Attorneys Fees and Costs

12/31/2019
12/31/2019
01/08/2020

01/14/2020

01/28/2020

01/30/2020

02/14/2020

02/27/2020

02/27/2020

03/04/2020

03/13/2020

•
•
•

Notice of Appeal

Appeal Filed in Supreme Court (Judicial Officer: Hippler, Steven )
Sheriff's Return
on Writ and Writ
Request
Request for Additional Transcript and Record

•

Order
Conditionally Dismissing Appeal - Supreme Court No. 47687

•
•
•
•
•

Order
Reinstating Appeal - Supreme Court No. 47687
Motion
to Stay Proceedings Pending Appeal
Notice of Hearing
re: Motion to Stay Proceedings Pending Appeal (3/13/2020 @ 2pm)
Notice of Service of Discovery Requests
Plaintiff s First Set
Reporter's Notice of Transcript(s) Lodged
- Supreme Court No. 47687

Motion to Stay (2:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Hippler, Steven)
Proceedings Pending Appeal
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11/17/2020

Pre-trial Conference (3:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Hippler, Steven)

12/01/2020

Jury Trial (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Hippler, Steven)

DATE

FINANCIAL INFORMATION
Defendant Gibson, David R.
Total Charges
Total Payments and Credits
Balance Due as of ╘3/4/2020

365.00
365.00
0.00

Plaintiff Hillen, Noah G.
Total Charges
Total Payments and Credits
Balance Due as of ╘3/4/2020

221.00
221.00
0.00
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Electronically Filed
6/7/2019 12:29 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Phil McGrane, Clerk of the Court
By: Eric Rowell, Deputy Clerk

Randall A. Peterman, ISB No. 1944
Alexander P. McLaughlin, ISB No. 7977
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP
601 West Bannock Street
Post Office Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720
Telephone (208) 388-1200
Facsimile (208) 388-1300
rap@givenspursley.com
apm@givenspursley.com
013683-0002
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
NOAH G. HILLEN, in his capacity as
Personal Representative of the Estate of
Victoria H. Smith,
Plaintiff,
vs.
DAVID R. GIBSON, an individual d/b/a
BLACK DIAMOND COMPOST
PRODUCTS,

CV01-19-10368
Case No. _____________________
Category: A. A.
Fee: $221.00
VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR
EJECTMENT AND OTHER RELIEF

Defendant.
COMES NOW the above-named plaintiff, Noah G. Hillen, the duly appointed
Personal Representative of the Estate of Victoria H. Smith, by and through his undersigned
counsel, and hereby alleges a Verified Complaint for Ejectment and other relief as follows:
I.
1.

PARTIES

Noah G. Hillen (“Plaintiff”) is the Personal Representative of the Estate of

Victoria H. Smith (the “Estate”), pursuant to that certain Decision Re: Multiple Motions (the

VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR EJECTMENT AND OTHER RELIEF - 1
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“Order”), entered in In re Estate of Victoria H. Smith, Case No. CV-IE-2014-15352, in the District
Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the state of Idaho, in and for the county of Ada.
2.

On or about June 2, 2017, the Honorable Judge Cheri C. Copsey entered an

Order on Motion Under Rule 70(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Vesting All Real and
Personal Property of the Estate in the Personal Representative (“Rule 70 Order”) under which the
Court transferred to Plaintiff any and all personal property or real property which had been
transferred by the Estate to Vernon K. Smith, Jr. (“Vernon”) since July 4, 2012. A true and correct
copy of the Rule 70 Order and subsequent judgment are attached hereto as Exhibit A.
3.

Upon information and belief, David R. Gibson (“Defendant”) is an

individual residing in the state of Idaho, county of Ada, and doing business as Black Diamond
Compost Products.
4.

This action is being pursued against Defendant, who is subject to these

proceedings given his status as a possessor and/or occupier of real property owned by Plaintiff.
II.
5.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

Defendant is subject to the jurisdiction of this Court for the causes of action

set forth herein.
6.

This Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s causes of action against

7.

The damages and/or property claimed herein and/or at issue here exceed the

Defendant.

minimum jurisdictional requirements of this Court.
8.

Venue in this Court is proper pursuant to Idaho Code Section 5-401, et. seq.

in that Ada County is the county in which the Premises (defined below) are located.

VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR EJECTMENT AND OTHER RELIEF - 2
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III.
9.

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff is the owner and the party with legal standing to care for and

otherwise maintain certain real property located in Ada County, described as Ada County
Assessor’s Parcel No. S1505220000, in the Northwest ¼ of Section 5, Township 2N, Range 2E,
Boise Meridian, located off Pleasant Valley Road southwest of its intersection with West Gowen
Road.
10.

The value of the Premises is greater than $10,000.00.

11.

Defendant is in possession of that portion of the Premises identified above.

12.

Defendant caused damage to the Premises by operating a solid waste

processing operation on the Premises and by accepting solid waste onto the Premises even after a
court order enjoined the same.
13.

On December 21, 2019, Plaintiff caused to be served via certified mail upon

Defendant a notice of termination of occupancy pursuant to Idaho Code section 55-208 (the
“Termination Notice”) which terminated whatever right Defendant had, if any, to occupy the
Premises effective January 31, 2019, and which demanded Defendant vacate the premises no later
than January 31, 2019. A true and correct copy of the Termination Notice is attached hereto as
Exhibit B.
14.

On information and belief, Defendant has refused to vacate or otherwise

surrender possession of the Premises and continues to occupy and possess the same.
15.

Defendant’s occupation of the Premises beyond January 31, 2019 was and

continues to be unlawful and without the permission of Plaintiff.1

Defendant Gibson was named in a lawsuit initiated by the Idaho Department of Environmental Quality:
DEQ v. Gibson, et. al., Case No. CV-OC-2015-3540, Fourth Judicial District, Ada County, State of Idaho. The lawsuit
alleges that Defendant, among other things, engaged in illegal composting activities associated with the Premises.
1
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16.

Plaintiff, as the rightful owner of the Premises, is entitled to possession

thereof. Plaintiff’s understanding is that Defendant is not in possession of the Premises pursuant
to any written or oral lease.
CLAIMS FOR RELIEF
COUNT ONE: EJECTMENT
17.

Plaintiff incorporates by reference all prior allegations as though restated in

18.

Plaintiff owns the Premises.

19.

Defendant is in possession of the Premises.

20.

Defendant has refused to surrender possession of the Premises to Plaintiff

full.

following demand via the Termination Notice.
21.

Defendant’s continued holding of the Premises entitles Plaintiff to

immediate possession of the Premises via ejectment of Defendant.
COUNT TWO: DECLARATORY JUDGMENT/QUIET TITLE
22.

Plaintiff incorporates by reference all prior allegations as though restated in

23.

Idaho Code Section 6-401 provides for “[a]ctions to quiet title” and states,

full.

in pertinent part, that “[a]n action may be brought by any person against another who claims an
estate or interest in real property . . . adverse to him, for the purpose of determining such adverse
claim.”
24.

Idaho Code Section 10-1202 provides that “[a]ny person interested under a

deed, will, written contract or other writings constituting a contract or any oral contract, or whose

Judgment was entered in favor of Defendant. See Exhibit C. That Judgment, among other things, enjoined Gibson
from engaging in illegal composting on the Premises. Gibson appealed the Judgment. That appeal is pending.
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rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract or
franchise, may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the
instrument, statute, ordinance, contract or franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status or
other legal relations thereunder.”
25.

Idaho Code Section 10-1201 provides for “[d]eclaratory judgments” and

goes on to state that “[c]ourts of record within their respective jurisdictions shall have power to
declare rights, status, and other legal relations, whether or not further relief is or could be claimed.
No action or proceeding shall be open to objection on the ground that a declaratory judgment or
decree is prayed for. The declaration may be either affirmative or negative in form and effect, and
such declarations shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree.” Idaho Code Section
10-1205 provides that “[t]he enumeration in Sections 10-1202, 10-1203 and 10-1204, does not
limit or restrict the exercise of the general powers conferred in Section 10-1201, in any proceedings
where declaratory relief is sought, in which a judgment or decree will terminate the controversy or
remove an uncertainty.”
26.

Idaho Code Section 10-1208 provides that “[f]urther relief based on a

declaratory judgment or decree may be granted whenever necessary or proper.”
27.

Defendant, who once held possession of the Premises with permission of

one of the Estate’s heirs which Plaintiff believes was wrongful, now remains in possession of the
Premises with no legal right thereto, and is claiming an interest in real property owned by Plaintiff.
28.

Therefore, Plaintiff is entitled to a judgment decreeing and declaring that

Defendant has no right to occupy or possess the Premises and for such other and further relief as
this Court deems appropriate.
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COUNT THREE: TRESPASS
29.

Plaintiff incorporates by reference all prior allegations as though restated in

30.

Plaintiff is the lawful owner of the Premises.

31.

Plaintiff has made demand upon Defendant to cease and desist from his

full.

trespassing on and unlawful occupation of the Premises.
32.

Defendant has failed and refused to cease and desist from his trespassing on

and unlawful occupation of the Premises.
33.

Defendant’s continued and unauthorized trespass upon and use of the

Premises has caused and will cause damage to Plaintiff because it interferes with Plaintiff’s use
and enjoyment of the Premises.
34.

Defendant’s continued and unauthorized trespass upon and use of the

Premises has caused and will cause further damage to Plaintiff because, among other things,
Plaintiff is unable to lease the Premises to a paying tenant.
35.

Defendant’s improper use of the Premises for solid waste processing2 has

damaged the Premises in an amount to be proven at trial and constitutes a trespass upon the
Premises.
36.

Plaintiff has been damaged by Defendant’s trespass in an amount to be

proven at trial.
COUNT FOUR: UNJUST ENRICHMENT
37.

Plaintiff incorporates by reference all prior allegations as though restated in

full.

2

See n.1.
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38.

Defendant has incurred a benefit by remaining in possession of the Premises

with no lawful right thereto and without paying any remuneration.
39.

Defendant has appreciated that benefit by possessing the Premises and

remaining in such possession despite demand to vacate from Plaintiff.
40.

Defendant’s acceptance of his benefit of possession of the Premises is

inequitable because has not paid for his past and continued use of the premises.
41.

Plaintiff is entitled to the amount by which Defendant has been unjustly

enriched.
ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS
42.

In order to prosecute this action it has become necessary for Plaintiff to

retain the services of the law firm of Givens Pursley LLP. A reasonable fee for said firm’s services
in the event that Defendant fails to appear and contest this matter would be the sum of $1,000, and
such further amounts as the Court may deem reasonable should Defendant appear and contest this
matter. Pursuant to Idaho Code, sections 12-120, 6-324, and/or 6-311A, and any other applicable
statutes, rules, regulations or law, Plaintiff is entitled to recover his costs and attorneys’ fees
incurred in prosecuting this action.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for relief as follows:
1.

For a Judgment in favor of Plaintiff on all counts of the foregoing

2.

For the specific relief sought in each Count of the foregoing Complaint;

3.

For an order of restitution of the Premises to Plaintiff, free of any and all

Complaint;

claims thereto by Defendant;

VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR EJECTMENT AND OTHER RELIEF - 7
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4.

For an Order of this Court directing that a Writ be issued, without further

notice, to the Sheriff of Ada County, to accomplish the restitution;
5.

For an award of Plaintiff’s costs and attorney fees herein, such attorney’s

fees to be the sum of $1,000 if Judgment is entered by default and such attorneys’ fees to be a
reasonable amount if this matter is contested; and
6.

For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

DATED this 7th day of June, 2019.
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP

By /s/ Randall A. Peterman
Randall A. Peterman – Of the Firm
Alexander P. McLaughlin – Of the Firm
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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VERIFICATION
STATE OF IDAHO )
) ss.
County of Ada
)

NOAH G. HILLEN, being first du ly sworn, deposes and says:
I have read the foregoing VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR EJECTMENT AND
OTHER RELIEF, know the contents thereof and that the same are true to the best of my
knowledge, information, and belief.

Noah G. Hillen

...J-1--

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this I_ day of June, 20 19.

OTRY

PUBLIC ~OR IDAHO
Residing at
J3o 1 -sc, X ~
My Com mission Expires
~t

T U-..,+\. t.
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EXHIBIT A
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FILED By: Tyler Atkinson

6/2/2017 at 2:49 PM

Deputy Cle

Fourtlh Judic»al rnstirnct, Ada Countyr
CHRIS OPHER D. RICH, C~e rrk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF
VICTORIA H. SMITH,
Deceased.

Case No. CV-IE-2014-15352

ORDER ON MOTION UNDER RULE
70(b) OF THE IDAHO RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE, VESTING ALL
REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY
OF THE ESTATE IN THE PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE

THIS MATTER came before the Court upon the Motion for Relief under Rule
70(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure ("Motion"), filed by Noah Hillen as Special
Administrator ("Special Administrator") on March 30, 2017.

Vernon K. Smith, Jr. filed an

Objection ("Objection") to the Motion on April 6, 2017.

No other objection was filed.

A hearing regarding the Motion and Objection occurred on May 5, 201 7, at which time the Court
considered the arguments of the parties, then granted the Motion.
The Court granted the Motion on May 5, 2017, under the authority granted it
under Rule 70(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Noah Hillen, as Personal Representative
is of the Estate ("PR" or "Personal Representative") is hereby granted the right and authority to

ORDER ON MOION UNDER RULE 70(b) OF THE IDAHO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE,
VESTING ALL REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY OF THE ESTATE IN THE PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE - 1
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execute or have notarized any and all documents necessary to carry out the purpose of this Order,
and to take any actions as necessary to carry out the purpose of this Order.
On May 25, 2017, Noah Hillen's appointment as a Special Administrator was
terminated, and Mr. Hillen was appointed as the Personal Representative of the Estate. As a
result, this Order conveys the properties to Mr. Hillen in his status as a Personal Representative
rather than a Special Administrator.
Accordingly, Judgment will be entered, pursuant to Rule 70(b) of the Idaho Rules
of Civil Procedure.
DATED this 2nd day of June, 2017.

The Honorable~. Copsey
District Judge
Signed: 6/2/2017 10:27 AM

ORDER ON MOION UNDER RULE 70(b) OF THE IDAHO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE,
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Signed: 6/2/2017 02:49 PM

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this _ _day of June, 2017, I caused a true and correct copy of
the foregoing ORDER ON MOTION UNDER RULE 70(b) OF THE IDAHO RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE, VESTING ALL REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY OF THE
EST ATE IN THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE to be served by the method indicated
below, and addressed to the following:
RANDALL A. PETERMAN
ALEXANDERP.MCLAUGHLIN
Givens Pursley LLP
601 W. Bannock St.
P.O. Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701
Attorneys for Noah G. Hillen, Special
Administrator

[ ] U.S. Mail
[ ] Facsimile: (208) 345-1129
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Overnight Delivery
[X] Email / iCourt:
rap@givenspursley.coms

VERNON K. SMITH, JR.
Attorney at Law
1900 West Main Street
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Personal Representative of Estate of Vernon K.
Smith, Sr. and attorneys for David Gibson

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[X]

U.S. Mail
Facsimile: (208) 345-1129
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
Email/ iCourt: vls59@live.com

RORY JONES and ERICA JUDD
JONES, GLEDHILL, FURMAN P.A.
225 North 9 th Street, #820
Boise, Idaho 83702
Attorneys for Vernon K. Smith, Jr.

[ ] U.S. Mail
[ ] Facsimile: (208) 331-1529
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Overnight Delivery
[X] Email/ iCourt: rjones@idalaw.com;
ejudd@ idalaw.com

ALLEN B. ELLIS
ELLIS LAW, PLLC
12639 West Explorer Drive
Boise, Idaho 83 713
Attorneys for Joseph H Smith

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[X]

Ronald L. Swafford
Swafford Law, PC
655 S. Woodruff Ave.
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83401
Attorneys for Sharon Bergmann

U.S. Mail
Facsimile: (208) 345-9564
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
Email/ iCourt: aellis@aellislaw.com

[ ] U.S. Mail
[ ] Facsimile: (208) 524-4131
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Overnight Delivery
[X] Email / iCourt:
rons@swaffordlaw .com

ORDER ON MOION UNDER RULE 70(b) OF THE IDAHO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE,
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Courtesy copy provided to:

Victoria Anne Converse
10548 NW Skyline Blvd.
Portland OR 97231

[X]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

U.S. Mail
Facsimile
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

ROBERT MA YNES
Maynes Taggart, PLLC
P.O. Box 3005
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83403
Attorneys for Walker Land & Livestock, LLC

[X]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

U.S. Mail
Facsimile: (208) 524-6095
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

Darrell G. Early
Office of the Attorney General
1410 N. Hilton, 2nd Floor
Boise, Idaho 83706
Attorneys for State ofIdaho Department of
Environmental Quality

[X]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

U.S. Mail
Facsimile: (208) 373-0481
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

ORDER ON MOION UNDER RULE 70(b) OF THE IDAHO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE,
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EXHIBITB

000021

GIVENS PURSLEY

LLP

Attorneys and Counselors at Law

601 W. Bannock Street
PO Box 2720
Boise, ID 83701
Telephone: 208-388-1200
Facsimile: 208-388-1300
www.givenspursley.com

Preston N. Carter
prestoncarter@givenspursley.com
208-388-1222

Gary G. Allen
Christopher J. Beeson
Jason J. Blakley
Clint R. Bolinder
Jeff W. Bower
Preston N. Carter
Jeremy C. Chou
William C. Cole
Michael C. Creamer
Amber N. Dina
Bradley J. Dixon
Thomas E. Dvorak
Jeffrey C. Fereday
Martin C. Hendrickson
Brian J. Holleran
Kersti H. Kennedy

Neal A. Koskella
Debora K. Kristensen
Michael P. Lawrence
Franklin G. Lee
David R. Lombardi
Kimberly D. Maloney
Kenneth R. McClure
Kelly Greene McConnell
Alex P. McLaughlin
Melodie A. McQuade
Christopher H. Meyer
L. Edward Miller
Patrick J. Miller
Judson B. Montgomery
Emily G. Mueller
Deborah E. Nelson

W. Hugh O’Riordan, LL.M.
Randall A. Peterman
Jack W. Relf
Michael O. Roe
Jamie Caplan Smith
P. Mark Thompson
Jeffrey A. Warr
Robert B. White

Kenneth L. Pursley (1940-2015)
James A. McClure (1924-2011)
Raymond D. Givens (1917-2008)

December 21, 2019
Via Certified Mail
David R. Gibson d/b/a Black Diamond Compost Products
3000 Rose Hill
Boise, Idaho 83705
Re: Occupancy of Property Owned by the Estate of Victoria H. Smith
Dear Mr. Gibson:
This firm represents the Estate of Victoria H. Smith (“Estate”), which owns the property
on which you, d/b/a Black Diamond Compost Products1 (“Property”), operate. As you know, the
Idaho Department of Environmental Quality (“DEQ”) initiated an enforcement action against
you and your d/b/a Black Diamond Compost Products (collectively, “you”), alleging that you
operated an unlawful solid waste processing operation on the Property. The Court determined
that you had violated DEQ regulations; imposed civil penalties; and enjoined you from accepting
additional solid waste on the Property without complying with DEQ regulations. A copy of the
Court’s Amended Judgment is attached as Exhibit 1.
The Estate has been informed that you accepted additional solid waste at the facility even
after the Court entered its Judgment. This activity must cease and desist immediately, and you
must immediately come into compliance with the Court’s Judgment. Please confirm, in writing,
that you have ceased accepting solid waste on the Property. Please also provide a list of persons
who have provided grass clippings, yard waste, or other materials at the Property for the Estate’s
records.
The Estate has also determined that your occupancy of the Property cannot continue, due
in part to your past unlawful use of the Property. This letter provides notice pursuant to Idaho
Code § 55-208 that your tenancy is hereby terminated and you must, by January 31, 2019, vacate
the Property and remove all solid waste and other substance, including, but not limited to,
Ada County Assessor’s Parcel No. S1505220000, in the Northwest ¼ of Section 5, Township 2N, Range 2E, Boise
Meridian, located off Pleasant Valley Road southwest of its intersection with West Gowen Road.
1
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David R. Gibson
December 21, 2018
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compost, hummus, or any similar substance. The Estate reserves all rights to avail itself to all
remedies, including judicial remedies, to remove you and all your belonging from the Property.
Please also be advised that you are responsible, and will remain responsible for removal,
cleanup, and/or remediation of any materials or environmental conditions on the Property.
Sincerely,

Preston N. Carter
Givens Pursley LLP
Attorneys for Noah Hillen, Personal Representative
of the Estate of Victoria H. Smith
PNC/klh
Enclosure
cc via email w/encls: Noah Hillen, Personal Representative of the Estate of Victoria H. Smith
Alexander P. McLaughlin, Givens Pursley LLP
Randall A. Peterman, Givens Pursley LLP
14328729_3.doc [13683.2]
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Filed: 06/21/2018 11:57:05
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Ellis, Janet

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,

Case No. CVOC-2015-03540
AMENDED1 JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
DAVID R. GIBSON, d/b/a/ BLACK
DIAMOND COMPOST PRODUCTS,
and VHS PROPERTIES, LLC,
Defendant.

JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:
Defendant David R. Gibson shall pay to Plaintiff the sum of $1,000.
Defendant VHS Properties, LLC, shall pay to Plaintiff the sum of $250.
Defendants David R. Gibson and VHS Properties, LLC, jointly and severally, shall
pay expenses to Plaintiff in the sum of $3,466.53.
Defendants David R. Gibson and VHS Properties, LLC, are hereby enjoined from
engaging in any of the following activities:
1.

Accepting or receiving any quantity of discarded grass, grass clippings,

leaves, straw, or hay, or permitting anyone from discarding any quantity of grass, grass
clippings, leaves, straw, or hay upon that real property described as the Northwest ¼ of
Section 5, Township 2N, Range 2E, Boise Meridian and identified by the Ada County
Assessor as parcel S1505220000 unless Defendants first comply with the provisions of
IDAPA 58.01.06.010.
1

This Judgment is being amended to reflect the Court’s award of expenses to Plaintiff.
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2.

Accepting or receiving, or permitting anyone from discarding upon that real

property described as the Northwest ¼ of Section 5, Township 2N, Range 2E, Boise
Meridian and identified by the Ada County Assessor as parcel S1505220000, within any
contiguous twelve-month (12) period a cumulative volume of discarded grass, grass
clippings, leaves, straw, or hay that exceeds 300 cubic yards unless Defendants first
comply with those provisions of IDAPA 58.01.06 applicable based on the volume of such
material they desire to receive.
This injunction is effective upon the date it is signed. It shall remain effective
permanently.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Signed: 6/21/2018 11:23 AM
______________________________
JONATHAN
ONATHAN MEDEMA
District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Christopher D. Rich, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have
June 21, 2018
emailed/mailed on _____________________,
one copy of the ORDER as notice pursuant
to Rule 77(d) I.C.R. to each of the attorneys of record in this cause as follows:

Cynthia Yee Wallace
cynthia.wallace@ag.idaho.gov
Mark Cechini-Beaver
mark.cechini-beaver@deq,idaho.gov
Vernon K. Smith
vvs1900@gmail.com

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH
Clerk of the District Court
Signed: 6/21/2018 11:58 AM

By:
y: _______________________
____
__
_ _______
__
____
__
____
__
_______
__
Deputy Court Clerk
C
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Electronically Filed
7/5/2019 10:48 AM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Phil McGrane, Clerk of the Court
By: Laurie Johnson, Deputy Clerk

VERNON K. SMITH
ATTORNEY AT LAW
1900 W . Main St.
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Idaho State Bar No. 1365
Telephone: (208) 345-1125
Fax:
(208) 345-1129
vkslaw@live.com

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

)
)
)
) Case No. CV0l-19-10368
)
) ANSWER TO VERIFIED
) COMPLAINT FOR EJECTMENT
) AND OTHER RELIEF
)
)
)
)

NOAH G. HILLEN, in his capacity as
Personal Representative of the Estate of
Victoria H. Smith,
Plaintiff,
V.

DAVID R. GIBSON, an individual, d/b/a
BLACK DIAMOND COMPOST
PRODUCTS,
Defendant.

COMES NOW, the Defendant above named, David R. Gibson, by and through his
attorney of record, Vernon K. Smith Jr. , and for Answer to the Verified Complaint on file
herein, does hereby respond and allege as follows :
FIRST DEFFENSE
Defendant denies each and every allegation set forth and contained in Plaintiff's
Verified Complaint for Ejectment and Other Relief, not otherwise specifically admitted
herein.
SECOND DEFENSE

ANSWER TO VERIFIED COMPLAINT
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That Plaintiff does not have the standing to bring this action against this
Defendant, as Plaintiff is not the owner of the real property and premises that is being
identified in the Verified Complaint, as only the heirs of the decedent are, as addressed
hereinafter in this responsive pleading.
TIIlRD DEFENSE
Defendant has been in possession of the real property and premises continuously
since August, 2004, having had continuous possession for almost 15 years, under an
agreement with both Victoria H. Smith, (having become deceased on September 11 ,
2013), and with Vernon K. Smith Jr. , (counsel representing Defendant's right to
possession of the premises, being the 2/3rds vested owner of the property), and is being
confronted by the controversial administration of this Personal Representative (PR) of the
Estate of Victoria H. Smith, who has a fiduciary duty to serve and protect the interests
owned by Vernon K. Smith Jr. , a 2/3rds heir and owner of the premises, who does oppose
the removal of this Defendant from the premises, as he has assisted in the development of
compost and humus that was intended to be utilized across the entire 520 acres in the
further agricultural development of the area; that Defendant has engaged in the
prevention of garbage dumping and the accumulation of debris that otherwise would be
deposited upon the premises, which would continue to occur in his absence, as such
dumping and discard has otherwise been occurring over the years in the area, being part
of the south desert front in Boise, Idaho, located south of Gowen Field and west of
Pleasant Valley Road, referred to as the Gowen Field Desert Front Area, where debris
and garbage was before periodically, routinely, and randomly deposited within this desert
area, and occasionally upon this property, which historically has included animal
carcasses of all kinds, waste petroleum products, such as used motor oils, garbage of
every kind, wood, metal, glass and assorted construction debris, concrete blocks,
fragments of concrete removal, rocks, brush, trash, tires, contaminates and hazardous
wastes of various types, as this desert area became a convenient inexpensive alternative
to delivering garbage and debris to the Ada County landfill, where charges are assessed;
that Defendant has served to prevent this activity by his continuous presence, along with
not only the protection, preservation, maintenance, and long term intended improvements
to the premises, but has also assisted Victoria H. Smith and Vernon K. Smith Jr. with the

ANSWER TO VERIFIED COMPLAINf

P. 2

000029

preservation of the agricultural tax allowance and exemption by his composting
operations, which must be preserved, in the event there is no sale of the property in the
months or years ahead.
FOURTH DEFENSE
That Plaintiffs Complaint fails to set forth any legal or factual basis to constitute
a cause of action against this Defendant for which any relief can be granted under the
statutes of the state of Idaho, as Plaintiff does not have any ownership interest in the
premises, and has no statutory standing to bring this action, as identified hereinafter.
FIFTH DEFENSE
As and for an answer to those allegations set forth in Category I, entitled
"PARTIES", Defendant does respond to those allegations as follows :
1. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 1 thereof, Defendant does
acknowledge that Noah G. Hillen ("Hillen") is the Personal Representative (PR) of the
Estate of Victoria H. Smith (Estate); that any "Order" entered by the magistrate Cheri C.
Copsey, is subject to the pre-emptive effects of the Uniform Probate Code, I. C. § 15-3101 and the case law interpreting that statutory provision; that ownership of said assets of
the decedent become vested interests of the heirs of said Estate, of which Vernon K.
Smith Jr. is a 2/3rds heir and vested owner, which interest had vested in all property
interests immediately upon the death of the decedent; that the 2/3rds interest of Vernon
K. Smith Jr. is a statutorily "vested" interest, not founded upon any "Order" of a

magistrate court, as statutorily mandated by I. C. §15-3-101 , interpreted and confirmed
by case law, Fairchild v. Fairchild, 106 Idaho 147 (1984), and El/maker v. Tabor, 160
Idaho 576, 377 P.3d 390, (2015).
That by virtue of Idaho law, all assets of a decedent "vest" in the heirs
immediately upon the date of death, not to any Estate, or PR, or administration process,
as I. C. § 15-3-1 O1 states:
" 15-3-101. Devolution of estate at death -- Restrictions. The power of a
person to leave property by will, and the rights of creditors, devisees, and
heirs to his property are subject to the restrictions and limitations
contained in this code to facilitate the prompt settlement of estates.
Upon the death of a person, his separate property devolves to the
persons to whom it is devised by his last will,
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That Fairchild v. Fairchild, 106 Idaho 147 (1984), held:
We view the statement that "all became cotenants" as a conclusion of
law, reached by applying existing law to the findings of fact. See I.C. §
15-2-103 (concerning the share of the decedent's heirs); and I.C. § 15-3101 (decedent's property devolves to his heirs at death). This
conclusion is correct. We uphold it.
.... .the narrow focus ofthis appeal has been the application of settled law
to the facts. Furthermore, there was no showing that the trial court
misapplied the law. Scott v. Castle, 104 Idaho 719, 662 P .2d 1163
(Ct.App.1983). We hold that this appeal was brought frivolously,
unreasonably and without foundation.
In El/maker v. Tabor, 160 Idaho 576, 377 P .3d 390, (2015) it was further held:
Idaho Code section Code section 15-3-101 provides, "Upon the death of a
person, his separate property devolves to the persons to whom it is devised
by his last will . .. ." The word "devolve" means: "1 . To transfer (rights,
duties, or powers) to another. 2. To pass (rights, duties, or powers) by
transmission or succession." Black's Law Dictionary 463 (7th ed. 1999).
"The term is said to be peculiarly appropriate to the passing of an estate
from a person dying to a person living." Black's Law Dictionary 540 (4th
ed. 1968). "The legal title to estate property vests in the heirs or
devisees upon the death of the decedent." Pierce v. Francis, 194 P .3d
505, 51 O (Colo.App. 2008).
That "heirs" refers to the statutory beneficiaries of an "Intestate" proceeding (I. C.
§15-1-201(12); that "devisees" refers to the statutory beneficiaries in a "Testate"
proceeding (I. C. § 15-1-201 (22); that by statutory declaration, devolution of property
interests vest upon death of the decedent in the heirs or devisees, whichever the situation
may be, not to or upon any estate, or any administrator, or conditioned upon any
distribution proceedings. That Defendant does assert that Vernon K. Smith Jr. has a
vested ownership interest in the subject property as an heir of this asset, which interest

vested at the time of death of the decedent, not subject to any "administration" of the
estate, which fact and legal result has been ignored or misunderstood by this PR.
2. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 2 thereof, Defendant
would state said "Order" of the magistrate, as entered June 2, 2017, under Rule 70(b),
IRCP, has no effect to any extent it contradicts the statutory provision and case law
identified above; that the effects of said "Order" is subject to the vested interests
established by statute; that said "Order" is inferior and subordinate to the provisions of
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the statute and that settled case law cited above; that by virtue of said provisions of the
Uniform Probate Code, I. C. §15-3-101, all real and personal property interests of the
decedent has immediately been transferred to and became vested in the heirs upon the
death of the decedent, which vesting occurred immediately upon death of the decedent,
once identified to be the property interests of the decedent, and nothing within the
administration of the Estate can cause any divesting or defeat the vested interests
established by statute.
That the existence of the "Order" of Magistrate Cheri C. Copsey does not, and
cannot, as a matter of law,. supersede or serve to divest any interest that has been
statutorily created, interpreted, and confirmed through case law; that any allegation set
forth within said Paragraph 2, to the effect that said "Order" of said magistrate is claimed
to be superior or superseding authority, seeking to alter the ownership of the assets of the
decedent, is rejected and denied, as being contrary to settled law; that the creation of the
statutory rights and vested interests of the heirs is superior to any inferior "Order" of this
magistrate, and Vernon K. Smith Jr. is a 2/3rds vested owner of the real property referred
to in this Verified Complaint.
Defendant is unaware of any statutory authority that permits an "Order" to
exceed the statutory vesting of property ownership and rights of the heirs, as no authority
has been found to exist to allow a court to defeat or undermine a vested real property
interest statutorily created and confirmed by case law; that any allegation by Plaintiff, as
to Plaintiffs alleged "ownership" of this premises, inconsistent with settled case and
statutory law, is herewith denied.
3. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 3 thereof, Defendant does
admit Defendant's residency in Ada County, Idaho, as alleged.
4. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 4 thereof, Defendant does
acknowledge he is in possession and /or is the occupier of the real property and premises
described in the Verified Complaint, which property is owned by the "heirs" of the
decedent, Victoria H. Smith, who died on September 11, 2013 ; that Vernon K. Smith Jr.
is such an heir, having a vested 2/3rds ownership interest in this real property and
premises, established by the statutory authority and case law set forth above; that Plaintiff
is not the "owner", as a matter of law, of said real property and premises, as the heirs
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hold the only vested interest in said real property, notwithstanding the "Order" cited by
Plaintiff; that Defendant denies any allegation set forth within said Paragraph 3 that is
inconsistent with this response.
SIXTH DEFENSE
As and for an answer to those allegations set forth m Category II, entitled
"JURISDICTION AND VENUE", Defendant does respond to those allegations as
follows :
5. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 5 thereof, concerning the
jurisdiction of the court, Defendant understands jurisdictional assertions constitutes
questions of law, not allegations of fact; that Defendant shall not render a legal opinion as to
the jurisdiction of any particular court to preside over this case; that Defendant does leave
the issue of jurisdiction to be decided by the provisions of the statute and the constitution;
that notwithstanding that reservation, Defendant would state, upon information and belief,
that based upon the statutes and constitutional provisions, and the actual "subject matter"
within the "Verified Complaint for Ejectment" seeks to address, being the subject matter of
possession, detainer, and ejectment, these are matters to be addressed within the magistrate
division of the district court, not the district court where this action is now pending, despite
the assertion that Plaintiff has chosen to declare the alleged value of the real property to
exceed $10,000.00 in value.
The Magistrate Courts and the District Courts are separate and distinct entities under
the Idaho Constitution, with the magistrate courts declared to be a division of the district
court, with each being separate and distinct courts under Idaho' s law.
The district courts and the magistrate courts are courts of record in Idaho (See I.C.
§§ 1-101 and 1-102); District Courts are "constitutional courts", having original jurisdiction
established by Art. V, §20 of the Idaho Constitution; Magistrate Courts are declared to be
"inferior courts," created by the Idaho Legislature within I.C. §1-2201 , by citation to the
authorization provided by Art. V, §2 of the Idaho Constitution; the Idaho Legislature alone
determines the jurisdiction of magistrate courts (See Acker v. Mader, 94 Idaho 94, 96, 481
P.2d 605, 607 (1971), stating: "It is our opinion that Art. 5, §2 of the Idaho Constitution
intended the legislature to be the sole authority in determining the jurisdiction of the inferior
courts.").
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That Magistrate Courts cannot, by judicial declaration, be turned into Art V. § 20
District Courts (See Nate v. Denny, 2017 WL 3033308 at *8 (Ida.Sup.Ct. July 18, 2017),
stating: ("[T]his Court does not have the authority to rewrite the Idaho Constitution, .").
Neither labeling a magistrate court to be a "division of the district courts," nor granting
magistrate courts' jurisdiction equal to that of the district courts, can tum magistrate courts
into district courts (See, I.C.AR. 5).
I. C. §l-2208(l)(a) has granted Magistrate Courts general jurisdiction in actions
where the amount of money, damages, or value of personal property claimed does not

exceed $5,000. I. C. § 1-2210( 1)(a) has granted Magistrate Courts general jurisdiction in
actions where the amount of money, damages, or value of personal property claimed

exceeds $5,000. That construed together, these two statutes created the potential for the
exercise of general jurisdiction by a magistrate court co-equal with the original jurisdiction
granted to the district courts by the Idaho Constitution. However, the Supreme Court's
"court rules", ever since 1981, has determined to limit the general jurisdiction of Magistrate
Courts "where the amount of damages or value of property claimed, does not exceed

$10,000." (See I.C.AR. 5(c)(l)). Reference to the adoption of this jurisdictional limitation
of$10,000 is found in The Advocate, Vol. 24, No. 1, January 1981 at pg. 2, and 1981 Idaho
Court Rules Cumulative Pocket Supplement, I.R.C.P. 82(c)(2)(A).
This general jurisdictional limitation on the magistrate court' s jurisdiction, when
combined with the specific conferrals of jurisdiction made in I.C. §§ 1-2208(1)(b), (l)(c),
(2), (3), (4), & (5); and 1-2210(l)(b), (l)(c), (l)(d), & (l)(e) operate to exclude from
magistrate court jurisdiction a number of alleged claims, including some common actions in
which the amount claimed, or the value of property placed at issue, exceeds $10,000,
including: (1) quiet title actions; (2) breach of contract actions; (2) general negligence
claims; (3) personal injury actions; (4) wrongful death actions; (5) malpractice claims; (6)
defamation claims; (7) mortgage foreclosure actions; (8) a private adjudication of water
rights; (9) trespass and easement claims; and (10) those matters addressed by the Uniform
Probate Code (Title 15), which do not involve either the probate of a will or the
administration of the estates of decedents, minors & incompetents, examples including
disputes arising out of charitable and spendthrift trusts, or matters concerning the exercise of
durable powers of attorney.
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The true "subject matter" that is being alleged by Plaintiff in the Verified Complaint
is the issue of Defendant's "possession", yet attempting to make false claims over title
ownership, and allegations of unlawful trespass, which the PR knows is a total falsehood, as
the PR seeks to eject Defendant from his continued possession of the real property and
premises, knowing Defendant's presence does not impact the true ownership interests of the
decedent' s heirs; that Defendant has never claimed an ownership interest, as that belongs to
the heirs; this is not a dispute over any amount owed to Plaintiff under any agreement or
contract with the PR, a claim alleged to be in excess of $10,000.00; that Defendant has no
agreement or obligation to the Plaintiff; rather this controversy is a dispute over Defendant's
right to the continued possession of the real property and premises, which came into being
and has been a continuing arrangement pursuant to the express wishes and objectives of the
former owner, and continuing with the consent and approval of the vested owner that holds
the 2/3rds ownership interest therein, namely Vernon K. Smith Jr., being an heir of the
assets of Victoria H. Smith, deceased .
•

'

Defendant would state, upon the advice of his counsel, this District Court may
elect not to assume jurisdiction, or to hear this controversy, and may conclude, upon the
allegations, true nature of the anticipated evidence and applicable law, that the magistrate
court has the jurisdiction to address this matter, and upon such a determination, this action
may be remanded to the magistrate court, where this controversy may be addressed over
the issue of possession.
6. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 6 thereof, Defendant
would re-allege the response as set forth to the allegations contained in Paragraph 5
above; that the issue of jurisdiction and statutory authority is to be determined by the
court.
7. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 7 thereof, Defendant
would deny "the damages and/or property claimed herein and/or at issue here exceed the
minimum jurisdictional requirements of this court"; that Defendant disputes that Plaintiff
has any damage claim whatsoever; that Plaintiff seeks to invoke the jurisdiction of the
district court, without any factual or legal basis to establish the fundamental requirement
of standing to assert such claims, as Plaintiff lacks the statutory ownership of the real
property and premises; that Defendant would re-allege the responses as set forth to the
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allegations contained in Paragraph 5 and 6 above; that Defendant denies Plaintiff has any
ownership standing to invoke jurisdiction of either the district court or the magistrate
court, as Plaintiff has no factual or legal basis to claim any ownership interest to assert
any damages stemming from "ownership" within any causes of actions, as alleged in the
Verified Complaint for Ejectment and Other Relief.
8. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 8 thereof, Defendant does
understand assertions made regarding contents of any statutory enactments also raise
questions of law, not allegations of fact; that Defendant does understand that the issue of
venue is a question oflaw, the determination of which is based upon a disposition of fact;
that unless the assertion of venue is denied, and made the subject of a motion for proper
venue pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3), Rule 12(h)(4), and Rule 40. l(a) & (b), I.R.C.P., and I.C.
§5-404, the objection as to proper venue is waived; that Defendant does admit the
property sought to be described in the Verified Complaint is located in Ada County,
Idaho, and upon that factual determination, and upon the advice of counsel, Defendant
would agree Ada County may be the proper venue to address this controversy.
SEVENTH DEFENSE
As and for an answer to those allegations set forth in Category ill, entitled
"GENERAL ALLEGATIONS", Defendant does respond to those allegations as follows :
9. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 9 thereof, Defendant
denies any allegation asserted by Plaintiff that said PR is the owner of the real property
and premises in question; that ownership is statutorily vested in the heirs of the Estate of
Victoria H. Smith, of which Vernon K. Smith Jr. is an heir and holds a vested 2/3rds
ownership interest in the real property and premises referred to in the Verified
Complaint; that said Vernon K. Smith Jr. has the right associated with any determination
as to the possession of his vested interest in said real property; that this Defendant has
been in the continuous possession of the real property since August, 2004, under the
arrangements as hereinabove and hereinafter described; that the real property and
premises is a large acreage within the rural desert front area, consisting of 520 acres,
which has been significantly protected by Defendant, with large quantities of compost
and humus being developed, produced and has been stored upon a portion of the
premises, intended for future improvement of the soil conditions, with the continuous
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efforts exhausted by this Defendant and Vernon K. Smith Jr. , commencing in August,
2004, and Defendant is entitled to have and maintain the continued possession thereof
under those arrangements established with Victoria H. and Vernon K. Smith Jr ..
10. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 10 thereof, Defendant
does acknowledge the value of the real property and premises does exceed $10,000.00;
however this controversy does not concern the value of the real property, but the right of
Defendant to the continued possession thereto by the consent and approval of the 2/3rds
vested owner, Vernon K. Smith Jr.,, as has been consented to by him to direct Defendant
to maintain his occupancy and possession of the real property and premises for the
protection and preservation of the premises, as a caretaker, and with the development and
protection of the compost and humus stored upon the premises.
11. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 11 thereof, Defendant
would admit he does have and maintain the possession of the premises, continuously
since August, 2004, with the consent and approval of Victoria H. Smith, now deceased,
and with the continuing consent and approval of her one heir, Vernon K. Smith Jr., who
does have and holds a 2/3rds vested interest in said real property and premises.
12. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 12 thereof, Defendant
denies he has caused any damage to the premises by either his past operations or his
present operations, as he is lawfully operating an agricultural composting facility under
the current Order of the court. DEQ had filed a lawsuit over the issue of the presence of
compost at the site, and that litigation has been on-going in the district court, and now on
appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, upon the misplaced and flawed belief asserted by
DEQ that Defendant needed to file a "Site Plan" with DEQ to continue the processing of
such quantities of compost and humus, as DEQ was of the opinion that "compost and
humus" were a "solid waste". A "Site Plan" is a simple form, which DEQ wants on
record to identify the operation, and would be immediately issued to Defendant upon
filing the Plan. However, Defendant, relying upon I. C. §39-7404, and the Federal
enactment, known as the Resource Conservation and recovery Act (RCRA) , as
determined by 40 CFR§26 l .2(e), these organic recyclable substances , as being used in
any of three certain categories, are excluded from the definition of "solid waste", and
there is no basis to file any "Site Plan", as this operation has been an agricultural
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composting operation and facility that meets all three of the categories. That DEQ sought
to litigate the issue, and to avoid such litigation, DEQ wanted to force Defendant to file a
"Site Plan", the effect of which would authorize the continuing operation without
interruption, as a Category "Tier II" processing facility, but Defendant properly disputed
any lawful basis to require him to file a "Site Plan" with DEQ; they have been aware of
this operation since August, 2004, and have never made such an accusation during any of
the preceding ten years of operation, during which the IDAP A Rules had been adopted
and in place; that Defendant has relied upon state and Federal law for his position, as this
was an excluded operation, being an agricultural composting operation, conducted under
state statute (I. C. §39-7404) Federal pre-emptive provisions, and certain IDAP A
exclusions referring to crop (plant) residue and agricultural wastes. Rather than filing the
simple "Site Plan", Defendant wanted to secure a judicial ruling, rather than succumb to
the arbitrary and capricious mandates ofDEQ in order to secure the continued operation;
that the district court agreed with Defendant that "compost and humus" are not a "solid
waste", and cannot be regulated by DEQ. However, the court further found that the
"presence" of "grass clippings and leaves", in that specific form, because they are a
substance that arguably has been "discarded" at the facility, that specific substance
appears to fit the definition of a "solid waste", that the district court therefore held within
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that 1) "compost and humus" are not a
"solid waste", and that DEQ' s attempt to call such substances a "solid waste" is not
supported by the law, and 2) because the ingredients, "grass clippings and leaves" may be
seen to have been discarded, these ingredients "grass clippings and leaves" shall be
deemed to constitute a "solid waste", if found to be present in that specific form, and such
substance presence, should the operator choose to decline to file a "Site Plan", the
operation must then reduce the physical presence and amount (no more than 300 cu.
Yards) received at any one time, (as defined within a "Tier I" Category of a processing
facility) . The Court's Order prohibited the continuation of the operation under a "Tier II"
category, in the absence of a "site Plan"; however, Defendant remains authorized and
within the IDAPA Rules and DEQ' s regulatory authority to operate under a "Tier I" or
Below Regulatory Concern (BRC) Category, the difference meaning (under "Tier I") that
up to 300 cu. Yards of the "physical presence" of the ingredients, grass clippings and
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leaves, may be discovered in that specific form at any one time, yet in all reality, once it
enters the criteria of compost or humus, it is no longer a " solid waste", and that happens
immediately. Under a "Tier II" Category, there can be the presence of a " solid waste", at
any one time, up to 600 cu. Yards. The only difference is found in the "physical
presence" of the claimed "solid waste" ,

and from a Category "Tier II" to a "Tier I" is

merely the reduction in the amount of the "physical presence" of the ingredients that is
physically present and observable at any one time. Because these ingredients, grass
clippings and leaves, have always been received in that lesser quantity at any one time,
and are daily mixed into the compost, humus, soil and dirt substances that are located at
this agricultural composting facility, the daily ingredients are immediately converted into
the criteria of a compost product, should the delivered ingredient not already have entered
into the compost criteria upon delivery and deposit. This operation has been historically
such that there has never been a time that Defendant's operation has been known to
receive, at any one time, any amount of an "ingredient" that ever reached the Category
"Tier II" criteria, as the quantity of ingredients received at this facility has been within
either Category "Tier I" or the BRC Category at all times.
That said, because an organic recycling agricultural operation, producing compost
and humus from organic ingredients, are expressly exempted from any definition of
" solid waste" by the pre-emptive effects and controlling application of the Resource

Conservation and recovery Act (RCRA), as determined by 40 CFR§261.2(e); that
Defendant has chosen to secure a final ruling from the Idaho Supreme Court, to confirm
that "grass clippings and leaves" are not a solid waste at any time, in any form, as they
are organic recyclable ingredients that are excluded from the definition of a " solid waste"
by the Code of Federal Regulations, mandated upon the definition of "solid waste" to be
used in Idaho by the effects of I. C. §39-7404, as they are used to produce a product to
substitute commercial products.
Defendant has been placed in possession of the premises since August, 2004, for
the purposes described above, for the benefit of the former owner, which has continued
during her life for a period of 9 years before her demise, at all times with the assistance of
and for the benefit of Vernon K. Smith Jr. , who holds his vested interest to 2/3rds of the
ownership of the real property and premises, which the PR has failed to appreciate the
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owners' concerns for the protection and preservation of the property and maintaining the
tax status and exemption, all of which will continue to be accomplished through the
continued possession of the Defendant, as these proceedings and actions significantly
affect the vested interests of Vernon K. Smith Jr., and his concerns to protect and
maintain this property asset, which has been and will continue to be protected with the
continued possession by the Defendant; that the Estate does not own the asset, despite the
inferior "Order", and has had no involvement with the asset since the appointment of this
PR, commencing with his appointment as Special Administrator in 2016. That to allow

the PR of the Estate to cause removal of Defendant serves only to exposes this and other
properties to uncertain damage and losses, and compromises the interests held by the true
ownership interests.
13 . For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 13 thereof, Defendant
would state that a Notice was sent to Defendant by the PR, originally on December 21 ,
2018 (though erroneously dated December 21 , 2019); that no action was thereafter taken,
for which Defendant concluded the PR was aware Defendant was in possession of the
property with the consent and approval of the vested owner holding 2/3rds of the
ownership interest, and if the real property were not sold, then it was all the more
important to maintain the protection of the property, and preserve the tax status with the
agricultural exemption, being maintained for the protection and preservation of the
premises by Defendant; that Defendant's continued possession has never been terminated
or discontinued by the 2/3rds vested owner, but rather confirmed to remain and maintain
and preserve the premises for the benefit of the heirs.
14. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 14 thereof, Defendant
does acknowledge he has neither vacated nor surrendered possession of the premises,
having full consent and approval from the 2/3rds vested owner to remain there and
protect the premises; that as stated above, Defendant's continuing right to retain
possession of the premises serves the best interests of the 2/3rds vested owner, until sold
or other arrangements are made with respect thereto, which will be consistent with
Defendant' s prior arrangements and agreement with both Victoria H. and Vernon K.
Smith Jr., as Defendant agreed to protect the property from accumulation of garbage and
debris, and to actively develop, produce and store huge quantities of compost and humus

ANSWER TO VERIFIED COMPLAINT

P. 13

000040

on the property for future improvement of the acreage, and continue with intended
agricultural development that Vernon K. Smith Jr. began and has maintained, seeking to
economically develop the premises, restore the well, restore the water rights, and install
circular irrigation systems for future irrigation.
That Vernon K. Smith Jr. has invested substantial efforts and time in protecting
the legal right to engage the compost production operation on this agricultural property,
committing years in litigation to the process of the right to engage compost production,
defending false claims by Ada County regarding County Ordinances and the pre-emptive
effects of the State statutory authority regarding permitted usage of agricultural
operations and composting facilities, along with the pending controversies with the
Department of Environmental Quality concerning the dispute as to the application of a
"Tier II" processing facility and the definition of " solid waste", which the lower court has
ruled that compost and humus are not a "solid waste", requiring the matter to be
addressed by the Idaho Supreme Court, where the matter is currently pending; that
Defendant shall continue to protect and preserve the agricultural operation without
interruption, serving the benefits to be generated to the property value as an agricultural
facility, and prevent the dumping consequences that take place in his absence.
The agreement with Victoria H. and Vernon K. Smith Jr. was for the parties'
mutual benefit, as Defendant's contribution was coming through product development,
maintenance, protection, and preservation of the premises, to further the agricultural
development, and that arrangement has continued for 15 years, and shall not be
terminated.
15 . For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 15 thereof, Defendant
denies same, as Defendant has the consent and approval of the 2/3rds vested owner.
16. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 16 thereof, Defendant
denies same, as Plaintiff is not a vested owner of the real property and premises, and
Defendant has never had any contract or agreement with Plaintiff.
EIGHTH DEFENSE
As and for an answer to those allegations set forth in in CLAIMS FOR RELIEF,
entitled "COUNT ONE: EJECTMENT", Defendant does respond to those allegations as
follows :
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17. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 17 thereof, Defendant
does re-allege his responses contained herein to the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1
through 16 of Plaintiff's Verified Complaint, as though said responses are set forth and
re-alleged in full herein.
18. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 18 thereof, Defendant
denies the same, for the reason stated previously hereinabove in this responsive pleading.
19. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 19 thereof, Defendant
admits the same, for the reason stated previously hereinabove in this responsive pleading.
20. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 20 thereof, Defendant
admits he has declined to surrender possession of the premises, for the reasons stated
previously hereinabove in this responsive pleading.
21. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 21 thereof, Defendant
denies same, for the reasons stated previously hereinabove in this responsive pleading.
NINTH DEFENSE
As and for an answer to those allegations set forth in CLAIMS FOR RELJEF,
entitled "COUNT TWO: DECLARATORY JUDGMENT/QUIET TITLE", Defendant
does respond to those allegations as follows :
22. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 22 thereof, Defendant
does re-allege his responses contained herein to the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1
through 21 of Plaintiff's Verified Complaint, as though said responses are set forth and
re-alleged in full herein.
23 . For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 23 thereof, it remains
Defendant's belief any assertions made as to the contents of any statutory enactments
raise questions of law, as opposed to allegations of fact; that Defendant will not engage in
the interpretation of this alleged statutory compilation enacted by the Idaho legislature, or
conclude in what manner a plaintiff may bring an action before the court, as in this case
by a PR, who is seeking to exercise the same right as that of a decedent prior to death,
when vesture of decedent' s property interests immediately vest in the heirs upon death,
not into any "estate", or PR of any estate; that the court will determine what authority is
derived from the alleged statute, I. C. §6-401 ; that Defendant does rely upon I. C. §15-3101 , and the case authority addressing that statute, which statute and case law confirms
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Plaintiff does not possess the lawful ownership interest in the real property and premises,
as a matter of law, and that Plaintiff lacks the legal standing upon which to assert any
"adverse claim" against this Defendant, when the PR has no ownership interest to the title
of the real property and premises, notwithstanding said "Order"; that the PR is bound by
his fiduciary duty to embrace and protect the interests of the heirs; and must respect the
interests and objectives of the 2/3rds vested ownership in the premises, and a PR' s
"administration" cannot conflict with or impair the vested interests of the vested owner(s)
of the premises.
24. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 24 thereof, it remains
Defendant's belief any assertions made as to the contents of any statutory enactments
raise questions of law, not allegations of fact; that Defendant will not engage in the
interpretation of this alleged statutory compilation enacted by the Idaho legislature
regarding questions of construction or validity arising under any "instrument, statute,
ordinance, contract or franchise", or to obtain any declaration of "rights, status, or other
legal relations", or to conclude in what manner a plaintiff may bring an action, as in this
case by a PR, who is seeking to exercise the same right as that of a decedent prior to
death, when the vesting of the decedent's property interests immediately vest in the heirs
upon death, not in any "estate" or any PR of any estate; that the court will determine what
authority is to be derived from said statute, I. C. § 10-1202, relative to the facts of this
controversy; that Defendant relies upon I. C. §15-3-101 , and the case authority
addressing that statute, confirming Plaintiff has no ownership interest in the real property
and premises, as a matter of law, and that Plaintiff has no legal standing upon which to
assert any "adverse claim" against this Defendant, when the PR has no ownership interest
to the title of the real property and premises, notwithstanding said "Order"; that the PR is
bound by his fiduciary duty to embrace and protect the interests of the heirs; to respect
the interests and objectives of the 2/3rds vested ownership in the premises, and a PR's
"administration" cannot conflict with or impair the vested interests of the vested owner(s)
of the premises.
25 . For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 25 thereof, Defendant
does reiterate his belief that assertions made as to the contents of any statutory
enactments raise questions of law, not allegations of fact; that Defendant will not engage
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m the interpretation of these alleged statutory compilations enacted by the Idaho
legislature relating to the determination or declaration of rights, status, and other legal
relations", or to conclude in what manner any statute may vest authority within a plaintiff
to bring an action on behalf of an estate, seeking to exercise the same right as that of a
decedent prior to death, when the vesting of the decedent's property ownership interests
immediately vests in the heirs upon death, not into any "estate" or the PR of any estate;
that Defendant would rely upon the court to determine what authority is to be derived
from these statutes, I. C. §§10-1201 , 10-1202, 10-1203, 10-1204, and 10-1205, relative to
the facts of this controversy; that Plaintiff does not have any standing to claim the right to
control property possession in the absence of an ownership interest in the premises, as a
matter of law, as relied upon by Defendant pursuant to I. C. §15-3-101 ; that there exists
no standing in this Plaintiff to give rise to assert an "adverse claim" against this
Defendant, as Plaintiff has no ownership interest in the title of this real property and
premises, as addressed in the Uniform Probate Code, and Plaintiff, as the PR, is bound by
his fiduciary duty to the heirs, and is to respect the interests and objectives of the vested
owners of the premises, and his "administration" cannot conflict with or impair the vested
interests of the vested owner(s) of the premises.
26. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 26 thereof, Defendant
does again reiterate his belief any assertions made as to the contents of any statutory
enactments raise questions of law, not allegations of fact; that Defendant will not engage
in the interpretation of this alleged statutory compilation enacted by the Idaho legislature
regarding any relief, as addressed in I. C. §10-1208, or to otherwise conclude in what
manner any statute may vest authority within a plaintiff to bring an action on behalf of an
estate, seeking to exercise the same right of a decedent prior to death, when the vesting of
the decedent's property ownership interests has immediately vested in the heirs upon
death, not into any "estate" or the PR of any estate; that Defendant would rely upon the
court to determine what relief is to be derived from said statute, I. C. § 10-1208, relative
to the facts of this controversy; that Plaintiff does not have any standing to claim the right
to control property possession in the absence of an ownership interest in the premises, as
a matter oflaw, as relied upon by Defendant pursuant to I. C. §15-3-101 ; that there exists
no standing in this Plaintiff to give rise to assert an "adverse claim" against this
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Defendant, as Plaintiff has no ownership interest in the title of this real property and
premises, as addressed in the Uniform Probate Code, and Plaintiff, as the PR, is bound by
his fiduciary duty to the heirs, and is to respect the interests and objectives of the vested
owners of the premises, and his "administration" cannot conflict with or impair the vested
interests of the vested owner(s) of the premises.
27. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 27 thereof, Defendant
would state that Defendant did, and still does, possess the real property and premises in
question, with the permission, consent and approval of the heir holding 2/3rds vested
ownership interest in the premises, for the reasons stated above; that Plaintiff seeks to act
contrary to the statutory authority regarding such ownership rights; that Plaintiff's actions
are inconsistent with and are contrary to his fiduciary duty owed to that heir, and to any
extent Plaintiff is asserting that Defendant is claiming an ownership interest in real
property, that is false and erroneous, as Defendant is not claiming any ownership interest
in the premises, but rather exercising the right to possession as extended to him by the
2/3rds premises owner, to protect and preserve the property throughout this on-going and
contentious administration of the estate, froth with a series of what has been the PR' s
misrepresentations, malicious falsehoods, malicious accusations, bogus and baseless
claims, and violations of the fiduciary duty owed to an heir.
28. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 28 thereof, Defendant
would state Plaintiff has no standing to seek any declaration that Defendant has no right
to occupy or possess the premises, which claim, had it even existed, would be the subject
of an unlawful possession/detainer action under I. C. §6-303, not a quiet title action or
trespass, as is being alleged in the Verified Complaint.
TENTH DEFENSE
As and for an answer to those allegations set forth in CLAIMS FOR RELIEF,
entitled "COUNT THREE: TRESPASS", Defendant does respond to those allegations as
follows:
29. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 29 thereof, Defendant
does re-allege his responses contained herein to the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1
through 28 of Plaintiff's Verified Complaint, as though said responses are set forth and
re-alleged in full herein.
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30. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 30 thereof, Defendant
denies same, for the reasons set forth above in Defendant's responses.
31 . For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 31 thereof, Defendant
would state that a Notice was sent to Defendant by the PR, dated December 21 , 2018 (the
letter was erroneously dated December 21 , 2019), from which no action was taken; that
Defendant concluded the PR' s non-action was due to their awareness of the ownership
issue, and that Defendant was in possession of the property with the consent and approval
of the vested owner holding 2/3rds of the ownership interest, all of which remained to be
the reasons concerning the continued protection and preservation of the premises by
Defendant; that Defendant is not and has never been a trespasser on the premises, and has
not, nor does he presently "unlawfully" occupy the premises; that any allegation
inconsistent with Defendant's response herein is herewith denied.
32. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 32 thereof, Defendant
would state he has continued to preserve and protect the premises as requested by the
2/3rds vested owner of the premises; that Defendant has remained in possession for the
benefit of the 2/3rds owner, with the consent and approval of the vested owner holding
2/3rds of the ownership interest, as there is the continuous concern for the need to
maintain, protect, preserve, and improve the premises; that Defendant has never been a
trespasser on the premises, and has never unlawfully occupied the premises; that any
allegation inconsistent with Defendant's response herein is herewith denied.
33 . For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 33 thereof, Defendant
denies same; that to the contrary, past actions of the PR have been seen to be detrimental
to the property interests of the 2/3rds vested owner of these assets.
34. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 34 thereof, Defendant
would state the continued presence and possession by Defendant will enhance the
preservation and maintenance of the premises, and better serves the ownership interests,
and perpetuate the tax exemption and tax treatment with respect to the assessment to be
levied against the real property, as best determined by the 2/3rds vested owner thereof;
that it has been a discovered fact that the PR has been utilizing various rents and lease
payments from other property interests for financing unnecessary, improper, baseless,
and wasteful administrative activities, wasting the estate cash reserves on needless
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administration expenses, legal fees, baseless civil actions and malicious accusations
against Vernon K. Smith Jr. , the heir whose actions and investments has made these
assets even available for any inheritance by any heirs, and this PR has been undermining
the vested interests of the 2/3rds owner' s best interests, that such wasteful actions has not
served the interests of either heir, and there will be no benefit or protection to the assets
should Defendant be removed from the possession placed with him, but rather a
developing concern there may be the wasteful consumption and destruction of the assets
by the PR, and Plaintiff has not endeavored to serve the best interests of the 2/3rds vested
owner of these assets, and in this particular property asset, would defeat the efforts that
has been expended in the preservation of the tax structure, production of compost and
humus substances, and would encourage and allow further dumping and accumulation of
debris, along with interfering with the elimination of debris that before had been placed
on the property; that Defendant would deny any damages exist from Defendant's
continuous occupancy under his agreement with the 2/3rds owner of the premises, and
Defendant's 15 years of soil improvement production, through the stored hundreds of
thousands of yards of compost, developed pursuant to his agreement with Victoria H. and
Vernon K. Smith Jr, the former titled owner and 2/3rds titled owner, respectively, has
been the continuing consideration for his possession and occupancy of the premises; that
Defendant has no obligation to Plaintiff, and no obligation to pay Plaintiff any rent under
the agreement he has, and to claim trespass and to seek to evict Defendant would
constitute a breach of the agreement upon which Defendant expended substantial
finances and efforts, which agreement he did reasonably and in good faith rely upon over
the years of his arrangement with Victoria H. Smith and Vernon K. , Smith Jr. .
35. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 35 thereof, Defendant
denies same; see Defendant's response to Paragraph 12 above, as there has never been
any improper use of the premises for "solid waste" processing, as it has at all times been
an agricultural composting facility.
36. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 36 thereof, Defendant
denies same; see Defendant's response to Paragraph 12 above, as there has never been
any improper use of the premises for "solid waste" processing, as it has at all times been
an agricultural composting facility.
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ELEVENTH DEFENSE
As and for an answer to those allegations set forth in CLAIMS FOR RELIEF,
entitled "COUNT FOUR: UNJUST ENRICHMENT", Defendant does respond to those
allegations as follows :
37. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 37 thereof, Defendant
does re-allege his responses contained herein to the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1
through 36 of Plaintiffs Verified Complaint, as though said responses are set forth and
re-alleged in full herein.
38. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 38 thereof, Defendant
denies that he receive any exclusive benefit, as the arrangement has been a "mutual"
benefit derived from his continuing possession; that Defendant's possession has served to
benefit the vested owners of the premises, protecting and preserving the premises, in
accordance with the continuation of the longstanding agreement and relationship with
Victoria H. Smith, now deceased as of September 11 , 2013, and with Vernon K. Smith
Jr., who is the 2/3rds titled and vested owner of the premises, as statutorily declared, and
serving the best interests of the property preservation and development; that Defendant
has engaged in a lawful right to the possession, and there has been, and will continue to
be, a tremendous benefit to the real property and premises.
39. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 39 thereof, Defendant
denies same, for the reasons as set forth above, also constituting Defendant's affirmative
defense set forth below.
40. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 40 thereof, Defendant
denies same, for the reasons as set forth above and identified in the affirmative defense
set forth below.
41 . For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 41 thereof, Defendant
denies same, as he has not been unjustly enriched.
TWELFTH DEFENSE
As and for an answer to those allegations set forth in the Category entitled
"ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS", Defendant does respond to those allegations as
follows :
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42. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 42 thereof, Defendant
denies same; that Plaintiffs Complaint is both unnecessary and wasteful, seeking to defeat
the best interests that serve to protect and preserve the premises, which efforts serve to
maintain and preserve the value of the premises, eliminating improper taxation, avoiding
the potential accumulation of more garbage, trash, and construction debris delivered to
the premises, and what will become significant expense to remove the quantities of
composted organic substances that were intended to enhance the humus content, nutrient
enrichment and fertility of the agricultural premises; that Defendant is entitled to recover
all costs, expenses, losses and damages against the Plaintiff, Noah G. Hillen personally,
as his misfeasance and malfeasance has required Defendant to incur these expenses in
defending this frivolous action, which action is being pursued maliciously and
vindictively against both Defendant and Vernon K. Smith Jr. , in contradiction of the
wishes and desires of the 2/3rds vested owner thereof, whose sole objective has been to
keep and maintain the improvements in the manner and fashion that has been undertaken
for what has been maintained for the previous and continuous 15 year period.
43 . For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 43 thereof, Defendant
denies same.
THIRTEENTH DEFENSE
As a further defense, herein asserted as an Affirmative Defense, this Defendant
does allege and state as follows :
That Plaintiff has filed and served this Verified Complaint, setting forth four
malicious causes of action, upon Defendant, requiring Defendant to secure the legal
services of Vernon K. Smith Jr. to protect and preserve his property interests; that
Plaintiff has well known Defendant has been in possession of the property continuously
for what will soon be 15 years; that Plaintiff previously served the "notice of termination"
upon Defendant on December 21 , 2018 (erroneously dated December 21 , 2019), seeking
to maliciously evict Defendant from the property upon the false pretense and erroneous
assertion that Defendant was in violation of a court order regarding the continued
production of compost; that Defendant may continue his operations under a "Tier I"
category, limiting the amount of grass clippings and leaves that can be processed in one
day, and no unlawful activity is being conducted, once again, another false and malicious
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statement by this Plaintiff; that Plaintiff has no ownership interest, as a matter of law,
though falsely being stated in his letter, as by statute, title passed to and was vested in the
heirs, as proclaimed within the Uniform Probate Code; that no further action was taken
by Plaintiff, and Defendant remained in possession as previously and continuously
authorized by the 2/3rds vested owner, Vernon K. Smith Jr. ; that this action filed by
Plaintiff is baseless, as Defendant is in possession with the consent and approval of the
2/3rds vested owner, having no agreement to pay "rent" to this Plaintiff, as Defendant's
arrangements has always been with Victoria H. and Vernon K. Smith Jr., to conduct the
preservation, generate the compost product, make the improvements and needed
installations to secure the development of an agricultural operation to preserve the tax
exemption, and eliminate any trash and debris accumulation; that Defendant has
faithfully performed in accordance with his agreement with them.
That Defendant has been in continuous possession of this property since August,
2004, which began under the agreement with Victoria H, Smith and Vernon K. Smith Jr.;
that Defendant is entitled to the continued occupancy because of his prior arrangements
and agreements, and good faith reliance upon his continuing performance as stated above,
which has required many thousands of dollars of Defendant's funds to conduct the
operations and production to this point of development, all of which

W<;tS

undertaken in

accordance with Defendant's agreement with Victoria H. and Vernon K. Smith Jr. .
That the agreement has always permitted Defendant to engage these operations
with no "rent" payment, as it was designed to be a mutual benefit, and business
engagement; that Plaintiff has purported to come into title to this premises under the
"Order" referenced to and attached as an Exhibit to their Verified Complaint, which
Order is not consistent with the statute or the case law, and this Defendant, and the heir of
said assets, does challenge the enforcement of that Order, as it remains to be in violation
of the statutory and case law, as heirs are vested owners, not this Plaintiff, acting as an
appointed PR; that Plaintiff does not have the legal standing to engage any dispute over
the occupancy and possession of this real property and premises, where the ownership of
the property has been established by settled law.
That should Plaintiff undertake to remove Defendant from the continued
occupancy and possession of the premises, this Defendant will be severally damaged, and
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Plaintiff will personally be subject to a resulting and significant claim for any such
damages, requiring Defendant to remove hundreds of thousands of cubic yards of
compost and humus from the premises, defeating the intent to improve the entire 520
acres, and Defendant will then be required to seek recovery for his resulting damages
stemming from this willful breach of this continuing arrangement that was reached and
relied upon by this Defendant, with Victoria H. Smith and Vernon K. Smith Jr., who now
is a 2/3rds vested owner of the premises.
Wherefore, Defendant, having answered Plaintiffs Verified Complaint, hereby
prays for entry of judgment as follows :
1. That Plaintiffs causes of actions be dismissed with prejudice, and Defendant
recover his costs and attorney fees against this Plaintiff, personally, and should Defendant
incur any further losses and damages, Defendant does preserve his claims for any future
damages and losses that may be incurred and come to accrue from these baseless actions;
2. That Defendant shall be allowed to continue his occupancy and possession of
the premises, as consented to, approved and requested by the 2/3rds vested owner, for
which Defendant has continuously performed his agreement;
3. That should this matter proceed to trial, a ju
to address any factual disputes.
4. For such other and further relief as this
prenuses.
Dated this 5th day of July, 2~19.
ernon K. Smith Jr.
Attorney for Defi
David R. Gibson
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the 5th day of July, 2019, I caused a true and correct
copy of the above and foregoing to be delivered to the followjng persons at the following
addresses:
Randall A Peterman
(
)
U.S. Mail
Alexander P. McLaughlin
(
)
Fax 208-388-1200
Givens Pursley, LLP
(
)
Hand Delivered
601 West Bannock Street
( x )
!court
P .O. Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701
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rap@givenspursley.com
apm@givenspursley.com

ls/Vernon K. Smithls/- - - Vernon K. Smith
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Electronically Filed
8/5/2019 11 :30 AM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Phil McGrane, Clerk of the Court
By: Laurie Johnson, Deputy Clerk

Randall A. Peterman, ISB No. 1944
Alexander P. McLaughlin, ISB No. 7977
Jack W. Relf, ISB No. 9762
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP
601 West Bannock Street
Post Office Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720
Telephone (208) 388-1200
Facsimile (208) 388-1300
rap@givenspursley.com
apm@givenspursley.com
jackrelf@givenspursley.com
013683-0002
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
NOAH G. HILLEN, in his capacity as
Personal Representative of the Estate of
Victoria H. Smith,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. CV0I-19-10368
MOTION FOR PARTIAL JUDGMENT
ON THE PLEADINGS AND MOTION
TO CERTIFY JUDGMENT UNDER
I.R.C.P. 54(B)

DAVID R. GIBSON, an individual d/b/a
BLACK DIAMOND COMPOST
PRODUCTS,
Defendant.

COMES NOW the above-named plaintiff, Noah G. Hillen, the duly appointed
Personal Representative of the Estate of Victoria H. Smith, by and through his undersigned
counsel, and hereby moves this Court for partial judgment on the pleadings and a Rule 54(b)
certificate on the judgment. This motion is made pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(c) and I.R.C.P. 54(b).
This motion is made on the grounds and reasons set forth in Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support

MOTION FOR PARTIAL JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AND MOTION TO
CERTIFY JUDGMENT UNDER I.R.C.P. 54(B) - 1
14736069.3
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of Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and Motion to Certify Judgment Under I.R.C.P. 54(b ),
which is incorporated herein as though restated in full. This motion is based on the records and
files herein. Oral argument is requested.
DATED this 5th day of August, 2019.
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP

By Isl Randall A. Peterman
Randall A. Peterman - Of the Firm
Alexander P. McLaughlin - Of the Firm
Jack W. Relf- Of the Firm
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 5th day of August, 2019, I caused a true and
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COMES NOW the above-named plaintiff, Noah G. Hillen, the duly appointed
Personal Representative of the Estate of Victoria H. Smith, by and through his undersigned
counsel, and hereby submits the following Memorandum in Support of his Motion for Partial
Judgment on the Pleadings and Motion to Certify Judgment under I.R.C.P. 54(b).

I.

INTRODUCTION

This is a relatively straightforward dispute that Defendant David Gibson
("Defendant" or "Gibson") and his counsel are doing everything they can to complicate. At its
core, this case boils down to a single issue: whether Plaintiff, Noah G. Hillen ("Hillen"), as
Personal Representative of the Estate of Victoria H. Smith (the "Estate"), owns the Estate property
Gibson currently possesses. Hillen does and such ownership is evidenced by the judgmentaffirmed by the Supreme Court-that the Honorable Cheri C. Copsey ("Probate Court") entered
in the probate of the late Victoria H. Smith's Estate ("Estate Case").
Defendant (but mostly his attorney Vernon K. Smith, Jr. ("Vernon"), who is a party
to the Estate Case and a 2/3's heir of the Estate) 1 attempt to collaterally attack the Probate Court's
judgment and findings that the duly appointed personal representative of the Estate does not have
a right to determine use of Estate property. Their assertions are legally unsound. Because Hillen is
the rightful owner of the property in question (the "Gowen Property"), and because Defendant
remains in possession of the Gowen Property, despite Hillen's demand that Defendant vacate,
Hillen is entitled to a judgment ejecting Defendant from the property. Hillen respectfully asks that
this Court grant Hillen's motion and enter a 54(b) certificate.

1

Which, based on counsel's arguments, appears to be fairly problematic as Vernon regular asserts in his
briefing defenses he personally has to this action-not defenses his client has.
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II.

BACKGROUND

Victoria H. Smith ("Victoria"), Vernon's mother, owned the Gowen Property prior
to her death in 2013. The parties agree on this point. Verified Complaint for Ejectment and Other
Relief (filed June 7, 2019) ("Complaint") at 3, ,r 9; Answer to Verified Complaint for Ejectment
and Other Relief (filed July 5, 2019) ("Answer") at 5, ,r 4 (acknowledging that the Gowen Property
was owned by Victoria prior to her death).
Victoria died on September 11, 2013. The procedural posture of her Estate is
complex and is itself the subject of extensive litigation. 2 One of the less complex matters in the
Estate Case, however, is that the Probate Court determined that Hillen, as the personal
representative, is vested with all right, title, and interest to all of Victoria's real and personal
property. That determination is memorialized in that certain Judgment on Motion Under
Rule 70(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Vesting All Real and Personal Property of the
Estate in the Personal Representative (the "Rule 70 Judgment"), entered in In re Estate of Victoria

H Smith, Case No. CV-IE-2014-15352, in the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the
state of Idaho, in and for the county of Ada (June 2, 2017). A true and correct copy of the Rule 70
Judgment is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 3
The Rule 70 Judgment states, in relevant part:
The Court does hereby vest in the Personal Representative as of May
5, 201 7, any and all real property of any kind or nature, including
but not limited to: any fixtures, appurtenances, additions, easements,
licenses, water rights, or similar rights of any kind or nature
appurtenant thereto; and any and all proceeds, product, offspring,
rents or profits of or from any real property (collectively 'Real
2

See e.g. In re Estate of Smith, 164 Idaho 457,432 P.3d 6, (2018).

3

Plaintiff asks this Court to take judicial notice of the Rule 70 Judgment, pursuant to I.RE. 201 (d). The
document is a public document on file in the Estate Case and recorded with the Ada County recorder's office.
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Property’), including but not limited to the [Gowen Property] . . .
Such vesting is free and clear of any lien, claim, or interest of
[Vernon].”
Rule 70 Judgment.
The pleadings establish that Defendant is in possession of a portion of the Gowen
Property, and has been since August of 2004. Complaint at 3, ¶ 11; Answer at 2. It is similarly
clear that Defendant intends to remain in possession of the Gowen Property. Complaint at 3, ¶ 13,
Ex. B; Answer at 13, ¶ 13 (“Defendant would state that a Notice [Exh. B to the Complaint] was
sent to Defendant by [Plaintiff]”) at 18, ¶ 27 (“Defendant is . . . exercising the right to possession
as extended to him by the 2/3rds premises owner[, Vernon] . . . .”).
Therefore, the sole disputed issue before the Court is the effect the Rule 70
Judgment has on the ownership of the Gowen Property. This is a purely legal question and the
answer is clear: Hillen is the sole lawful owner.
III.

LEGAL STANDARD

The Court considers whether a judgment on the pleadings is warranted under the
same standard as a ruling on summary judgment. State v. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471, 474, 163 P.3d
1183, 1186 (2007). When only matters within the pleadings themselves are presented, this Court
cannot look to matters outside the pleadings. Syringa Networks, LLC v. Idaho Dep't of Admin., 159
Idaho 813, 367 P.3d 208, 219 (2016) (expressing a “preference for interpreting the Idaho Rules of
Civil Procedure in conformance with the interpretation placed upon the same language in the
federal rules” and applying that preference to Rule 12(c)).
When there are “no disputed issues of material fact, only a question of law remains,
and [the] Court exercises free review.” Hoyle v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 137 Idaho 367, 371, 48 P.3d
1256, 1260 (2002). “A judgment on the pleadings is properly granted when, taking all the
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allegations in the pleadings as true, [a] party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Lyon v.
Chase Bank USA, N.A., 656 F.3d 877, 883 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Dunlap v. Credit Prot. Ass'n,
L.P., 419 F.3d 1011, 1012 n. 1 (9th Cir. 2005)).
IV.

ARGUMENT

This memorandum is divided into two sections. Section A discusses the substance
of Hillen’s ejectment claim, which is Count One of the Complaint. Section B addresses Hillen’s
request for a 54(b) certificate in the event the Court grant’s this motion and enters a partial
judgment in Hillen’s favor.
A.

Plaintiff is Entitled to a Judgment of Ejectment Removing Defendant from the
Gowen Property.
“An action for ejectment requires proof of (1) ownership, (2) possession by the

defendants, and (3) refusal of the defendants to surrender possession.” PHH Mortg. Servs. Corp.
v. Perreira, 146 Idaho 631, 637, 200 P.3d 1180, 1186 (2009) (internal quotations omitted). All
three elements are established by the pleadings.
1.

Hillen is the Sole Lawful Owner of the Gowen Property.

The Rule 70 Judgment is unambiguous. It vests all right, title, and interest in the
Gowen Property to Hillen. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the Rule 70 Judgment following
Vernon’s appeal. In re Estate of Smith, 164 Idaho at 482, 432 P.3d at 31. Vernon asserts that the
Rule 70 Judgment has no effect because it somehow conflicts with his “vested” ownership right in
the Gowen Property as a 2/3 heir of the Estate. Defendant (through Vernon) claims Vernon’s
partial interest in the Gowen Property became “vested” pursuant to Idaho Code Section 15-3-101
upon her death.
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This argument lacks merit. First, Section 15-3-101 does not mention permanently
vesting interests nor pre-emption of future orders or judgments. Second, the Rule 70 Judgment
expressly states that Hillen’s ownership of the Gowen Property “is free and clear of any lien, claim
or interest of the Claimants [which includes Vernon.]” The Rule 70 Judgment was, fittingly,
entered pursuant to Rule 70(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. That provision allows courts
to “enter a judgment divesting any party’s title and vesting it in others.” I.R.C.P. 70(b). Therefore,
any interest Vernon once had in the premises was divested by the Rule 70 Judgment and vested in
Hillen, the current sole owner.
2.

The Parties Agree that Defendant is in Possession of the Gowen
Property.

There is no dispute that this element is met. Hillen asserts—and Defendant
admits—that Defendant is in possession of the Gowen Property. Complaint at 3, ¶ 11; Answer at
2, “Third Defense.”
3.

The Parties Agree that Defendant Refuses to Surrender Possession of
the Gowen Property.

There is likewise no dispute that the third and final element of ejectment is met. It
is clear that Defendant intends to remain in possession of the Gowen Property despite demand to
vacate by Hillen. Complaint at 3, ¶ 13, Ex. B; Answer at 13, ¶ 13 (“Defendant would state that a
Notice [Exh. B to the Complaint] was sent to Defendant by [Plaintiff]”) at 18, ¶ 27 (“Defendant is
. . . exercising the right to possession as extended to him by the 2/3rds premises owner[, Vernon]”).
Accordingly, because all three elements of ejectment are met without any issue of fact, Hillen is
entitled to a judgment of ejectment removing Defendant from the premises.
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4.

Having Established Entitlement to Ejectment of Defendant, Hillen
Requests a Writ of Assistance.

A writ of assistance is the typical remedy in an ejectment action, and Hillen is
entitled to one here. “A writ of assistance is a form of process issued by a court of equity to transfer
the possession of property, and more specifically lands, the title or right to which it has previously
adjudicated. . . .” Eagle Rock Corp. v. Idamont Hotel Co., 60 Idaho 639, 95 P.2d 838, 841 (1939).
Therefore, in addition to a judgment ejecting Defendant from the Gowen Property, Hillen
respectfully requests a writ of assistance transferring possession of the Gowen Property from
Defendant to Hillen.
B.

Any Judgment on the Ejectment (Count One) Should be Certified as Final
Under Rule 54(b).
Rule 54(b) provides that a partial judgment may be certified as final when “an

action presents more than one claim for relief” and the court finds “there is no just reason for
delay.” Whether or not to certify a partial judgment as final is within the sound discretion of this
Court. PHH Mortg. Servs. Corp. v. Perreira, 146 Idaho 631, 636, 200 P.3d 1180, 1185 (2009). In
Perreira, the district court certified as final a partial judgment restoring possession of real property
to the plaintiff. Id. at 634, 200 P.3d at 1183. The Idaho Supreme Court upheld the district court’s
decision to certify as final a partial judgment granting the plaintiff possession of real property at
issue. Id., 146 Idaho at 636, 200 P.3d at 1185.
The same result is warranted here. The Gowen Property represents a large portion
of the Estate that Hillen is unable to sell or otherwise account for due to Defendant’s unlawful
possession. See Declaration of Noah G. Hillen in Support of Motion for Partial Judgment on the
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Pleadings and Motion to Certify Judgment Under I.R.C.P. 54(b) ("Hillen Declaration"). 4 In fact,
Hillen is currently attempting to sell the Gowen Property on behalf of the Estate, but cannot, as a
practical matter, move forward with any such sale while Defendant stays there. Hillen is charged
with expeditiously liquidating Estate property and distributing the proceeds to its heirs. As long as
Defendant is on the Gowen Property, Hillen cannot discharge his statutory duties as the personal
representative of the Estate. In light of these facts, there is no just reason to delay decision on
Defendant's ejectment. If anything, time is of the essence.
Plaintiff, therefore, requests that the Court here rule in favor of him on Count One,
certify the corresponding judgment as final under Rule 54(b ), and immediately issue a writ
restoring possession of the Gowen Property to its lawful owner, Hillen.

V.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests this Court grant his Motion
for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings.
DATED this 5th day of August, 2019.
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP

By Isl Randall A. Peterman
Randall A. Peterman - Of the Firm
Alexander P. McLaughlin - Of the Firm
Jack W. Relf- Of the Firm
Attorneys for Plaintiff

4
The Hillen Declaration is submitted solely in support of the portion of this motion addressing the propriety
of a 54(b) certificate and not the portion discussing the need for judgment on the pleadings. Accordingly, the presence
of the Hillen Declaration does not result in a denial of the 12(c) motion for going outside of the pleadings. Nor does
the Court have to consider converting the motion to one for summary judgment.
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[ ]
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Facsimile (208) 345-1129
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DECLARATION OF NOAH G. HILLEN
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
PARTIAL JUDGMENT ON THE
PLEADINGS AND MOTION TO
CERTIFY JUDGMENT UNDER I.R.C.P.
54(B)

Defendant.

NOAH G. HILLEN, under penalty of perjury, hereby declares and states as
follows:
1.

I am above the age of 18 and a resident of the state of Idaho. I am the

Personal Representative of the Estate of Victoria H. Smith ("Estate") in that certain probate matter
styled as In re Estate of Victoria H Smith, Case No. CV-IE-2014-15352, in the District Court of
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the Fourth Judicial District of the state of Idaho, in and for the county of Ada (“Probate Case”).
The Honorable Cheri C. Copsey (“Probate Court”) presides over the Probate Case.
2.

I have personal knowledge of the facts in this Declaration and make this

Declaration on the basis of such knowledge.
3.

The Estate’s res consists largely of three parcels of real property that the

parties have described in the Probate Case as follows: (a) the Hamer Property; (b) the Gowen
Property; and (c) the Chinden Property.
4.

As part of my duties as the Personal Representative of the Estate, I sold the

Hamer Property. The proceeds of that sale have been utilized to pay certain administrative
expenses of the Estate. The remaining proceeds will, hopefully, be utilized to pay Estate tax
liabilities, as well distributions to the Estate’s heirs, consisting of Joseph Smith (“Joseph”) and
opposing counsel in this case, Vernon K. Smith, Jr. (“Vernon”). Vernon holds a 2/3rds interest in
the Estate. Joseph holds an interest in the remaining 1/3rd.
5.

On or about April 24, 2019, the undersigned moved the Probate Court to

sell the Gowen Property, aka, the Pleasant Valley Road property. A true and correct copy of the
Personal Representative’s Motion to Sell 520 Acres in Ada County Known as the Pleasant Valley
Road Property is attached hereto as Exhibit A and incorporated herein by reference.
6.

The Probate Court granted the foregoing motion on or about May 16, 2019.

A true and correct copy of the Probate Court’s order is attached hereto as Exhibit B and
incorporated herein by reference.
7.

As a result of the motion and order, the undersigned, through Cushman and

Wakefield, has begun efforts to sell the Gowen Property. One of the issues, however, with those
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efforts is the fact that the Defendant David Gibson (“Defendant”) is in possession of a portion of
the Gowen Property.
8.

Defendant’s possession is unlawful as he does not have any sort of leasehold

interest to any portion of the Gowen Property. In any event, the undersigned sent a termination
notice to Defendant several months back terminating whatever tenancy Defendant may or may not
have had. This is to say nothing of the fact that Defendant is named in a lawsuit initiated by the
Idaho Department of Environmental Quality: DEQ v. Gibson, et. al., Case No. CV-OC-2015-3540,
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County, State of Idaho. The lawsuit alleges that Defendant, among
other things, engaged in illegal composting activities associated with the Premises. That suit is
currently on appeal.
9.

Defendant refuses to vacate the property. This creates a significant issue.

As the Personal Representative, I am charged with liquidating Estate property in an expeditious
manner and distributing the same to the Estate’s heirs. In light of the motion and order, the Probate
Court has signed off to that approach.
10.

However, Defendant’s possession of the Gowen Property effectively makes

it impossible to sell the Gowen Property at top dollar for obvious reasons. Prospective buyers
want to purchase 520 acres of property, not litigation.
11.

Accordingly, in the interest of selling the Gowen Property and obtaining the

highest return possible, it is necessary to have the Defendant removed from the property as quickly
as possible.
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12.

Any delay associated with his removal prevents me from discharging my

duties in a prompt fashion since, the longer the Defendant is on the property, the longer it will take
me to sell the property at a premium rate, pay IRS obligations, and make distributions to the heirs.
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the state of Idaho that the
foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief.
Dated this 5th day of August, 2019.

Isl Noah G. Hillen
Noah G. Hillen
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF
VICTORIA H. SMITH,

Case No. CV-IE-2014-15352
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE'S
MOTION TO SELL 520 ACRES IN ADA
COUNTY KNOWN AS THE
PLEASANT VALLEY ROAD
PROPERTY

Deceased.

COMES NOW Noah Hillen, as Personal Representative ("Hillen" or the "PR") of
the Estate (the "Estate") of Victoria H. Smith ("Victoria"), and hereby files this Motion to Sell
520 Acres in Ada County Known as the Pleasant Valley Road Property ("Motion"). This Motion
is based on the records and files herein and is made on the following grounds and reasons.
Oral argument is requested.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Pleasant Valley Road Property ("Property") consists of approximately 520
acres located in Ada County, Idaho, southwest of the Boise Airport.

A complete legal
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description for the Property is attached as Exhibit A to the Declaration of Randall A. Peterman
in Support of Personal Representative's Motion to Sell 520 Acres in Ada County Known as the
Pleasant Valley Road Property ("Peterman Dec."), filed in support of this Motion.
The sale of the Property is necessary to, among other things: (1) pay the taxes that
will be owing to the I.R.S. in the amount of approximately $9 million, 1 (2) pay ongoing Estate
expenses, and (3) generate monies to effectuate a distribution to the heirs. Accordingly, a sale of
the Property is not only in the best interests of the Estate, but is essential for Hillen to carry out
his duties as PR. Further, the beneficiaries have agreed-at least preliminarily-to the sale
forming the subject matter of this Motion. Hillen respectfully asks that this Court grant the same.
II.

A.

BACKGROUND

The Estate Property

As the Court is aware, the Estate consists primarily of three (3) large parcels of
land that the parties have referred to as: (1) the Hamer Property; (2) the Chinden Property (or
Home Place); and (3) the Pleasant Valley Road Property. The PR previously sold the Hamer
Property for $7.4 million, which netted roughly $6 million to the Estate. At one point, Hillen
believed that amount would be sufficient to cover the Estate's liability to the I.R. S. That is no
longer the case, given that the Renewed Motion to File Estate Tax Return demonstrates that the
Estate's bill to the I.R.S. will be approximately $9 million, although Vernon disagrees with that

Vernon K. Smith, Jr. ("Vernon") contests the amount of tax liability. But, he does not
contest that the Estate will have to pay a significant amount of taxes to the I.R.S. Even if the tax
liability is less than $9 million, there does not appear to be enough monies in the Estate to make
distributions to the heirs, pay administrative expenses, and pay the I.R.S., even if Vernon's
theory on Estate tax liability is proven correct.
1
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amount. See Declaration of Randall A. Peterman in Support of Renewed Motion to File Estate
Tax Return, Ex. A.
Moreover, as this Court is also aware, the Supreme Court affirmed this Court’s
decision associated with setting aside Victoria’s will. That means a portion of the Estate will be
distributed via intestate succession to Joseph. Between the liability to the I.R.S. and Hillen
having to pay Joseph his share of the Estate, it has become necessary to sell additional Estate
properties and the Pleasant Valley Road Property makes the most sense.
B.

Purchase Procedures.

Having determined that it is necessary to sell the Property, the next question is
how to do so to maximize the Estate’s return. Hillen proposes a purchase procedure (“Purchase
Procedure”) for the sale of the Property with the assistance of either Mark Bottles Real Estate
(“MBRE”) or Cushman & Wakefield (“CW”—the “Realtor”), which shall exercise the Purchase
Procedure substantially as follows:
1.

The Realtor shall publicize, promote, and implement a proposed sealed bid

sale for the purchase of the Property, with all written and dated and sealed bids (“Bids”) to be
received by a date certain (“Date Certain”), to be determined by the PR.
2.

Sometime before the hearing date on this Motion, the PR (with the input

of the beneficiaries) shall identify the Realtor, as between MBRE and CW.
3.

As to compensation, the Realtor shall be entitled to a 3% commission of

the gross sales price achieved if the Purchase Procedure results in a final sale of the Property.
The Realtor may offer a 1% “courtesy commission” to real estate agents or brokers representing
the successful purchaser (“Purchaser”). That 1% shall be deducted from the Realtor’s 3%
commission. Under these conditions, the Realtor could be entitled to a 2% commission and the
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Purchaser's broker would be entitled to a 1% commission. If the Purchase Procedure does not
result in a final sale of the Property, the Realtor shall not be entitled to any compensation for his
efforts to sell the Property.
4.

The Realtor may not act as an agent or broker or representative of any

Purchaser of the Property. The Realtor shall only represent the PR.
5.

The Realtor and the PR shall enter into a Commission Agent Agreement,

but only so long as it conforms to this Motion.
6.

As a part of the Purchase Procedure, the Realtor shall prepare a purchase

package ("Purchase Package") to distribute to possible Purchasers. At a minimum, the Purchase
Package shall contain:
(a)

a copy of the Order approvmg this Motion, should the Court

(b)

a specimen form to be signed and dated by any possible Purchaser,

approve this Motion;

which must include (at a minimum): (i) the legal description of the Property; (ii) the amount of
the cash down payment required by the PR, which shall be no less than $400,000; (iii) a due
diligence period ("Due Diligence Period") of sixty (60) days before closing, during which the
Purchaser can complete its Due Diligence; 2 (iv) such other matters or conditions as the PR may
deem in his discretion as necessary and proper; (v) a statement that the sale of the Property shall
For purposes of this Motion, the term "Due Diligence" shall mean the investigation of
the condition and suitability of the Property for the Purchaser's proposed use, which
investigation may include review of the physical condition of the Property, Property boundaries,
title, zoning and other land use regulations, availability of utilities, environmental studies, soils
tests, geological studies, engineering studies and any other surveys and tests reasonably
necessary to enable Purchaser to evaluate the suitability of the Property, subject to certain
limitations, conditions and indemnification obligations that will be set forth in the PSA.
2
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occur solely through Hillen's execution of a personal representative's deed; and (vi) such other
matters as the PR may determine are reasonable and necessary under the circumstances; and
(c)

A proposed gross bid amount ("Bid Amount") of $15 million, or

best offer as determined by the PR.
7.

The PR reserves the absolute right to accept or reject at any time, within

his sole and absolute discretion and without further liability to any potential Purchaser, any Bid
made by any Purchaser under the terms of the Purchase Procedure.
8.

All Bids shall be considered for all purposes to be bona fide "offers to

purchase the Property, valid and binding on any Purchaser who submits a Purchase Package
offer, until ten days after the Date Certain, at which time all Purchasers (other than the Qualified
Bidder(s) as identified below) shall be released from such contractual requirements."
9.

The successful Purchaser shall execute in favor of the PR a purchase and

sale agreement ("PSA") in a form reasonably acceptable to the PR. Closing as to the PSA shall
occur within ten (10) days after the Due Diligence Period has expired.
10.

Within three (3) business days after the Date Certain, the PR (in

conjunction with the Beneficiaries, 3 and each of them) shall determine which bids are considered
Qualified Bids ("Qualified Bids"). The PR shall provide written notice of such status to each
Qualified Bidder. The PR (in conjunction with the Beneficiaries, and each of them) shall then be
granted the discretion to: (1) determine which (if any) of such Qualified Bids constitute the
highest and best bid ("Highest and Best Bid") for the Property; and (b) negotiate to final sale and
For purposes of this Motion, the "Beneficiaries" are identified as (a) Vernon K. Smith,
Jr. (both in his own right and as the assignee of any beneficial interest of Victoria Converse
Smith; and (b) Joseph Smith.
3
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closing the offer representing such Highest and Best Bid. Each of the beneficiaries reserves and
retains the right to object to the PR’s decision, which objection shall be resolved by this Court at
a hearing after the sale.
III.

LEGAL STANDARD

Idaho Code § 15-3-701, et. seq., prescribes a personal representative’s powers.
That statute states, in relevant part, that a personal representative, “acting reasonably for the
benefit of the interested persons,” has the authority to “acquire or dispose of an asset, including
land in this or another state, for cash or on credit, at public or private sale . . . .” I.C. § 15-3715(6). Title 15 also states that a personal representative may “[s]ell, mortgage, or lease any real
or personal property of the estate or any interest therein for cash, credit, or for part cash and part
credit, and with or without security for unpaid balances[.]” I.C. § 15-3-715(23).
IV.
A.

ARGUMENT

The Court Should Grant the Motion Because the Sale of the Property
is in the Best Interest of the Estate and is Necessary for Hillen to
Carry Out His Statutory Duties as PR.

The proposed sale of the Property is in the best interest of the Estate. First, the
Property will be sold at a time in the real estate market cycle which maximizes the return to the
Estate, without the dangers inherent in a decline in that market. The Property will be sold for
cash. If the Property is sold under the Purchase Procedure, the net funds available to the Estate
will be the gross purchase price, less the commission to the Realtor, less the costs of closing.
The Estate already holds cash funds (from the sale of the Hamer Property) of approximately
$6 million, which, when added to the cash proceeds received from the sale of the Property,
should be sufficient to satisfy any estate tax liability, including penalties and interest, and satisfy
future costs of administration, (“Estate Proceeds”).
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The Estate Proceeds will, in the opinion of the PR, be sufficient to satisfy all
claims against the Estate.

Included within those claims are the payment of the Estate tax

liability, although the PR will obviously make every effort to minimize that liability. The Estate
Proceeds will, hopefully, also be sufficient to make a distribution to Joseph.

V.

CONCLUSION

The PR respectfully requests that this Court GRANT the Motion and approve the
Purchase Procedures.
DATED this 24 th day of April, 2019.
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP

Isl Randall A. Peterman
Randall A. Peterman - Of the Firm
Alexander P. McLaughlin - Of the Firm
Attorneys for Noah Hillen, Personal
Representative

By
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 24th day of April, 2019, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE'S MOTION TO SELL 520
ACRES IN ADA COUNTY KNOWN AS THE PLEASANT VALLEY ROAD PROPERTY
to be served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
VERNON K. SMITH, JR.
Attorney at Law
1900 West Main Street
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Personal Representative ofEstate of Vernon K.
Smith, Sr. and attorneys for David Gibson

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[X]

U.S. Mail
Facsimile: (208) 345-1129
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
Email/ iCourt: vls59@live.com

RORY JONES and ERIKA JUDD
JONES, GLEDHILL, FURMAN P.A.
225 North 9th Street, #820
Boise, Idaho 83702
Attorneys for Vernon K. Smith, Jr.

[ ] U.S. Mail
[ ] Facsimile: (208) 331-1529
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Overnight Delivery
[X] Email/ iCourt: rjones@idalaw.com;
ejudd@idalaw.com

JEFFREY A. STROTHER

[ ] U.S. Mail
[ ] Facsimile: (208) 342-2429
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Overnight Delivery
[X] Email/ iCourt:
j strother@strotherlawidaho.com

STROTHER LAW OFFICE

200 N. 4th Street, Suite 30
Boise, Idaho 83702
Attorneys for Joseph H. Smith

RONALD L. SWAFFORD
SWAFFORD LAW, PC
655 S. Woodruff Ave.
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83401
Attorneys for Sharon Bergmann
D. Blair Clark
Jeffrey P. Kaufman
LAW OFFICES OF D. BLAIR CLARK, PC
1509 Tyrell Lane, Ste. 180
Boise, Idaho 83 706

[ ] U.S. Mail
[ ] Facsimile: (208) 524-4131
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Overnight Delivery
[X] Email/ iCourt:
rons@swaffordlaw.com
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[X]

U.S. Mail
Facsimile: (208) 475-2055
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
Email/ iCourt: dbc@dbclarklaw.com

PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE'S MOTION TO SELL 520 ACRES IN ADA COUNTY
14556006.1
KNOWN AS THE PLEASANT VALLEY ROAD PROPERTY - 8
000079

Courtesy copy provided to:

Victoria Anne Converse
10548 NW Skyline Blvd.
Portland OR 97231

[X]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[X]

U.S. Mail
Facsimile
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
Email: sixlsoi@mac.com

Isl Randall A. Peterman
Randall A. Peterman
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Randall A. Peterman, ISB No. 1944
Alexander P. McLaughlin, ISB No. 7977
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP
601 West Bannock Street
Post Office Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720
Telephone (208) 388-1200
Facsimile (208) 388-1300
rap@givenspursley.com
apm@givenspursley.com
013683-0002

Filed: 05/16/2019 08:20:00
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Phil McGrane, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Holstine, Shannon

Attorneys for Noah Hillen, Personal Representative

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF
VICTORIA H. SMITH,
Deceased.

Case No. CV-IE-2014-15352
ORDER GRANTING PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE'S MOTION TO
SELL 520 ACRES IN ADA COUNTY
KNOWN AS THE PLEASANT VALLEY
ROAD PROPERTY

THIS MATTER having come before the Court at the hearing on May 8, 2019,
upon the Personal Representative's Motion to Sell 520 Acres in Ada County Known as the
Pleasant Valley Road Property ("Motion") filed on April 24, 2019, by Noah G. Hillen ("Hillen"
or the "Personal Representative"), Personal Representative of the Estate of Victoria H. Smith
The Court, having considered the arguments of counsel in the Motion, the

(the "Estate").

arguments of counsel at the hearing, and good cause appearing therefor;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1.

The Motion is hereby GRANTED in its entirety;
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2.

The Personal Representative may retain the services of Cushman &

Wakefield to exercise the Purchase Procedure for the Pleasant Valley Road Property.

See

Motion, Ex. A.
3.

The Purchase Procedure in the Motion is hereby APPROVED in full.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed: 5/15/2019 11 :02 AM
DATED - - - - -------

The Honorable Cheri C. Copey
District Judge
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Signed: 5/16/2019 08:21 AM

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE'S
MOTION TO SELL 520 ACRES IN ADA COUNTY KNOWN AS THE PLEASANT
VALLEY ROAD PROPERTY to be served by the method indicated below, and addressed to
the following:
RANDALL A. PETERMAN
ALEXANDERP.MCLAUGHLIN
Givens Pursley LLP
601 W. Bannock St.
Boise, ID 83701
VERNON K. SMITH, JR.
Attorney at Law
1900 West Main Street
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Personal Representative ofEstate of Vernon K.
Smith, Sr. and attorneys for David Gibson
RORY JONES and ERIKA JUDD
JONES, GLEDHILL, FURMAN P.A.

225 North 9th Street, #820
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Attorneys for Vernon K. Smith, Jr.

JEFFREY A. STROTHER
STROTHER LAW OFFICE

200 N. 4th Street, Suite 30
Boise, Idaho 83702
Attorneys for Joseph H Smith

RONALD L. SWAFFORD
SWAFFORD LAW, PC
655 S. Woodruff Ave.
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83401
Attorneys for Sharon Bergmann

[ ] U.S. Mail
[ ] Facsimile: (208) 388-1300
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Overnight Delivery
[X] Email/ iCourt:
rap@givenspursley.com
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[X]

U.S. Mail
Facsimile: (208) 345-1129
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
Email/ iCourt: vls59@live.com

[ ] U.S. Mail
[ ] Facsimile: (208) 331-1529
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Overnight Delivery
[X] Email/ iCourt: rjones@idalaw.com;
ejudd@idalaw.com
[ ] U.S. Mail
[ ] Facsimile: (208) 342-2429
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Overnight Delivery
[X] Email/ iCourt:
jstrother@strotherlawidaho.com
[ ] U.S. Mail
[ ] Facsimile: (208) 524-4131
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Overnight Delivery
[X] Email/ iCourt:
rons@swaffordlaw.com
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D. Blair Clark
Jeffrey P. Kaufman
LAW OFFICES OF D. BLAIR CLARK, PC
1509 Tyrell Lane, Ste. 180
Boise, Idaho 83 706

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[X]

U.S. Mail
Facsimile: (208) 475-2055
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
Email/ iCourt: dbc@dbclarklaw.com

[X]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[X]

U.S. Mail
Facsimile
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
Email: sixlsoi@mac.com

Courtesy copy provided to:
Victoria Anne Converse
10548 NW Skyline Blvd.
Portland OR 97231

e~~

By~lerk

Signed: 5/16/2019 08:20 AM
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Electronically Filed
9/12/2019 5:23 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Phil McGrane, Clerk of the Court
By: Laurie Johnson, Deputy Clerk

VERNON K. S:MITH
ATTORNEY ATLAW
1900 W. Main St.
Boise, Idaho 83702
Idaho State Bar No. 1365
Telephone: (208) 345-1125
Fax:
(208) 345-1129
vkslaw@live.com

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
NOAH G. IIlLLEN, in his capacity as
Personal Representative of the Estate of
Victoria H. Smith,
Plaintiff,
V.

DAYID R. GIBSON, an individual, d/b/a
BLACK DIAMOND COMPOST
PRODUCTS,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV0l-19-10368
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION
TOMOTIONFORPARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE
PLEADINGS, AND RESPONSE TO
MOTION TO CERTIFY JUDGMENT
UNDER I.R.C.P. 54(B)

INTRODUCTION
The Plaintiff, Noah Hillen, (hereafter PR) in his capacity as the appointed
personal representative of the Decedent, Victoria H. Smith (hereinafter referred to as
"Victoria" of "Decedent"), filed his Motion for "Partial Judgment on the Pleadings"
(hereafter referred to as Motion), asserting that he, as the PR, was made the owner of the
property described in the Verified Complaint, and therefore entitled to all rights, as the
owner, to do what he wants with the property, advancing the argument Vernon K. Smith,
(hereafter "Vernon"), who, is a 2/3rds heir of all the assets of Victoria, is no longer an
interested owner of the assets of the Decedent, and therefore has no say in the process of
any possession or sale of the real property assets. The PR has relied entirely upon a
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Judgment entered by the magistrate in the probate controversy, being a Rule 70(b) Order
and Judgment entered by Magistrate Copsey on June 2, 2017 (hereinafter "Rule 70(b)
Order").

Mr. Gibson, the Defendant, (hereafter "Gibson") answered the Verified
Complaint filed by the PR, through his counsel, Vernon K. Smith, who is knowledgeable
of the historical facts, being an heir to the assets of the Decedent, therein setting forth the
affirmative defense this PR does not have standing to bring this ejectment action against
Gibson, as the PR is not, as a matter of law, the titled or vested owner of the real property
identified in the Verified Complaint, as only heirs of the decedent are, as addressed
hereinafter in this Memorandum, and the PR possesses no ownership interest from which
to take the ejection action he has sought to eject Gibson.

II
UNDERLYING FACTS

Gibson, d/b/a Black Diamond Compost Products, has been in actual and
continuous possession of a 10 acre parcel, being a small portion of this desert front
undeveloped subject matter property, consisting less than 2% of the entire 520 acre parcel
that is the subject real property that is identified in the Verified Complaint.
Gibson has remained in continuous possession of this 10 acres since August,
2004, with the express consent of Victoria, who died 9 years later on September 11,
2013, almost a decade into Gibson's authorization to have possession of that acreage,
along with the express and continuous agreement and arrangements with Vernon (who
has become the 2/3rds heir of Victoria's property assets), and with the agreement of VHS
Properties, LLC, (hereafter "VHS") a limited liability company that was vested with title
to the subject real property from July 4, 2012 until the June 2, 2017 Rule 70(b) Order,
when the transfer of the ownership interest held by VHS was declared invalid by the
magistrate, and the ownership of the subject property was placed back in the name of
Victoria, then having become deceased.
Gibson retained his continuous possession of the 10 acres for over 15 years,
conducting his composting operations as agreed, in full compliance with any applicable
rules or regulations, with the express agreement originally given by Victoria, Vernon, and
VHS. The composted product was always intended to be used as a soil amendment to
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enhance the soil nutrient of the entire 520 acres, at such time the water rights to the real
property were again restored and the re-construction of the irrigation system installed so
such agricultural operations could thereafter be commenced.
Gibson's right to possession has continued uninterrupted under his agreement
with Victoria and Vernon, who is now the counsel representing Gibson's interests and
right to possession of the parcel, aware that Vernon is the 2/3rds vested owner of the
entire subject property, as a matter of Idaho law, with a PR who has chosen to be
confrontational with Vernon, and engaged in litigation that has been deemed by such heir
to be wasteful and non-productive.

A PR has a fiduciary duty to serve and protect the successor's interests, including
Vernon's 2/3rds interest as an heir and owner of the entire assets of Victoria, who has
rightfully and for good reasons opposed the removal of Gibson from the IO acres he has
possessed for 15 years, as he has assisted in the development of compost and humus that
has been produced with the intent to be utilized across the entire 520 acres in the further
agricultural activities envisioned for the future agricultural development of the subject
property.
Gibson has engaged in the continual prevention and discouragement of what
otherwise would be garbage dumping and the accumulation of debris on this entire 520
acres that otherwise would experience the use this undeveloped grazing ground to be an
area that has before used as a "free" garbage dump. Gibson's presence has significantly
reduced the flow of those garbage deposits initially and curtailed it entirely with his
caretaking efforts that have come with his presence there.
The deposit of trash upon the entire premises would have continued to occur in
his absence, and Gibson, over the 15 years, has removed much of the trash dumped upon
the premises from accumulations over preceding years prior to his possession, as the area
is part of the undeveloped south desert front area of south Boise, as the subject property
is located south of Gowen Field, and west of Pleasant Valley Road, being desert ground
that has been used for dryland grazing for many years past and into the present. The area,
commonly referred to by Vernon and his Father, is the Gowen Field Desert Front Area,
where debris and garbage was routinely and randomly deposited within this desert area,
typically included discarded animal carcasses of all kinds, waste petroleum products,
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discarded motor oils, garbage of every kind, wood, metal, glass and assorted construction
debris, concrete blocks, fragments of concrete flatwork removal, rocks, brush, trash, tires,
contaminates and hazardous wastes of various types. This desert area had been a
convenient and inexpensive alternative to delivering garbage and debris to the Ada
County landfill, as there was no one present, no oversight, and no fence to limit or control
the access to dump, and most attractive was that no dump fee charges were assessed.
Gibson has stopped that trash accumulation, prevented any more of that
continuing damage and liability, by maintaining his virtual daily presence where he
operates at the area that provides the most convenient access to the property, preventing
their dumping efforts, and providing not only the protection, preservation, maintenance,
and limiting the liability from this historic dumping activity, but as importantly, engaged
in his authorized activities to produce compost in accordance with the long term intended
improvements to take place on the property, and just as important to Victoria before and
Vernon's continuing best interests, has preserved the agricultural tax exemptions and
allowances stemming from the continuing grazing activities and his agricultural
operations reflected in his composting operations, as undertaken pursuant to the statewide
permitted agricultural use under the Right to Farm Act (RTFA) and the Soil and Plant
Amendment Act (SAPAA), contained in Title 22, Chapters 22 and 45 respectively.
These agricultural tax exemptions must be preserved, irrespective whether there is
any agreement of a sale, as even upon any sale, there would be no development of the
property for a prolonged period of time, as development plans would need to be
engineered, surveys completed, complex City annexation undertaken, and extensive
impact studies and entitlements secured for any commercial, industrial, or residential
development.
Substantial infrastructure would need to be undertaken, as the land is bare grazing
desert ground, and by any conservative estimate, any future development would
encompass a period between three to five years of administrative regulatory proceedings
to secure entitlements and approvals for any planned development objectives. During any
such period required for future development, Gibson is an asset, not a liability to any sale
process, preserving the allowable tax exemption, along with the grazing arrangements of
the entire 520 acre parcel.
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m
STANDARD OF REVIEW, APPLICABLE STATUTORY AND CASE
AUTHORITY FOR JUDGMENTS ON THE PLEADINGS
The issues addressed in a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is controlled by
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12(c)&(d), IRCP, and if facts are considered outside
the confines of the pleadings, Rule 56, IRCP may then have possible application. The PR's
Motion is controlled by Rule 12(c), and should affidavits be considered by the court, the
Motion may then be addressed as a motion for summary judgment (Rule 56(c)), requiring
additional time to address the issues raised outside the confines of the pleadings.
Rule 12(c) IRCP, defines the Motion as follows:
"After the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the
trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings. If on a motion for
judgment on the pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are presented to and
not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary
judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given
reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion
by Rule 56"
Rule l(a), IRCP, states "[t]hese rules govern the procedure and apply uniformly in
the district courts and the magistrate's divisions of the district court in the state of Idaho in
all actions, proceedings and appeals of a civil nature whether cognizable as cases at law or in
equity, including probate proceedings .... " I.RC.P. l(a).
Ajudgment upon the pleadi.ngs results from the fact that the answer does not put

forth an issue as to any material a/legations of the complaint, or where the pleadings show
upon their face that the party is entitled to recover without proof. A judgment on the

pleadings may be allowed, not because of the lack of proof, but because of the lack of an
issue raised by the responsive pleadi.ng. Where issues of fact are raised by the pleadings,

which require evidence to establish before the court could intelligently determine whether
such issues are to be found, it is deemed to be error to enter a judgment on the pleadings.
See Alspaugh v. Reid, 6 Idaho 223, 55 P. 300; Coombs v. Collins, 6 Idaho 536, 57 P. 310;
Mills Novelty Co. v. Dunbar, 11 Idaho 671, 83 P. 932; Davenport v. Burke, 27 Idaho 464

149 P. 511 (1915); and more recently, see Jones v. City of St. Maries, 111 Idaho 733, 727
P.2d 1161 (1986). In Hicks v. Lovell, 64 Cal. 14, 49 Am. Rep. 679, 27 P. 942, it was held
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that, Judgment on the pleadings is authorized "where the answer admits or leaves undenied
the material facts stated in the complaint."
When a case is decided on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, for the purpose
of any appeal of that decision, the appellate court must accept as true the appellants'
allegations. See, Jones, supra, citing Davenport v. Burke, 27 Idaho 464, 473, 149 P. 511,
515 (1915). In Sterling v. Bloom, 111 Idaho 211, 723 P.2d 755 (1986), the court held that
where the district court decided the case on a motion for judgment on the pleadings,
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(c), the moving party admits all allegations of the opposing party's
pleadings, and concomitantly admits the untruth of its own allegations which has been
denied, therein once again citing to Davenport v. Burke, 27 Idaho 464,473, 149 P. 511, 515
(1915).
In Stafford Smith v. Woodruff Smith, et al, 160 Idaho 780, 379 P.3d 1048 (2016),,

2016, the Court held:
"I.R.C.P. 12(c) governs motions for judgment on the pleadings. By
its terms, Rule 12(c) treats such motions similarly to motions for summary
judgment. Thus, the standard of review applicable to lower courts' rulings on
motions for summary judgment also applies to motions for judgment on the
pleadings." Trimble v. Engelking, 130 Idaho 300, 302, 939 P.2d 1379, 1381
(1997). Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). "For purposes of a motion for
judgment on the pleadings, the moving party admits all the allegations of the
opposing party's pleadings and also admits the untruth of its own allegations
to the extent they have been denied." State v. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471,474,
163 P.3d 1183, 1186 (2007). "All doubts are to be resolved against the
moving party, and the motion must be denied if the evidence is such that
conflicting inferences may be drawn therefrom, and if reasonable people
might reach different conclusions." G & M Farms v. Funk Irr. Co., 119
Idaho 514, 517, 808 P.2d 851, 854 (1991)."
In Capital Partners Int'/ Ventures, Inc. v. Danzas Corp., the federal court held

if

matters outside the pleadings are presented to the court, the motion for judgment on the
pleadings is converted into a summary judgment motion under Rule 56, F.R CP.. Before

summary judgment may be entered, the non-moving party must be given notice and an
opportunity to respond, when a represented party has reason to know the court will look

autside of the pleadings. 309 F.Supp.2d 1138, 1143 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
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The Idaho Supreme Court has expressed a "preference for interpreting Idaho Rules
of Civil Procedure in conformance with the interpretation placed upon the same language in
the federal rules." Obendorf v. Terra Hug Spray Co., Inc., 145 Idaho 892, 897, 188 P.3d
834, 839 (2008). Both the Idaho rules and Federal rules use identical language requiring that
motions to dismiss and nwtions for judgment on the pleadings, and are treated as summary
judgment motions when matters outside the pleadings are presented I.R.C.P. 12(b), 12(c);
FRCP 12(c), 12(d); see also Hoyle v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 137 Idaho 367, 48 P.3d 1256

(2002);Bagleyv. Thomason, 155 Idaho 193,307 P.3d 1219 (2013).
The Idaho Supreme Court will review a judgment on the pleadings in the same
manner as it reviews rulings in summary judgment proceedings. Bowles v. Pro lndiviso,

Inc., 132 Idaho 371, 374, 973 P.2d 142, 145 (1999). In reviewing a summary judgment, the
appellate Court employs the same review used by the trial court in ruling on the motion.

Union Pacific Land Resources Corp. v. Shoshone County Assessor, 140 Idaho 528, 531, 96
P.3d 629, 632 (2004). Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issues of material
fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw. I.R.C.P. 56(c).

In this action, it appears the court has not been asked to look outside the pleadings,
as they seek a legal analysis, and we accommodate that analysis with application of what is
disclosed to be the controlling law on the issue of titled ownership identified within this
Memorandum.
If this Motion is to be converted to a summary proceeding, the parties are entitled to
notice of this potential "conversion" from a judgment upon the pleadings to a summary
proceeding, in which case adequate notice must be provided with delayed hearing date,
instead of the typical 14 day notice provided for by Rule 7, IRCP, should this court find
such submittals necessary and essential to its ruling, such that they constitute the
presentation of new and additional evidence derived by such testimony in the affidavit(s),
such that it serves to supplement those previously submitted exhibits attached to the
pleadings and factual basis as alleged in Plaintiff's complaint, that event may serve to
afford all parties additional time to respond.
The District Court employs the same standard and analysis in summary proceedings
as does the appellate court regarding summary proceedings, as identified in See Farmers

National Bank v. Green River Dairy, LLC, 155 Idaho 853, 318 P3d 622 (2014); Cnty. of

DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL
P. 7
JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS 000092

Boise v. Idaho Cntys. Risk Mgmt. Program, Underwriters, 151 Idaho 901, 904, 265 P.3d
514, 517 (2011 ). As this court is well aware, summary judgment is proper only when
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). The party moving for summary judgment
carries the burden to establish there is no genuine issue of material fact. Eliopulos v. Knox,
123 Idaho 400, 404, 848 P.2d 984, 988 (Ct.App.1992). See also Coghlan v. Beta Theta Pi
Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388, 401, 987 P.2d 300, 313 (1999). This burden may be met if
establishing the absence of evidence on any element the nonmoving party will be required to
prove at trial. Dunnick v. Elder, 126 Idaho 308, 311, 882 P.2d 475, 478 (Ct.App.1994).
"Summary judgment .... is appropriate where the plaintiff fails to submit evidence .to
establish an essential element of the claim." Nelson v. City of Rupert, 128 Idaho 199, 202,
911 P.2d 1111, 1114 (1996). See also Aardema v. U.S. Dairy Sys., Inc., 147 Idaho 785,
793, 215 P.3d 505, 513 (2009).
This well-established standard was addressed in Hap Taylor & Sons, v.
Summerwind Partners, LLC, 157 Idaho 600, 338 P3d 1204 (2014), stating:
"This Court reviews a motion for summary judgment pursuant to the same
standards as the district court. Mackay v. Four Rivers Packing Co., 145
Idaho 408, 410, 179 P.3d 1064, 1066 (2008). Summary judgment is
appropriate where " the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). " [A]ll reasonable inferences that can be
drawn from the record are to be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party,"
and disputed facts will be liberally construed in favor of the nonmoving
party. Mackay, 145 Idaho at 410, 179, P.3d at 1066 ...... This Court
exercises free review over questions of law. Martin v. Camas Cnty. ex rel.
Bd ofComm'rs, 150 Idaho 508, 511, 248 P.3d 1243, 1246 (2011)."
Recited in Golub v. Kirk-Scott, Ltd, (Supreme Ct. January 30, 2015 No. 41505),
342 P.3d 893 (2015):
"The standard of review on appeal from the district court's grant of
summary judgment is well-settled."
"On appeal from the grant of a motion for summary judgment, this Court
utilizes the same standard of review used by the district court originally
ruling on the motion. Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings,
depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw." I.R.C.P. 56(c).
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When considering whether the evidence in the record shows that there is
no genuine issue of material fact, the trial court must liberally construe the
facts, and draw all reasonable inferences, in favor of the nonmoving party.
If the evidence reveals no disputed issues of material fact, then only a
question of law remains, over which this Court exercises free review.
Conner v. Hodges, 157 Idaho 19, 23, 333 P.3d 130, 134 (2014) (internal
case citations omitted). "Statutory interpretation is a question of law
subject to free review." J & M Cattle Co., UC v. Farmers Nat'/. Bank,
156 Idaho 690, 692, 330 P.3d 1048, 1050 (2014). On discretionary
matters, "[a] district court does not abuse its discretion when it (1)
correctly perceives the issue as discretionary, (2) acts within the bounds of
discretion and applies the correct legal standards, and (3) reaches the
decision through an exercise of reason." Agrisource, Inc. v. Johnson, 156
Idaho 903, 914, 332 P.3d 815, 826 (2014) (internal citations omitted).
Recited in Sims v. AC! Northwest, Inc., (Idaho Supreme Court No. 41269, January 21,
2015), 342 P.3d 618 (2015):
"On appeal from the grant of a motion for summary judgment, this
Court utilizes the same standard of review used by the district court
originally ruling on the motion." Arregui v. Gallegos-Main, 153 Idaho
801, 804, 291 P.3d 1000, 1003 (2012). Summary judgment is proper " if
the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with t~e
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c). "When considering whether the
evidence in the record shows that there is no genuine issue of material
fact, the trial court must liberally construe the facts, and draw all
reasonable inferences, in favor of the nonmoving party." Dulaney v. St.
Alphonsus Reg'/ Med Ctr., 137 Idaho 160, 163, 45 P.3d 816, 819 (2002).
"If the evidence reveals no disputed issues of material fact, then only a
question of law remains, over which this Court exercises free review."
Lapham v. Stewart, 137 Idaho 582, 585, 51 P.3d 396, 399 (2002). Conner
v. Hodges, 157 Idaho 19, 23, 333 P.3d 130, 134 (2014).
Recited in Houpt v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Supreme Court ofldaho, No. 41990,
March 9, 2016, 2016 Opinion No. 28, 370 P.3d 384 (2016):
"We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo,
and apply the same standard used by the district court in ruling on the
motion. Grazer v. Jones, 154 Idaho 58, 64, 294 P.3d 184, 190 (2013).
Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." I.R. C.P. 56(c). All reasonable
inferences that can be drawn from the record are to be drawn in favor of
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the nonmoving party, and disputed facts are liberally construed in the
nonmoving party's favor. Mackay v. Four Rivers Packing Co., 145 Idaho
408, 410, 179 P.3d 1064, 1066 (2008). If reasonable people could reach
different conclusions or inferences from the evidence, summary judgment
is inappropriate. Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp., 141 Idaho 233, 238, 108
P.3d 380, 385 (2005). An award of attorney fees is a factual determination
which is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Smith v. Mitton, 140 Idaho 893,
901, 104 P.3d 367, 375 (2004)."
And recited in Forbush et al v. Sagecrest Multi Family Property Owners'

Association, Inc. et al, 162 Idaho 317, 396 P.3d 1199 (2017), the court held:
"This Court reviews a summary judgment order under the same
standard the district court used in ruling on the motion. Kolin v. Saint
Luke's Reg'/ Med Ctr., 130 Idaho 323, 327, 940 P.2d 1142, 1146 (1997).
That is, summary judgment is appropriate if "the pleadings, depositions,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 11 I.R.C.P. 56(c). We construe
disputed facts in favor of the non-moving party, and all reasonable
inferences that can be drawn from the record are to be drawn in favor of
the non-moving party. Major v. Sec. Equip. Corp., 155 Idaho 199, 202,
307 P.3d 1225, 1228 (2013). Mitchell v. State, 160 Idaho 81, 84, 369
P.3d 299, 302 (2016)."

IV.
ARGUMENT
A.

The Supreme Court, In Deciding In re Estate o(Smith, 164 Idaho 457,432
P.3d 6 {2018} Did Not Confirm -And Was Without Authority To Confirm Noah Hillen As The Sole Lawful Owner Of The Gowen Field Property

This Motion, seeking Partial Judgment on the Pleadings, arises out of an action
brought by the PR, Noah Hillen, for the ejectment of the Gibson from the Gowen Field
property. Gibson possesses 10 acres of a parcel consisting of 520 acres. This action for
ejectment is being pursued as a "necessary condition" precedent to the PR's intended sale
and liquidation of the Gowen Field property. The PR is currently attempting to sell the
Gowen Field Property (520 acres) on behalf of the Estate, but cannot, as a practical
matter, states that the PR cannot "move forward with any such sale while Defendant stays
there." Partial S.J. Memo, at pg. 7). Gibson is an asset, not a liability, either to the heirs
or to any perspective buyer, as the tax exemption remains a crucial issue to either.
The possession of the Gowen Field property, for purposes of administration of the
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Estate, was restored to Victoria, by the operation of the June 2, 2017 Rule 70(b) Order.
For purposes of an action for ejectment, an essential and required element is Petitioner's
"ownership" of the property at issue. Therefore in an attempt to satisfy this element of an
ejectment claim, Mr. Hillen, in this capacity as the PR of the Estate of Victoria H. Smith,
has asserted that, "the sole disputed issue before the Court is the effect the Rule 70
Judgment has on the ownership of the Gowen Property." See, Partial S.J. Memo at pg. 3.
The PR argues that as a consequence of the entry of the magistrate's Rule 70(b) Order, he
has become the "sole lawful owner of the Gowen Field property." See, Partial S.J. Memo
at pp. 4-5.
The PR's argument is untenable and erroneous, for reasons that both this district
court, and the Idaho Supreme Court, are bound by the limited power granted to a personal
representative over title to a Decedent's property, as only being to the extent necessary
for the administration of that property in the interests of creditors and other interested
persons. I.C. §§ 15-3-703, 15-3-709, and 15-3-711. See e.g., "Official Comment" to I.C.

§ 15-3-711 ("The personal representative is given the broadest possible 'power-over
title.' He receives a 'power,' rather than title, ...."). Title to the property of a decedent
is vested in the devisees or heirs immediately at the time of death of the decedent,
confirmed to be the controlling law by the Idaho Supreme Court. The statute, which vests
"title" to all property interests at the decedent's death, confirms that title passes to and
vests with the heirs and devisees upon death of the decedent (I. C. §15-3-101). The case
authority, El/maker v. Tabor, 160 Idaho 576, 377 P.3d 390 (2015) and Fairchild v.

Fairchild, 147 Idaho 147, 676 P.2d 722 (1984) are explicitly controlling on this issue.
El/maker, supra, declared "legal title to estate property vests in the heirs or devisees
upon the death of the decedent", citing Pierce v. Francis, 194 P.3d 505, 510 (Colo.App.
2008). Also, Fairchild, supra, declared "The trial court had found ... .leaving as her heirs
her children .... , who all became cotenants in the thirteen acres in question." We view
the statement that "all became cotenants" as a conclusion of law, reached by applying
existing law to the findings of fact. See I.C. § 15-2-103 (concerning the share of the
decedent's heirs); and I.C. § 15-3-101 (decedent's property devolves to his heirs at

death).
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"Heirs" refers to the statutory beneficiaries of an "Intestate" proceeding (I. C.
§15-1-201(12); "devisees" refers to the statutory beneficiaries in a "Testate" proceeding

(I. C. §15-1-201(22); that by statutory declaration, devolution of property interests vest

immediately upon death of the decedent in the heirs or devisees, whichever the situation
may be, not to or upon any estate, any administrator, or conditioned upon any distribution
proceedings.
Notwithstanding the magistrate's use of rather expansive and all-encompassing
language within the Rule 70(b) Order, the effect of that Order can neither exceed, nor in
any manner expand, the limited scope of the statutory authority granted to the personal
representative in his administration of a decedent's property, as provided by Idaho's
Uniform Probate Code, I.C. §§ 15-3-701 et seq. and 15-3-901 et seq. (hereinafter,
"UPC").
Yet this PR has asserted that as a result of the entry of the magistrate's Rule 70(b)
Order, "any interest Vernon once had in the premises was divested by the Rule 70
Judgment and vested in Hillen, the current sole owner." See, Partial S.J. Memo at pg. 5.
This is an aberration of the law, and such a result is not only in contradiction to - but
exceeds - the express limitations placed upon the authority of the PR, as declared by the
Idaho Legislature in its adoption of the Uniform Probate Code (UPC). See e.g., In the

Matter of Jane Doe II, 160 Idaho 360, 362, 372 P.3d 1106, 1108 (2016) ("'The
legislature and the legislature only, under our constitution, has the power to legislate.'
(citation omitted)." (parenthetical reference added)).
No issue was presented for decision - nor was any issue actually decided - on the
appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court in, In re Estate of Smith, 164 Idaho 457, 432 P.3d 6
(2018), to either eliminate the legal title that passed to the heirs as a matter of law under
I.C. § 15-3-101, nor did the Idaho Supreme Court declare that the effect of the Rule 70(b)
Order was to oust the estate heirs of any and all title to the Decedent's property, and to
substitute in their place, the personal representative, Noah Hillen, as the sole lawful
owner of Decedent's property.
All that the Idaho Supreme Court determined on that appeal was that the
attempted "power of attorney transfers" of Decedent's property on July 12, 2012 had
been nullified by the magistrate, and that the Decedent's property, allegedly transferred
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under that attempted exercise of the now-nullified power of attorney authority, was to be
returned to the prior ownership, the Decedent, being the intended consequence of this
Court's Rule 70(b) Order. 164 Idaho at 471-73, 432 P.3d at 20-22. No other questions
were presented, decided, or ripe for any adjudication on that appeal concerning the extent
and effect of this Court's Rule 70(b) Order on the question of any determination of title to
the Decedent's property as provided by the Idaho UPC. 1
It is undisputed that at the time of Victoria's death on September 11, 2013, there
were no creditors - either secured or unsecured - as Vernon resolved any and all debts
ever owed by the Decedent. There were no creditors for the benefit of which creditors the
personal representative would have been required to act for purposes of actually setting
aside any transfers that had been made by the decedent (or as made on her behalf by use
of Vernon's POAs), as there was no alleged fraud of any creditors' interests. I.C. § 15-3710. The only obligation of the Decedent's estate - other than the payment of fees and
expenses churned by this PR and his extended legal cast - has been only that which has
emerged in the course of the PR' s administration, and that has been repetitiously referred
to as being the payment of federal estate taxes, which extent and amount thereof has been
extensively disputed, and the PR declined to secure the proper farmland appraisals,
causing need for Vernon to secure such relevant appraisals to protect his interests,
deemed to be a violation of the PR' s fiduciary duty.
Gibson and his counsel would argue, in opposition to the PR Motion for partial
Judgment on the Pleadings, the critical legal restraints and propositions:
1.

The PR only has the limited authority to act on behalf of creditors, and

persons interested in the estate, but he is otherwise without any authority to blatantly
ignore, or to thwart, the express provisions of the UPC concerning the rights of heirs
arising out of intestate succession, where title vests immediately in the heirs upon death
of the decedent.
The Rule 70(b) Order was entered for the purpose of restoring the prior ownership and the control
to the personal representative. The Idaho Supreme Court neither addressed, nor decided, any issue other
than the invalidity of the 2013 power of attorney transfers which had allegedly transferred all estate
property out of the estate and the invalidation of the Decedent's Will. The Idaho Supreme Court's primary
reference to the Rule 70(b) Order on the appeal was to the use of that Order as a demarcation point in
defining those claims which encompassed the time period in the scope of the appeal. ''This appeal follows
the parties' stipulation to bifurcate the appeal to first address any matters occurring up to the post-trial
judgment under Rule 70(b) before considering matters thereafter." 164 Idaho at 466,432 P.3d at 15.
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2.

Neither this Court, nor the Idaho Supreme Court, can act in excess of, or is

authorized to expand, the limited statutory authority granted to a personal representative
by the UPC, being the exclusive authority granted to the Idaho Legislature.
3.

The December 2018 decision of the Idaho Supreme Court only has

binding precedential effect arising out of issues that were actually raised and decided on
thatappeaL

.1.
The Authority Of The PR To Act In Respect To Estate
Property Is Limited to Those Actions Only Necessary To Protect The
Rights Of Creditors Or Other Interested Parties

Under § 15-3-101 of the UPC, "Estates immediately descend at death to
successors identified by any probated will, or to heirs if no will is probated, subject to
rights which may be implemented through administration." See, "Official Comment"
I.C. § 15-3-101, subsection (1), final sentence (underlined emphasis added); and as held
in Hintz v. Black, 125 Idaho 655, 659, 873 P.2d 909, 913 (Ct.App.1994) ("[T]he assets
were subject to recoupment by the personal representative, if required in order to satisfy
estate liabilities.

I.C. § 15-3-709."). Therefore, absent any need arising out of the

administration of the estate - especially the interests of creditors, of which there are
none in this proceeding - the property of the estate passes at the death of the decedent to

devisees and heirs, as a matter oflaw, under I.C. § 15-3-101.
Section 15-3-101 is repetitively referenced within the chapter 3 provisions of the
UPC which address the powers of the personal representative. See, "Official Comment"
§15-3-709 ("Section 3-101 provides for the devolution of title on death. Section 3-711

defines the status of the personal representative with reference to 'title' and 'power' in a
way that should make it unnecessary to discuss the 'title' to decedent's assets which his
personal representative acquires."); "Official Comment" §15-3-901 ("Title to a
decedent's property passes to his heirs and devisees at the time of his death. See Section
3-101. This section adds little to Section 3-101 except to indicate how successors may
establish record title in the absence of administration."); "Official Comment" §15-3-906
("This section establishes a preference for distribution in kind. It directs a personal
representative to make distribution in kind whenever feasible and to convert assets to
cash only where there is a special reason for doing so. It provides a reasonable means for
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determining value of assets distributed in kind. It is implicit in Sections 3-101, 3-901 and
this section that each residuary beneficiary's basic right is to his proportionate share of
each asset constituting the residue.").
The "Official Comment" to I.C. §15-3-711 states most clearly the intended
relationship between the ownership interests of the heirs and the trust responsibilities of
the PR:
The personal representative is given the broadest possible "power
over title." He receives a "power," rather than title, because the power
concept eases the succession of assets which are not possessed by the
personal representative. Thus, if the power is unexercised prior to its
termination, its lapse clears the title of devisees and heirs. Purchasers
from devisees or heirs who are "distributees" may be protected also by
Section 3-910. The power over title of an absolute owner is conceived to
embrace all possible transactions which might result in a conveyance or
encumbrance of assets, or in a change of rights of possession. The
relationship of the personal representative to the estate is that of a trustee.
Hence, personal creditors or successors of a personal representative cannot
avail themselves of his title to any greater extent than is true generally of
creditors and successors of trustees.
Interested persons who are
apprehensive of possible misuse of power by a personal representative
may secure themselves by use of the devices implicit in the several
sections of Parts 1 and 3 of this Article. See especially Sections 3-501, 3605, 3-607 and 3-611.
Official Comment to I. C. §15-3-711.
Idaho's adoption of the UPC became effective in 1971, and did not constitute any
departure from the then-existing Idaho rule that the personal representative was not
considered to be an "owner" of the estate property, which had been the rule of law in
Idaho since the Territory's first adoption of a probate code in 1864. See, Laws of the
Territory ofldaho, First Sess., Probate Practice Act, § 116, pp. 345-46, as codified at I.C.

§ 15-410 at the time of its repeal and the enactment of the Idaho Uniform Probate Code
in 1971. Under the Idaho Probate Code, as it existed prior to the adoption of the UPC,
the Idaho Supreme Court in, Lemp v. Lemp, 32 Idaho 397, 401, 184 P. 222, 223 (1919),
held that, "The administrator or executor is not the owner of any part of the estate. He, in
his official character, only holds it in trust for the parties entitled to it, subject to the
purposes of administration."
This "trust relationship" between the PR and the estate has been carried forward
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within the current provisions of the UPC, as set out in the text ofl.C. §15-3-711 by use of
the qualifying phrase, "in trust however," within that statute and as further cemented in
the unqualified declaration made in the "Official Comment" to that same section (as set
out in full above) to the effect that, "The relationship of the personal representative to the
estate is that ofa trustee." See e.g., Allen v. Shea, 105 Idaho )1, 35,665 P.2d 1041, 1045
(1983) ("[T]he personal representative exercises control over the property of the estate, in

her fiduciary capacity, until the close of administration of the estate."

(italicized

emphasis in original)). The PR only receives "possession" - not title -to estate property.

Blake v. Blake, 69 Idaho 214, 221, 205 P.2d 495, 499-500 (1949) ("The property of the
estate, upon the testator's death, immediately passed to the possession of the executrix or
executor, Section 15-410, I.C.A., for administration."
Consequently, the blatant assertions by this PR, Noah Hillen, which underlie his
Motion for partial Judgment on the Pleadings, to the effect he is the "owner" of the
Decedent's property, and that the magistrate's Rule 70(b) Order served to oust the heirs
of their statutory ownership rights in the Decedent's property, is an egregious misstatement of the law and misrepresentation as to the Decision of the Supreme Court, and
is clearly erroneous, being either advanced maliciously, or an act of gross negligence and
misfeasance of the fiduciary capacity to respect the law, as he has been sworn to uphold.
The PR does not possess the required ownership interest necessary to pursue any action
for ejectment of Gibson from the 10 acres, and his Motion must be denied in its entirety.

The PR Cannot Act, Nor Can He Be Authorized to Act Bv
Court Order, In Excess Of The Limited Authority Granted By The

2.

UPC and Idaho Law
The PR, in his actions, is bound by the limitations imposed by the UPC. The
Official Comment to I.C. § 15-3-703 specifically constrains a PR's acts by statutory
authority in declaring that, "[A] personal representative's authority is derived from
appointment by the public agency known as the Court. But, the Code also makes it clear
that the personal representative, in spite of the source of his authority, is to proceed with
the administration, settlement and distribution of the estate by use of statutory powers and
in accordance with statutory directions. See Sections 3-107 and 3-704..... " Here, the
personal representative has been acting entirely in excess of his statutorily-conferred
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authority in claiming that he has been made the "owner" of the Decedent's property, and
that the effect of the magistrate's Rule 70(b) Order was intended to divest the heirs of all
statutorily-conferred title to the Decedent's property.
The question of a court acting in excess of statutorily-conferred authority has been
most prominently addressed by the Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. Armstrong, 146
Idaho 372, 195 P.3d 731 (Ct.App.2008) where that Court laid out the problem as follows:
[C]ourts and lawyers sometimes say that a court lacked jurisdiction when
they really mean simply that the court committed error because the action
that was taken did not comply with governing law. For example, our
appellate courts have referred to a lack of "jurisdiction" when perhaps
more precisely meaning that a motion or complaint was not timely filed,
that a condition precedent to the right to file the action was not satisfied,
or that governing statutes or court rules did not authorize the particular
decision made by the court. (citations omitted) 146 Idaho at 375, 195 P.3d
at 734 (parenthetical reference to "citations omitted," added).
The Court in Armstrong cited the California Supreme Court's decision in People
v. American Contractors Indemnity Co., 33 Cal.4th 653, 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 76, 93 P.3d 1020

(2004) for the proposition that, when a court acts contrary to the authority conferred by
statute, it has acted in excess of its jurisdiction and that action is rendered voidable, and
may become void. 146 Idaho at 376, 195 P.3d at 735.
The Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Hartwig, 150 Idaho 326, 329 n.3, 246 P.3d
979, 982 n.3 (2011) acknowledged the Idaho Court of Appeal's decision in Armstrong, as
differentiating between the concepts of a court's jurisdiction and its authority, without
altering that formulation of Idaho law made by the Idaho Court of Appeals. 2 The Idaho
Courts continued to authoritatively cite and rely upon the Armstrong decision subsequent
to the Idaho Supreme Court's comment on Armstrong as made in the 2011 Hartwig
decision. See e.g., State v. Vaughn, 156 Idaho 13, 15,319 P.3d 497,499 (Ct.App. 2014)
and State v. Steelsmith, 154 Idaho 577, 580 n.2, 288 P.3d 132, 135 n.2 (Ct.App. 2012).
Notwithstanding the over-inclusive language (in dereliction of the statutory
declarations) used by the magistrate in the Rule 70(b) Order, and the Idaho Supreme
Court commenting upon that Order ("In June 2017, the court entered a judgment pursuant
2

Until superseded by a decision of the Idaho Supreme Co~ as issued upon the same questio~
opinions of the Idaho Court of Appeals are binding precedent upon all lower Idaho Courts. State v.
Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 986-87, 842 P.2d 660, 665-66 (1992).
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to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 70(b), which vested title to all of Victoria's real and
personal property in the personal representative who had been appointed." 164 Idaho at
466, 432 P.3d at 15 (emphasis added)), this Court must construe that Order as having
only the effect as restoring title to the prior owner, the Decedent, and then permitting,
by the limitations imposed by authority granted to the personal representative under the
UPC, those limited powers over the vested interests of the heirs. In the absence of such a
construction, limiting the effect of the Rule 70(b) Order, this court is perpetuating .an
egregious error of the magistrate, and in the event this Court grants the relief requested
by the personal representative, this responding party has no choice but to secure
certification to challenge such Order, as applied in this matter as exceeding the grant of
statutory authority provided to the personal representative under the UPC.
3.
The Decision Of The Idaho Supreme Court in, In Re Estate Of
Smith, Provides No Authority In Support Of The PR's Proposed
Actions

The question raised and presented on this Motion for partial Judgment on the
Pleadings by the PR, Noah Hillen, seeks affirmation from this Court that, as a
consequence of the magistrate's Rule 70(b) Order, and as a consequence of the
subsequent appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, the PR became the sole lawful owner of

the Gowen Field property, and that "any interest Vernon once had in the premises was
divested by the Rule 70 Judgment and vested in Hillen the current sole owner." Partial
S.J. Memo at pp. 4-5. 3 No statute or case law supports that untenable position.
This specific question, concerning the effect of the magistrate's Rule 70(b) Order,
as divesting the heirs - Vernon & Joseph - of all interest and title in the Decedent's
property, and having that title and interest entirely transferred to Hillen, as the PR, was
neither raised, made an issue, argued, nor decided by the Idaho Supreme Court in its
decision rendered in, Matter of Estate of Smith, 164 Idaho 457, 432 P.3d 6 (2018), and
had it been seen to be in need of clarifying the controlling law, the Idaho precedent cited
above would have been entirely incorporated within the Decision, as there is no other
case authority to the contrary, thereby rejecting such a bogus claim now being
3

Even though Hillen's argwnent is directed solely at Vernon K. Smith, if Hillen is successful in his
pursuit of that argument, then this Court's decision will have equal effect on the ownership interests of
Joseph H. Smith, also currently declared to be an intestate heir, by necessarily divesting his title and
transferring it to the personal representative for pwposes of the PR's pursuit of his ejectment action
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maliciously asserted by the PR regarding ownership. In issuing its opinion, the Idaho
Supreme Court did use inopportune language (as highlighted in the quotation from that
opinion set out below) in even referring to the Rule 70(b) Order, but in the context of the
issues that were actually raised and decided on that appeal, that inopportune language is
at deemed to be and treated as mere dicta. The following, as included within the Idaho
Supreme Court's recitation of the factual and procedural background of this case, is the
Court's only express reference within its opinion to the Rule 70(b) Order:
In June 2017, the court entered a judgment pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 70(b), which vested title to all of Victoria's real and personal
property in the personal representative who had been appointed.
Vernon appealed these decisions, and this Court granted Joseph's
motion for acceptance of appeal directly from the magistrate court
pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 44. This appeal follows the parties'
stipulation to bifurcate the appeal to first address any matters occurring
up to and including the post-trial judgment under Rule 70(b) before
considering any matters occurring thereafter. The personal representative
of the estate, Intervenor-Respondent Noah Hillen, is not participating in
this portion of the appeal. 164 Idaho at 466, 432 P.3d at 15 (emphasis
added).
The PR would have been an interested party had the issue of vested title been
made an issue in the appeal. The PR was not participating because he had no interest in
the two issues presented on appeal-the transfers to VHS and the validity of the
Holographic Will. As argued above, the PR' s proposed interpretation of the magistrate
Rule 70(b) Order, as constituting an actual transfer of "title" from the heirs to the PR,
would be in excess of the statutory authority provided by the UPC. Title to a decedent's
property devolves to the heirs at the death of the decedent, subject only to possible
subsequent divestment, if necessitated by the administration for the benefit of creditors.
I. C. §15-3-101. There is no statutory grant of authority that permits a transfer of title
from the heirs to then become vested with the personal representative of a decedent's
estate.
Court judgments and decrees are subject to the same rules of interpretation as
apply to the construction of contracts. McKoon v. Hathaway, 146 Idaho 106, 109, 190
P.3d 925, 928 (2008). A prominent rule of contract interpretation is that contracts must
be interpreted in respect to the then-existing law. Path to Health, LLP v. Long, 161 Idaho
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50, 57, 383 P.3d 1220, 1227 (2016) ('"This Court has held that "it is axiomatic that extant
law is written into and made a part of every written contract.""' (citations omitted). This
rule was expressly applied to the interpretation of an appellate decision in, Application of
Kaufman, 69 Idaho 297, 306-07, 206 P.2d 528, 533 (1949) ("What the court said,
therefore, must be taken in connection with the statutes as they then existed and applied,
.... "); and in, In re Anderton 's Estate, 61 Idaho 160, 163, 174 P.2d 212, 213 (1946)
(noting that an executor must act "in strict compliance with the law .... "). The Idaho
UPC, as in effect at the time of the referenced appeal in, Matter ofEstate of Smith, supra,
applies in the interpretation and application to both the magistrate's Rule 70(b) Order and
the Idaho Supreme Court's opinion on appeal.
Long-standing Idaho authority supports the interpretation of Idaho appellate
decisions that differentiates between those issues that were actually raised and were
decided by the Court, and other matters which were simply referred to in the decision.
Bashore v. Adolf, 41 Idaho 84, 88, 238 P. 534, 534 (1925) ("'There is a pronounced line
of demarcation between what is said in an opinion and what is decided by it." (citation
omitted, italicized emphasis added)). See also, Idaho Schools For Equal Educational
Opportunity v. Evans, 123 Idaho 573, 586, 850 P.2d 724, 737 (1993) (McDevitt, C.J.,
concurring and dissenting); North Side Canal Co. v. Idaho Farms Co., 60 Idaho 748, 758,
96 Idaho 232, 235-36 (1939); and Stark v. McLaughlin, 45 Idaho 112, 123, 261 P. 244,
245 (1927).
This long-standing principle of interpretation as applied to Idaho appellate
opinions, as based upon the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in Bashore v. Adolf, supra,
has been recently applied by Idaho's U.S. District Court in, AMX Intern., Inc. v. Batte/le
Energy Alliance, 144 F.Supp.2d 1087, 1091-92 (D.Idaho 2010); and Hash v. U.S., 454
F.Supp.2d 1066, 1072 (D.Idaho 2006) ("The Idaho Supreme Court itself has stated that
its opinions "must be considered and construed in the light of the rule that they are
authoritative only on the facts on which they are founded. General expressions must be
taken in connection with the case in which those expressions are used. "There is a
pronounced line of demarcation between what is said in an opinion and what is decided
by it." (Citation omitted).' Bashore v. Adolf, 41 Idaho 84, 238 P. 534 (1925) (emphasis
in original).").
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Because the questions raised on the appeal in, In re Estate of Smith, 164 Idaho
457, 432 P.3d 6 (2018), only addressed the challenged power of attorney transfers, and
the resulting re-transfer to the decedent of those assets earlier transferred under that
invalid use of the power of attorney, the magistrate's Rule 70(b) Order, as addressed by
that appeal, only concerned the challenged power of attorney transfers, and the validity of
the Will, not any question as to whether the estate heirs had been divested of their
statutorily-conferred ownership interests by the operation of that Rule 70 Order.
Because that question was neither raised nor decided on that appeal, the decision
of the Idaho Supreme Court on that appeal has no binding precedential effect concerning
the question raised on this Motion, nor does that appellate decision establish "law of the
case" for the purposes of this Motion proceeding. See e.g., Smith By and Through Smith

v. Treasure Valley Seed Company, LLC, 164 Idaho 654, 657, 434 P.3d 1260, 1263
(2019).
In addition to the rules establishing the extent of a binding precedent, or the
application of the law of the case doctrine, neither res judicata, nor collateral estoppel, as
arising out of the recent appeal apply to the ownership issue raised on this Motion by the ·
PR. Res judicata and collateral estoppel only apply to "subsequent" litigation. Maravilla

v. J.R Simplot Co., 161 Idaho 455, 458, 387 P.3d 123, 126 (2016). This Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings arises within the estate proceeding as was the subject of the
matter heard on the recent appeal in Matter ofEstate of Smith, supra.
Nonetheless, collateral estoppel has no preclusive effect because the application
of that doctrine requires the issue must be raised had been actually decided in the prior
litigation. Brown v. State, Indus. Special lndem. Fund, 138 Idaho 493,496, 65 P.3d 515,
518 (2003) ("Collateral estoppel applies to issues that actually and necessarily have been
decided in prior litigation."). Neither the question of the personal representative's actual
ownership of Decedent's assets, nor the divestiture of the Decedent's heirs of ownership
of the Decedent's assets, was raised and actually decided as a consequence of the earlier
appeal.
In the same vein, this specific question as to the actual ownership of Decedent's
assets - as opposed to the presumption the personal representative would perform his
statutory functions within the confines of the possessory trust rights conferred upon him
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under the UPC - did not become ripe for adjudication until the personal representative
actually - and unexpectedly - would choose to advance this false position as he now
claims actual ownership of the Decedent's assets, egregiously in excess of his statutorilyconferred authority to engage this present ejectment proceeding, and in excess of the
magistrate's jurisdiction or authority.
Res judicata does not bar the adjudication of claims that were not ripe for
adjudication in the prior proceeding. Pocatello Hosp., LLC v. Quail Ridge Medical

Investor, LLC, 157 Idaho 732, 740-41, 339 P.3d 1136, 1144-45 (2014); Bell Rapids Mut.
Irr. Co. v. Hausner, 126 Idaho 752, 753-54, 890 P.2d 338, 339-340 (1995); and Duthie v.
Lewiston Gun Club, 104 Idaho 751, 754, 663 P.2d 287, 290 (1983).
In summary, no accepted Idaho doctrine of prior adjudication, whether it be the
rules for construction and application of precedents, the law of the case doctrine, or the
doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel, establishes any bar to bringing this
challenge to potentially ultra vires actions upon which the personal representative has
predicated his Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings in this matter.

v.
For the reasons set forth above, th

~e's__ ~o-.....,

before the court must be denied entirely.

'\
\

Dated this 12th day of Septem

·
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Despite Defendant's 1 attempt to complicate the facts, this case remams a
straightforward dispute and the issue before the Court is a narrow one: whether Hillen, as Personal
Representative of the Estate, has a sufficient ownership interest in the Estate's real property to
eject Gibson therefrom. He does based on, among other things, Judge Copsey's Rule 70 Judgment
the Supreme Court previously upheld. Because the pleadings establish all three ejectment
elements, Hillen is entitled to a judgment ejecting Gibson from the Gowen Property. Hillen
respectfully requests that the Court grant Hillen's motion.
II.

ARGUMENT

The argument section of this memorandum makes three points: (a) that Gibson
improperly references, in briefing, factual assertions that are not in the record and are irrelevant in
any event; (b) Hillen is the legal title holder to the Gowen Property, pursuant to the Rule 70
Judgment; and (c) Hillen has the power and authority to eject Gibson from the Gowen Property,
pursuant to the Uniform Probate Code ("U.P.C."). Each point is discussed in tum.
A.

The Court Should Not Consider the Irrelevant Assertions in Gibson's
Briefing.

Despite agreeing that this is properly a motion for judgment on the pleadings,2
Gibson sets forth pages of assertions and generalized commentary describing why Gibson views
his occupation of the Gibson Property as a boon, rather than a burden. Hillen disagrees with
Gibson's comments. However, they are irrelevant to Hillen's ejectment claim.

1

Capitalized terms not defined herein shall have the same meaning as in prior briefing.

2

Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings, filed
September 12, 2019 ("Opposition Memorandum") at 7 (In this action, it appears the [C]ourt has not been asked to
look outside the pleadings, as they seek a legal analysis, and we accommodate that analysis .... ").

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PARTIAL JUDGMENT ON
THE PLEADINGS AND MOTION TO CERTIFY JUDGMENT UNDER I.R.C.P. 54(B) - 1
14736069.3

000111

All the Court needs to determine on Hillen’s motion is whether the three elements
of ejectment—ownership by Hillen, possession by Gibson, and refusal by Gibson to surrender
possession—are present from the pleadings. Gibson concedes the second and third elements,
leaving only ownership to be decided by the Court, which Hillen will discuss in the next section
of this brief. The point to be made, however, is that the assertions Gibson makes are irrelevant to
the task before the Court—which is to determine whether Hillen owns the Gowen Property and
may eject Gibson.
B.

The Rule 70 Judgment Establishes Hillen as the Lawful Owner of the Gowen
Property.
The pleadings are more than sufficient to establish Hillen’s ownership interest in

the Gowen Property. The Rule 70 Judgment states, in no uncertain terms: “The Court does hereby
vest in the Personal Representative as of May 5, 2017, any and all real property of any kind or
nature . . . including but not limited to [the Gowen Property.]”
Further, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the Rule 70 Judgment in Matter of
Estate of Smith, 164 Idaho 457, 463, 432 P.3d 6, 12 (2018). The opening paragraph of Smith states
that Vernon appealed from decisions of the magistrate court “and a corresponding judgment
entered pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 70(b) [the Rule 70 Judgment]. We affirm the
decisions of the magistrate court.” Matter of Estate of Smith, 164 Idaho 457, 463, 432 P.3d 6, 12
(2018). Given the ruling in Smith, Hillen undisputedly owns the Gowen Property and can assert
all powers associated with such ownership.
Of course, Gibson claims the decision in Smith is dicta. His argument lacks merit.
First, Hillen does not need Smith to establish ownership. The bottom line is that Hillen holds a
Rule 70 Judgment vesting title in the Gowen Property to Hillen. As stated in 47 Am.Jur.2d
Judgments § 754, “A judgment of a court having jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PARTIAL JUDGMENT ON
THE PLEADINGS AND MOTION TO CERTIFY JUDGMENT UNDER I.R.C.P. 54(B) - 2
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is presumptively binding until set aside in a manner prescribed by law.” Gibson has done nothing
to set aside the Judgment. Accordingly, it is valid and binding.
Second, the comments in Smith are not dicta. As noted by Gibson, the Court
recognized that the Rule 70 Judgment vested title to all of Victoria’s real and personal property in
Hillen. Smith, 164 Idaho at 466, 432 P.3d at 15. The Court then addressed “any matters occurring
up to and including the post-trial judgment under Rule 70(b)[.]” Id. (emphasis added). After
considering any matters up to and including the veracity of the Rule 70 Judgment, the Supreme
Court concluded that “the decisions of the magistrate court are affirmed.” Id. at 482, 432 P.3d at
31. This is not dicta. It is a direct and clear ruling from the highest court in the state.
C.

Hillen Has the Power to Eject Gibson From the Gowen Property.
Gibson argues that a Personal Representative’s power over estate property is

limited to satisfying estate debts, with the remaining power having become “vested” in the heirs
at the time of the decedent’s death. 2’s Opposition Memorandum at 14. Because this is the case,
according to Gibson, Hillen has no power to eject Gibson from the Gowen Property. Gibson’s
arguments are incorrect.
First, Gibson’s arguments conflict with Idaho statute. The U.P.C. states that
personal representatives—such as Hillen—have “the same power over the title to property of the
estate that an absolute owner would have, in trust however, for the benefit of the creditors and
others interested in the estate.” I.C. § 15-3-711. An absolute owner of the Gowen Property would
have a sufficient interest to eject an unwelcome party therefrom. The plain language of the U.P.C.
vests Hillen with that same power. Accordingly, Hillen has the authority to bring this ejectment
action against Gibson.
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Second, Gibson’s claim is illogical and runs counter to the U.P.C. Section 15-3101, for example, expressly provides that rights of heirs—like Vernon—“are subject to the
restrictions and limitations” of the U.P.C. That same Uniform Probate Code caused Hillen to be
lawfully appointed the Personal Representative and the Probate Court to vest in him all of the
Estate’s real property, including the Gowen Property.
Third, Fairchild does not support Gibson. Fairchild

reiterates the statutory

mandate that a decedent’s property devolves to his heirs at death. It in no way impugns the statutory
provision holding that the property devolution is subject to estate administration. Fairchild v.
Fairchild, 106 Idaho 147, 151, 676 P.2d 722, 726 (Ct. App. 1984).
Fourth, the Ellmaker case cited by Gibson is similar, but actually represents a more
direct refutation of Gibson’s point. True, the case says a decedent’s property devolves to intestate
heirs upon death. However, the Court in Ellmaker only allowed the action to recover the property
in that case because “no court proceeding concerning the succession or administration of [the
decedent’s] estate ha[d] occurred.” Ellmaker v. Tabor, 160 Idaho 576, 580, 377 P.3d 390, 394
(2015). By contrast, in this case an administration of the Estate—which is a court administered
estate—has occurred and any transfer of the decedent’s property will not be effective absent order
of the Probate Court.
Fifth, Gibson’s repeated reference to Idaho Code Section 15-3-711 is unavailing.
Gibson cites to the foregoing provision for the proposition that Hillen does not hold a sufficient
ownership interest to eject Gibson from the Gowen Property. However, Section 15-3-711 and its
comments actually state the opposite. As to the latter, the comments to Section 15-3-711 make it
clear that the power conferred on Hillen is “the broadest possible ‘power over title.’” The
comments go on to note that the power is “conceived to embrace all possible transactions which
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PARTIAL JUDGMENT ON
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might result in a conveyance or encumbrance of assets, or in a change o(possession." (emphasis
added). If Hillen is entitled to effectuate a change of possession with respect to Estate property, it
is unclear how Hillen could ever lack the authority to remove an individual from Estate property
that is unlawfully possessing the same. That is what Hillen is doing here.

III.

CONCLUSION

The pleadings in this case establish each element of an ejectment action.
Accordingly, Hillen requests that the Court, among other things, grant the motion at bar, enter a
partial judgment with respect to Count One, certify the corresponding judgment as final under
Rule 54(b), and issue a writ of assistance restoring possession of the Gowen Property to Hillen. 3
DATED this 18th day of September, 2019.
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP

By /Randall A. Peterman
Randall A. Peterman - Of the Firm
Alexander P. McLaughlin - Of the Firm
Jack W. Relf- Of the Firm
Attorneys for Plaintiff

3

Gibson does not argue that Hillen is not entitled to a writ of assistance or Rule 54(b) certificate.

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PARTIAL JUDGMENT ON
THE PLEADINGS AND MOTION TO CERTIFY JUDGMENT UNDER I.R.C.P. 54(B) - 5
14736069.3

000115

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 18th day of September, 2019, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
PARTIAL JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AND MOTION TO CERTIFY
JUDGMENT UNDER I.R.C.P. 54(B) to be served by the method indicated below, and addressed
to the following:
Vernon K. Smith, Jr.
1900 W. Main St.
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Attorney for Defendant

[ ]
[X]
[ ]
[ ]
[X]

U.S. Mail
Facsimile (208) 345-1129
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
Email/iCourt: vkslaw@live.com

Isl Randall A. Peterman
Randall A. Peterman

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PARTIAL JUDGMENT ON
THE PLEADINGS AND MOTION TO CERTIFY JUDGMENT UNDER I.R.C.P. 54(B) - 6
14736069.3

000116

N0-----=,,..----11;00 F1l.fI)
A.M,- - ' - " - - - P.M - - - -

OCT O2 2019
PHI!.. McGRANE, Cieri(

TIIE DI TRlCT CO R OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DI TRlCT Of Tl l ffi:,EMILYCHILD
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TATE OF IDAHO. f A D FOR TH CO

TY OF ADA

OAH G. HILLE . in his capacity as Personal Case o. CV0l - 19-10368
Representative of the Estate of Victoria 11.
mith,
Plaintiff,

MEMORAND M DE I 10 A D
ORDER GRA TTNG PLAI TIFF'
MOTIO FOR PARTIAL JUDGME T
0 THE PLEADI G

DA YID R. GIB O , an individual d/b/a
BLACK DIAMO D OMPO. T
PROD CT .
Defendant.

I.

I TROD CTIO
oah Hillen, as personal representative of Victoria mith' s estate. seeks to eject David

Gibson and his business. Black Diamond Compost Product . from property owned by Victoria's
e tate (the "Gowen Property. ' defined belo"")- Hillen al o seeks to quiet title to the Gowen
Property and asserts claim for trespass and unj ust enrichment against Gib on.
l lillen now moves for summary judgment on the ejectment count, claiming that
Victoria's estate owns the Gowen Property. that Gib on is in pos e ion of it, and that Gibson
refuses to surrender possession. Hillen also ask the ourt to enter partial final judgment under

l.R.C.P. 54(b) on his cjccunent claim and i sue a writ of as i tance.
The 'ourt took the motion under ad isement after the hearing held on cptembcr 30.
20 I 9. For the reasons that follow, the Court grants IIillen's motion for judgment on the
pleading . Following this order's entry, the Court will enter partial final judgment under I.R.C.P.
54(b) and issue a writ of assistance.

II.

TA DAROS
A part) may move for judgment on the pleading once "the pleadings arc closed."

l.R.C.P. 12(c). uch motions are decided according to the rules for summary judgment. Union

Bank. .V.A . ,·. J V L.L. .. 163 Idaho 306. 3 11. 41 3 P.3d 407. 412 (2017) (quoting Trimble ,,.
Engelking. I 30 Idaho 300, 302, 939 P.2d 1379. I 38 l (1997)). In thee ent the Court relies on
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materials outside of the pleadings. the motion for j udgment on the pleadings convert into one
for summar) judgment. requiring the ourt to gi c the parties "a reasonable opportunity to
present all the material that is pertinent to the motion." I.R.C.P. 12(d).
ummary judgment is proper "if the movant shows that there is no genuine di pute os to
any material fact and the mo anti entitled to judgment as a mancr of law." I.R. .P. 56(a). To
obtain summary judgment against a claim or defense of the nonmo ant. the mo ant must show
that th~ evidence docs not support an element of the challenged claim or defense. E.g , I foldaway
\. Broulim '

upermarket. 158 Idaho 606, 611. 349 P.3d 1197. 1202(20 15). That can be done b)

offering evidence dispro ing that element, by demonstrating that the nonmovant i unable to
offer e idence pro ing that element, or in both of tho e ways. Id. ; see al o I.R. . P. 56 c)(l). The
movant then is entitled to summary judgment unless the norunovant ' respondfsl ... with specific
facts ho" ing there is a genuine i sue for trial." Wright v. Ada Cry.. 160 Idaho 491. 495. 376
P.3d 58, 62 (20 16). By contrast. 'laJ mere cintilla of evidence or only slight doubt as to the facts
is not sufficient" to a,oid summary judgment. Id. In deciding v.hether to grant summary
judgment, the trial court must construe the record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.
drawing all rea ·onable inferences in the nonmovant' s favor. Id

II I.

ALLEGATIO
rhis action centers on the Gowen Property, which is "real property located in Ada

County, de eribed as Ada County Assessor s Parcel

o. I 505220000, in the orthwest ¼ of

ection 5. I own. hip 2 . Range 2E. Boise Meridian. located off Pleasant Valley Road south, est
of its intersection with West Gowen Road." (Comp!.

9.) The panics appear to agree that

ictoria owned the Gowen Property at some point before her death. ( ee Comp!. , 2. 9
(alleging I lillcn owns the Gowen Property. o tensibly via the Rule 70(b) order entered in the
probate case); Answer 4 (claiming Vernon .'mith O\J ns a two-thirds interest in the Gowen
Property as one of ictoria's heir).) Victoria died eptember 11, 2013. (Answer ' 4.)
Gib. on currently occupies the Gowen Propcn . (Comp!. .: 11 , 19; n wer '

11 . 19.)

On it. Gibson operate what the parties variously describe as a" olid \\aste proce ing
operation," ( ompl. 41 12). or an "agricultural com po ·ting facility," (Answer 41 12).

ibson says

he has permission from one of ictoria's heir . cmon mith. to operate this business on the
Gowen Propert) . (Id.

41

10.)

2
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On June 2. 2017, in the probate case for Victoria's estate, Judge Cheri op ·ey entered an
order "convey[ing] Lhe properties to Mr. I lillcn in his status as a Per onal Repre entative."
( ompl. Ex. A. at 2.) The order doe not list v,hat "properties" were conveyed. but the
subsequently-entered judgment ("Judgment") lists property with descriptions matching that of
the Gowen Property. Compare Judgement on Mot. oder Rule 70(b) [hereinafter "Judgment"],

Ex. B. at Parcel 6. Unit II, Parcel A & B, In re Estate of mirh. Ada County Case o.
2014-15352 (Idaho Dist. Ct. judgment entered June 2, 2017), 1 with Comp!.
d cription matching Parcel 6.

V-IE-

9 (Gowen Property

nit 11. Parcels A & B described in the Judgment). The Judgment

' est[. j in the Per onal Representative as of May 5, 20 17. any and all real property of any kind
or nature. including ... [the Gowen Property]. uch vesting is free and clear of any lien. claim or
interest of the laimants." one of whom was Vernon. Judgement at§ 11, Ex. B. Thi Judgment
was affirmed on appeal after Vernon challenged the underlying grant of summary judgment. See
In re Estate of 'mith. 164 Idaho 457. 466, 482, 432 P.3d 6, 15, 31 (2018).

On December 21. 20 l 9. Hillen sent a notice of termination of occupancy. demanding that
Gibson cea e operations and lea e the Gowen Property by January 31. 2019. (Comp!. fi 13. Ex.

B; Answer

13.) Gibson did not vacate, and refu es to surrender pos ession of the Gowen

Property. (Comp!. '

14. 20~ Answer ., 14. 20.)

After this refu ·al to vacate, I IiJlen filed suit against Gibson. asserting the following
claims: ount One for ejectment. ount Two for declaratory judgment to quiet title to the Gowen
Property. Count Three for trespass. and Count Four for unjust enrichment.
As noted above. Hillen now move for partial judgment on the pleading on ount One.
The main dispute is over who ovms the Go\! en Property. Based on the Judgment, Hillen claim
he has authority to eject Gib on from the Go\l en Property. Gib on argue that Vernon own the
Gowen Property as one of Victoria's heir . lea ing Hillen without authority to eject ,ib on.
1

Per Hillen' request, the ourt take judicial notice of the Judgment under I.R.E. 201. It i
attached to this order. Becau e Ilillen 's complaint contains an exhibit- which is "part of the
pleading for all purpo es," I.R.C.P. l0(c)--that references the Judgment, ( ompl. Ex. A. at 2).
and the Judgment is central to Hillcn's claim. considering the Judgment docs not convert
I Ji lien's motion into one for summary judgment, see, e.K,. Citadel Grp. Ltd. v. Wash. Reg 'I Med.
Ctr. , 692 F.3d 580. 591 (7th Cir. 20 12) (citing Brownmark Film , LLC v. Comedy Partners. 682
F.3d 687, 690 (7th ir.2012)) (applying federal version of I.R.C.P. I2(b)). In any e ent, whether
the pre ent motion should be treated as one for judgment on the pleading or for ummary
judgment i immaterial, as the standard is the same and the parties have had "a reasonable
opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion.' l.R.C.P. 12(d).

3
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I .

A1 ALY I

A.

ount One: Ejectment

To ucceed on his ejectmcnt claim. Hillen must prove '( l) ownership. (2) pos cssion b)
the defendant[]. and (3) refusal of the dcfondant[J to surrender possession.» PHff .\Jortg. Servs.

Corp. v. Perreira, 146 Idaho 63 1, 63 7. 200 P.3d I 180, 1186 (2009) (quoting Ada Cty. 1/ighway
Dist. \' Total uccess lnvs.. LLC. 145 Idaho 360. 369. 179 P.3d 323, 332 (2008)). Gibson admits
the sc ond and third elements. (Answer ., 11, 14. 19-20.) The parties' disagreement centers on
the first clement of ownership.
The Judgment clearly gives l lillen o·wncr hip of the Gowen Property. as it "vest[s] in
[Hillen] ... any and all real property of any kind of nature, including ... lthe Gowen Property)."
Judgment at

s II. Ex. B. This Judgment was upheld on appeal. In re Estate of

mith, 164 Idaho at

466. 482,432 P.3d at 15. 3 1. Jt conclusi ely shows Hillen has O\-mership of the Gowen Propcrt)
as the per onaJ representative of Victoria' s estate.
Gibson di agrees with this conclusion. Although he admits that the Judgment meant that
" [t]he po session of the Gowen [Property}. for the purpo e of administration of the E ta le. was
restored to Victoria.' (De f.' Mem. Opp' n Pl. 's Mot. Partial J. Pleading I 0-11). he argue that
title immediately pas ed from

ictoria's estate to her heirs. And as one of the hei r . Vernon has

the right to determine who may po. e s the Go"en Property. not I Iillen. This. Gibson claims. is
ullicient to defeat Hillen' motion.
In support of his argument. ,ib.on point · out that "[u]pon the death of a person." a
decedent's property ''de olve to ... [the] heirs." LC .. 15-3-101. Idaho courts have interpreted
this to mean that "(tjhe legal title to estate propert) ests in the heirs or devisees upon the death
of the decedent. " £//maker v. Tahor, 160 Idaho 576,580.377 P.3d 390. 394 (2015) (quoting

Pierce v. Franci. , 194 P.3d 505. 510 ( olo.

l.

App. 2008)): ee also Fairchild v. Fairchild. I 06

klaho 147. 150. 676 P.2d 722. 725 ( t. App. 1984) (trial court correctly concluded that heir
became cotcnants upon decedent's death).
Gibson is correct that propert) immediately devolves to the heirs upon the decedent's
dt.:a1h., ee I. .

15-3-10 l. But Gib on gi es only 1he general rule. which like man) legal rules is

subject 10 exception.. The statute Gibson points to clear)) state that "the rights of ... heirs to la
decedent'sJ propert) are ubjcct to the restrictions and limitations contained in this code to
facilitate the prompt settlement of estates." Id. One of tho e restrictions is a personal
4
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representative's "right land obligation) to ... take po es ion or control of .. . the decedent's
propen) ." LC. § 15-3-709. The personal representative's right i. the "same power over the title
to propen) or the estate that an absolute o" ner would ha,e. in trust however. for the benefit of
the creditors and others interested in the estate." LC . . 15-3-711 (emphasis added). This power
continues "f ujntil termination of [the personal rcprcscntative'sj appointment." Id.
Gibson argues that the " power" given by statute is not the same a. giving " title." and that
I lillen does not have power to eject Gibson because Vernon holds title. Gibon's interpretation is
not upponed by the official comment . Thi "power over title of an absolute owner is conceived
to embrace all possible transactions" including those re ulting "in a change of rights of
possession." Id. cmt. The comment explains that the rea. on for giving the personal representative
a "power" instead of "title" is "because the pov,er concept eases the succession of assets which
arc not po se ed by the personal rcprcscntati,e. Thus, if the power i unt!xerci ed prior to its
termination. its lap e clears the title of .. . heirs." Id.
This .. lap ·e" noted in the comment stem from the rule that a personal repre ·entati ve is
not required to take possession of all the estate's assets, as "any real property or tangible
per. onal property !MY be left with or surrendered to the person presumptively entitled thereto.'·
I. C. § 15-3-709 (emphasis added). If so lcfi, title pas e. immediately to the he ir, as the per onal
reprcscntati, e has not exercised his statutory po", cr over the property. See I. . § 15-3- 10 I. On
the other hand. the per onal representative can decide. in his own j udgment. that the '·po e sion
of the propcrt) by him will be necessary for purpo ·e of administration." LC . · 15-3-709. rhe
personal representative• di cre1ion in this matter is absolute. as "(1)he request by a personal
representative for delivery of an) property po · ·es ·ed by an heir or devisee is conclusive
evidence. in any action against the heir or devisee for po se · ion thereof. that the possession of
the property by the personal reprc. cntati e is necessary for purpose of administration." Id.
(emphasis added). o contrary to Gibson's position. the fact that the tatute gi es a "power"
in tcad of " title" does not matter-even without holding title. Hillen would still have the po\.\'er
of an absolute owner over the Gowen Propcrt). which includes determining who can occupy it.
The c~ e cited by Gib on do not compel a different re ult. T hey stand for the general
rule that a decedent' s propeny immediately de. cends to an heir upon the decedent' . death. but
neither one addressed the language in I.C. § 15-3-10 l that an heir' s right to a decedent ' s propeny
"are subject to restrictions and limitations." See generally. El/maker. 160 Idaho 5761 377 P.Jd
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390; Fairchild. 106 Idaho 147. 676 P.2d Tl?.. In those ca es. there was no need to consider a
per onaJ reprc cntativc's temporary power over the property. and its effect on an heir's right to
immediate vesting of tjtle. In El/maker 'there was no probate of [the decedent's1estate." 160
Idaho at 580. 377 P.3d at 394. o there "'ould not ha c been a personal representative. And
although in Fairchild the estate had been probated. the issue in that cru;e was whether one heir
had adversely possessed the property or instead wru; a cotenant with the other heirs by common
inheritance. I 06 Idaho at 150. 676 P.2d at 725. 1t had nothing to do with the personal
rcprc cntati e's temporary power to control the property. ee id. Becau e neither El/maker or
Fairchild addres ed any sort of "restriction" mentioned in LC.

15-3-101, their holdings arc no

more than reiterations of the general rule. They do not help in deciding the cope of a personal
rcpre entativc' temporary tatutory power O\Cr a decedent s property.
Gib ·on also argues that a per onal rcpre. entati e' s power is limited. and can be u ed onl)
''to the e tent nece sary for the administration of that property in the interests of creditor a11d
other i11terel·ted per on ."(Def.' · Mem. Opp'n Pl.'

ot. Partial J. Pleadings 11.) It is true that a

personal representative' s temporary power i · held "in trust ... for the benefit of the creditors and
others interested in the est.ate." I.C. § I5-3-71 1. Thi creates a fiduciary duty, but contrar) to
Gib on's assertion. does not lim it the per onal representative's power to control the property.
Whether possession of property is "neces ary for purposes of administration" is left to the ole
discretion of the personal repre entati, e. "ho ·e request "i conclusive evidence, in any action
against the heir ... for posses ion thereof. that the po session of the property by the personal
representative is nece sary for purpo es of admini tration." I. .. 15-3-709. In other \\Ord , ~
the comment notes. an heir ma. be able to sue " for breach of fiduciary duty. but thi po sibilit)
should not interfere with the personal representati e' administrative authority as it relates to
posses ion of the estate." Id. cmt. o even if fli llen might . omchow violate his fiduciary duty to
Vernon by ejecting Gibson. the proper course is for Vernon to sue Hillen for breach of fiduciary
duty. But Gibson has not claimed such relief. nor could he do so, a he i · not an heir to Victoria's
e ·tate.
Finally. Gibson argues that whether title was, ested in Hillen instead of Vernon

wa'i

not

litigated in the probate case or on appeal in In re E rare of. milh. and o the Judgment doe · not
determine title. But the Judgment clearly· vcst[cd] in [Jlillen] ... any and all real propert) of an)
kind or nature. including .. . [the Gowen Propen) )" and specificall) noted that "[s]uch "e ting i

6
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free and clear of any lien. claim or interest of the laimants.'' which included Vernon. Judgement
at§ 11, l:.x. 1:3. Gibson cannot, as a part of thi ca e. collaterall_ attack the Judgment. ee ·rare v.

1/eyrend, 129 Idaho 568. 571. 929 P.2d 744. 747 (Ct. App. 1996) (panic generally cannot
collaterally attack a judgment entered in another case unless the attack is based on lack of subject
matter jurisdiction). If, as Gibson claims, the Judgment could not ha e done what it purported to
do. then Vernon hould ha e moved in that case for relief from the judgment under I.R . .P.
60(b). Gibson es entially reque ts that the Court act as an appellate court and overrule the
Judgment in the other case. something it cannot do. The ourt grants Hillcn's motion for partial
judgment on the pleadings.
B.

Entry of judgment under I.R. .P. 54(b)

Ha ing granted his motion for partiaJ judgment on the pleadings, the Court next
addresses llillen 's request for entry of partial final judgment under LR. '. P 54(b). If a complaint
contains multiple claims. the Court '·may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more. but
fewer than all. claims ... only if the court expressly dctcnnines that there is no just reason for
delay." I.R.C.P. 54(b). ·ntcringjudgment under 1.R.C.P. 54(b) comes within the ourt's
discretion. PHH Morrg. . ervs. Corp., 146 Idaho at 636. 200 P.3d at 1185 (quoting Brinkmeyer v.

Brinkmeyer. 135 Idaho 596. 599. 21 P.3d 918. 921 (200 I)).
In the underlying probate or ictoria' estate. Jlillen eek · to ell the Gowen Property as
part of his duties as a per onal repre entati e. (See Hillen Deel. ' 5.) The probate court granted
his motion to put up the Go",en Property for ale. (id. 6. Ex. 8), but Gibson's presence on the
land has impeded thi proce ·. (id. " I 0). Gibson has not presented any reason for why judgment
should not be entered at this time. nor has he opposed this part of Hillen's motion. The ourt
find · there i no ju treason for delay and that entry of partial final judgment on Count One i
warranted under LR. . P. 54(b).
Writ of a i tancc

The Court next turns to I lillen' r~uest for a writ of assistance. Whether to grant a writ
of assi tance is made in the ourt's di cretion. Pro lndivi o, Inc. v..\1id-lvlile Holdini Tr.. 131
Idaho 741. 745, 963 P.2d 1178, 1182 ( 1998) (citing cases). uch a writ "is a fonn of process
is ·uc:d b) a court or equit) to transfer the po session of propert) , and more spc:cificall) land. . the
title or right to which it has previously adjudicated." Id. at 746,963 P.2d at 1183 (quoting Eagle

Rock ·orp. v. ldamonl /101el Co. 60 Idaho 639, 647, 95 P.2d 838 841 ( 1939)). "The writ of
7
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ai.; i. tance is an equitable remedy and the power to issue such 'wTit terns from the need of the

court to enforce its own decrees." Curti. v. Campbell. 105 Idaho 705. 707. 672 P.2d 1035. 1037
( 1983) (citing U , . l\'ar '/ Bank ofOr. "· Chave:. 574 P.2d 647 (Or. 1978)).
Whether Lo grant such a writ involves a simple analysis: "The sole question to be
determined on the motion is wht:ther applicant has a right. as again Lthe party in pos e sion Lo
use the \.vrit to obtain po ession." Pro Jndiviso, inc .. 13 1 Idaho at 746, 963 P.2d at 1183
(quoting Eagle. Rock Corp.. 60 Idaho at 648. 95 P.2d at 841 ). " In the absence of an, claim of an
independent paramount title. the only question on such application is ,vhether the decree has or
has not b en complied with." Id.
As di cu cd above. l lillen has the right to eject Gibson from the Gowen Property. This

leaves the question of whether Gib on has complied with the order. The Court recognize that
the typical course would be to refrain from issuing a writ of assi lance until after the party fail

to comply v:ith the judgment. In this case. however. such a ,,aiting period would be pointle . as
it ccms likely that Gib on v. ill not comply in a timely manner. Hi future non-compliance seems
likel) for two reason. : First, when at the hearing the Court asked Gib on whether he would
comply v. ith a judgment against him. Gib on failed to give an unequi ocal answer in the
affirmative. ccond. Vernon' conduct in the underlying probate case reveals a dilatory pancm.
and the Court is concerned that cmon. as Gib on' coun el. will continue thi pattern by
encouraging his client to not immediately comply with the judgment. A waiting period in this
instance eemingly would serve no purpose but to further delay the probate of Victoria' · e ·tatc
and waste here ·tate'. re. ourcc by requiring it to again request a v.,Tit of as i tance after Gib ·on
fails to om ply. ·1o aYoid such a waste of time. and belie ing a writ v. ill likely be neces

ST)

to

en fore~ the judgment, the Court grant · Hillen' . request for a writ of as istance.
V.

0 CL

10

Iiilien's motion fo r partial judgment on the pleadings is GR

TED. Judgment and a writ

of as i tance will be entered eparately.

IT I ' 'O ORDERED.

er·

Dated this

L~ay

of October. 2
~
0 1~
~ - -- - - tc

ppl

D strict Judge
8
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NO
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OCT O2 2019
PHIL McGRANE, Clerk

THE 01 TRI T COUR OF THE FOURTH JUDI IAL DI. TRJCT OF TMaw11vc1-1:LD
,

• TATE OF JD HO. I A D FOR TI IE CO

O:J>~ rl'

TY OF ADA

1OAH

G. HILLE . in his capacity as Personal Case o. CV0 1-1 9-1 0368
Representati e of the Estate of ictoria 11.
'mith,
J DGME T

Plaintiff.
V.

DAVID R. GIB O . an individual d/b/a
BLACK DIAMO D COMPO T
PROOUCI ·.
Defendant.

J DGME T L E TERED A FOLLOW :

Judgment is granted in fen or of oah G. Hillen. as personal representative of the estate of
Victoria I I. mith. on ount One of his complaint. Da id R. Gib on d/b/a Black Diamond
ompost Product hall immediately acate and surrender po session of the premises de ·cribcd
below:
A<la ' ounty Assessor' Parcel o. 1505220000, in the orthwe. t ¼ of ection 5.

1 ownship 2 , Range 2E. Boise Meridian. located off Pleasant VaJley Road south\\-e t of its
intersection with We t Go, en Road.

Dated this

~/4)' of October. 2019.
Di ·trict Judge
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R LE 54(b) ERTl FICATE
With respect !o the issues determined by the above partial judgment it is hereby
CERTIFIED, in accordance ,vith Rule 54(b). I.R.C.P., that the court has determined that there is
no just rea on for delay of the entry of a final judgment and that the court has and does hereby
direct that the above partial judgment is a final judgment upon which execution may issue and an
appeal may be taken as provided by the Tdaho Appellate Rules.
Dated this / ~ o f October, 2019.

District Judge

2
000127

CERTIFICATE OF MAILI G

,.J
I hereby certify that on this _)__ day of October. 20 19. l emailed (served) a true and correct copy
of the within instrument to:

Jack W. Relf
Alexander McLaughlin

GIVE S PURSLEY
jackrelf@ givenspursley.com
apm@ givenspursley.com

Vernon K Smith Jr
Anomey at Law
vk law@ live.com

PHIL MCGRANE
Clerk of the District Court

f

c.Lll.

•

II I

't '

•••

By: / 4 .
Deputy Court Clerk

•
••
,

,,

•

........••

111 I 111111 1 , ,

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
000128

...

OCT O3 2019
Tl IE DI TRI CT CO R OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DI TRICT OF THI[- ;~icGRANE, Cieri<
, CMILYCHILO
TAT OF IDAHO, I

A1 D FOR TIIE CO

OAH G. HILLE , in his capacity as Personal
Rcpre.entati e of the Estate of Victoria H.
mith,

Case

TY OF

D

o. CV0 1- 19- 10368

AW'\.Lv-.d.µ
MEMORAND M DE I 10

Plainti ff,
\'.

OEPVTY

D

ORDER GRA TI G PLAI
MOTIO FOR PARTIAL J
0 THE PLEADI G

T

DAVID R. GIB O . an individual d/b/a
BLACK DIAMO D COMPO T

PRODUCT .
Defendant.

I TROD CTIO

I.

oah Hillen, as personal representative of Victoria mith 's estate. seeks to eject David
Gibson and his busine s, Black Diamond Compost Products. from property owned by Victoria' s
estate {the "Gowen Property." defined below). J lillen also seeks to quiet title to the Gowen
Prope y and asserts claims for trespass and unjust enrichment against Gibson.
Hillen now mo es for summary judgment on the cjectment count, claiming that
ictoria' s e tate own the Gowen Property. that Gib on i in po e ion of it, and that Gib on
refuses to surrender pos ession. Hillen al o asks the Court to enter partial final judgment under
l.R.C.P. 54(b) on his ejectment claim and issue a writ of as i tance.
The Court took the motion under advisement afler the hearing held on eptember 30.
20 19. For the reasons that follow. the Court grants Hillen s motion for judgment on the
plcadir gs. Follov.,ing this order s entry. the Court will enter partial final judgment under I.R.C.P.
54(b) and is ue a \.\Tit of as i tance.

JJ .

TA DARO
A pany may mo e for judgment on the pleadings once 'the pleading are clo ed."

l.R.C .P. 12(c). ·uch motions arc decided according to the ruJe for summary judgment. Union

Bank.

1.A.

,,. J V L.L.C.. 163 Idaho 306, 311.41 3 P.3d 407. 412 (2017) (quoting Trimble v.

En~elking. 130 Idaho 300, 302. 939 P.2d 1379, 1381 ( 1997)). In thee ent the Court relie on
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materials outside of the pleadings. the motion for judgment on the pleadings convert into one
for summary judgmenL requfring the Court to gi e the parties "a reasonable opportunity to
present aJl the material that is pertinent to the motion." I.R.C.P. 12(d).
ummary judgment is proper "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute a to
any material fact and the mo ant is entitled to judgment as a manerofla\.\." I.R.C.P. 56(a). To
obtain ummary judgment against a claim or defense of the nonmovant, the movant mu ·t how
that the evidence doe not support an clement of the challenged claim or defense. E.g., I foldaway
v. Broulim 's Supermarket. 158 Idaho 606. 61 I. 349 P .3d 1197. 1202 (2015 ). That can be done by

offering C\ idence disproving that clement. by demonstrating that the nonmovant i unable to
offer evidence proving that element, or in both of tho c ways. Id: see also I.R. '.P. 56(c)(l). The
movant then is entitled to summary judgment unless the nonmovant "respond[s] . . . with pecific
facts showing there i a genuine issue for trial." Wright "· Ada Cry., I 60 Idaho 491. 495. 376
P .3d 58. 62 (20 I 6 ). By contrast.

"ral mere

cintilla of evidence or only slight doubt a to the facts

i~ not sufficient" to a oid ummary judgment. Id. In deciding, hether to grant summary
judgment. the trial court mu ·t construe the record in the light mo t fa orable to the nonmovant.
drawing all reasonable inferences in the nonmovant's favor. Id.

HI.

ALLEGA TIO
lni action centers on the Gowen Property. which is "real property located in

Count)', described as Ada

ounty A e sor's Parcel

o.

1505220000. in the

da

orthwe l ¼ of

ection 5. Township 2 . Range 2E. Boi e Meridian. located off Pleasant Valley Road south\,e t
of its inter ection with West Gowen Road . '(Comp!. ' 9.) The parties appear to agree that
Victoria owned the Gowen Property at some point before her death. ( ee Compl. '

2. 9

(alleging I lillcn own the Gowen Property. ostensibly ia the Rule 70(b) order entered in the
probate case): /\n wcr

4 (claiming Vernon mith owns a two-third intere tin the Gowen

Property as one of ictoria's heirs).)

ietoria died ' eptember 11. 2013. (An wer ' 4.)

Gib ·on currently occupies the Go\.\en Property. (Comp!. •
On it, Gibson operates what the panic

11. 19: Answer '

I I. 19.)

ariously de cribe a a 'solid waste processing

operation," (Comp!.' 12). or an "agricultural compo ting facilit) ." (An wer ' 12). Gibson says
he has pcnnission from one of Victoria's heirs.
Gowen Propcrt) . (Id.

crnon • mith. to operate thi business on the

I 0.)

2
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On June 2, 2017. in the probate ca-:;e for Victoria' estate. Judge Cheri Cop ey entered an
order "con c lingJ the properties to Mr. Hillen in hi. statu as a Personal Represcntati c."
(Comp!. x. A. at 2.) The order doe nol li t what "properties" were con c ed. but the
subsequently-entered judgment ("Judgment") lists property with descriptions matching that of
the Gowen Property. Compare Judgement on Mot. Under Rule 70(b) [hereinafter' Judgment"l.
x. B. at Parcel 6,

nit II. Parcels A & f3. In re fatale of, mith. Ada ounty a e o. CV-I ·-

20 I4-15352 (Idaho Dist.

l. judgment

entered June 2. 2017). 1 with ·ompl. 9 (Gowen Property

description matching Parcel 6. Unit II. Parcels A & B de cribed in the Judgment). The Judgment
"vestIsJ in the Personal Representative as of Ma) S. 2017. any and aJI real property of any kind
or narurc, including . . . [the Gowen Property j. :ueh e. ting i free and clear of any lien, claim or
interest or the Claimants." one of whom was emon. Judgemenl at · II, Ex. 8 . This Judgment
was aflirrned on appeal after cmon challenged the underlying grant of summary judgment. See

In re £ ·tale of mirh. 164 Idaho 457. 466, 482. 432 P.3d 6, 15. 31 (2018).
On December 21. 2019. Hillen ent a notice of termination of occupancy. demanding that
Gib on cease operations and lea c the Gov.en Property by January 31.2019. (Com pl.
B; Answer

13. E

13.) ib on did not vacate. and rcfu. cs to surrender po ·session of the Gowen

Propert) . (Comp!. '

14. 20; Answer ' 14. 20.)

After thi rcfusal to "acate. I Ii lien filed suit against Gib on. as erting the follo,.ving
claim : Count One for ejectment, ount Two for declaratory judgment to quiet title to the Gowen
Property. ount Three for trespass. and Count Four for unjust enrichment.
As noted above. l lillcn now move for partial judgment on the pleadings on ·ount One.
The main dispute i over who own the Go\\en Property. Based on the Judgment, I lillen claim.
he has authority to eject Gib on from the Gowen Property. Gibson argues that emon own. the
Gowen Property as one of Victoria's heir. leaving Hillen without authority to eject Gibson.
1

Per I lillen's request. the Court takes judicial notice of the Judgment under l.R.E. 20 I. It is
attached to this order. Because Hillen' complaint contains an exhibit- which i part of the
pleading for all purpo es," l.R.C.P. l0(c)-that references the Judgment, (Compl. E . A. at 2).
and the Judgment i central to llillcn's claim. con idering the Judgment does not con en
Hillen 's motion into one for surnrnary judgment. see, e.g.. Citadel G,p. Lid. v. Wa h. Reg 'I Med
Ctr., 692 F.3d 580. 591 (7th 'ir. 2012) (citing Brownmark Films. LLC v. Comedy Partners, 682
f .3d 687, 690 (7th Cir. 2012)) (applying federal ersion ofl.R .. P. 12(b)). Jn any e ent. whether
the pre ent motion should be treated as one for judgment on the pleadings or for summary
judgment is immaterial a the standard is the same and the parties ha c had "a reasonable
opportunity to present aJl the material that is pertinent to the motion." l.R. '. P. 12(d).
3
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IV.

A ALY I ,
A.

Count One: Ejectm ent

To succeed on his ejectment claim. I Iillcn mu. t prove"( 1) owner hip, (2) posses ion b)
the defendant[). and (3) refusal of the defendant() to surrender possession." I'l/11 Mortg. Serv.

Corp. ,.. Perreira, 146 ldaho 63 l, 637, 200 P.3d 1180. 1186 (2009) (quoting Ada Cry. 1/ighway
Dist. v. Tola/ uccess lnvs., LLC. 145 Idaho 360. 369. 179 P.3d 323, 332 (2008)). Gibson admit
the second and third clements. (Answer

11. 14. 19-20.) The parties' di agreement centers on

the first clement of ownership.
f'he Judgment clear!) gives 11illen O\vnership of the Gov.en Property. a it "vest[s) in
LI lillcn] ... any and all real property of any kind of nature, including ... [the Gowen Propertyl."
Judgment at§ JI. Ex. B. This Judgment was upheld on appeal. In re Estate ofSmith. 164 Idaho at
466. 482,432 P.3d at 15. 31. It conclusively show I lillcn has ownership of the Go,,en Property
as the personal representati e of Victoria' e tale.
Gib on disagree v.,ith this conclusion. Although he admits that the Judgment meant that
' [t]he posse. ion of the Gowen [Property I. for the purposes of admini tration of the Estate. was
re tored to Victoria.' (Def.'
title immediately passed from

tern. Opp'n Pl. 's Mot. Partial J. Pleading I 0-11 ). he argue that
ictoria' e tate to her heir ·. And as one of the heirs. Vernon ha.

the right to determine v.ho may posse

the Gowen Property, not llillen. Thi . Gib on claims. i

sufficient to defeat Hillen 's motion.
In upport ofhi argument, Gib on points out that "[u]pon the death of a person." a
decedent's propert) "devolves to ... [thel heirs." I. . § 15-3-101. Idaho courts have interpreted
this to mean that "I tjhe legal title to estate property ests in the heirs or dcvisees upon the death
of the decedent." t:llmaker "· Tabor, 160 Idaho 576. 580,377 P.3d 390. 394 (20 15) (quoting

Pierce v. Francis, 194 P.3d 505, 510 ( olo. Ct.

pp. 2008)); ·ee also Fairchild v. Fairchild. I 06

Idaho 147, 150.676 P.2d 722. 725 (Ct. App. 1984) (trial court correctly concluded that heirs
became cotenant · upon decedent's death).
Gibson i correct that propert) immediately de olves to the heirs upon the decedent '
death. See I. .

15-3-10 I. But Gibson gives only the general rule. which like man) legal rules is

·ubject to exceptions. The statute Gibson point · to clearly . tale that '1hc right of ... heirs to [a
c.lecedcnt'sl property arc subject to the restrictions and limitations contained in this code to
facilitate the prompt settlement of estates." Id. One of those restrictions is a personal

4
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representati e's "right [and obligation] to ... take possession or control of . .. the decedent's
property." 1.C. § 15-3-709. The personal representative ' s right is the "san1c power over the title
to property of the estate that an absolute owner would have. in trust however. for the benefit of
the creditors and others interested in the estate." I.C. § 15-3-711 (emphasis added). This power
continues "(ujntil termination of(the personal repre entative'sl appointment.'· Id.
Gibson argues that the "po"er" given b) statute is not the same as giving ''title." and that
Hillen docs not have power to eject Gibson bccau e Vernon holds title. Gibon' interpretation is
not upported by the official comments. This "power over title of an absolute owner is conceived
to embrace all possible transactions" including those resulting "in a change of rights of
possession." Id. cmt. The comment explains that the reason for gi\ ing the personal rcpre entati e
a "power" instead of "title" is "because the power concept case the succession of ac; ets which
are not possessed b) the personal representative. rhus. if the power is unexerci ed prior to its
termination. its lapse clears the title of ... heir ·." Id.
This 'lapse" noted in the comment stem. from the rule that a per onal representative i.
not required to take posse. sion of all the estate's assets. as "any real property or tangible
personal property may be ten \<\ith or surrendered to the person presumptive!) entitled thereto."
J.C. § I 5-3-709 (emphasis added). If so lell. title passes immediately to the heir. as the personal
representative has not exercised his statutory pov,er over the propert) . See I.C. § 15-3-10 I. On
the other hand, the personal representative can decide. in his own judgment, that the "possession
of the property by him will be necessary for purpose of administration." J.C.§ 15-3-709. The
personal reprcscntati,e' s discretion in thi matter is absolute. as "(t]he request by a per onal
representative for delivery of any property possessed by an heir or devisee is conclusive
evidence. in any action against the hci r or devi ee for pos e ion thereof. that the posse· ·ion of
the property by the personal representative is necessary for purposes of administration." Id.
(emphasis added) .. o contrary to Gib. on's position. the fact that the statute gives a " po""er"
instead of "title" does not matter-even without holding title. Hillen would still have the power
of an ab. olute owner over the Gowen Property. \.\ hich includes determining who can occupy it.
The ca es cited by Gib on do not compel a different result. They stand for the general
rule that a decedent ' s property immediately descend to an heir upon the decedent's death. but
neither one addressed the language in l.C. § 15-3-101 that an heir's right to a decedent's properl)
"are subject Lo restrictions and limitations." See generally . £//maker. 160 Idaho 576) 377 P.3d

5
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390; Fairchild. I06 Idaho 147. 676 P.2d 722. ln those ca. e . there was no need to consider a
personal representati\'e' · temporary power o er the propcn). and it effect on an heir's right to
immediate esting of title. In r.:1/maker "there was no probate of [the decedcnt'sj e tate." 160
Idaho at 580. 377 P.Jd at 394. so there would not ho c bc~n 11 personal repre entativc:. And
although in Fairchild the estate had been probated. the issue in that case was, hether one heir
had advcr cl) po ·se sed the property or instead was a cotenant with the other heirs by common
inheritance. I 06 Idaho at 150. 676 P.2d at 725. It had nothing to do\ ith the personal
repre ·entative's temporary power to control the property. See id. Becau e neither El/maker or
Fairchild addressed any ort of "restri ction" mentioned in J.C. § 15-3-10 I. their holdings are no

more than reiteration of the general rule. rhe) do not help in deciding the scope of a per onal
rcprc. entative's tcmporaf) ·tatutory power O\er a decedent's propeny.
Gibson also argue that a personal representative's power is limited. and can be used onl
"to the extent nece ary for the administration of that property in the intcrc ts of creditor. and
other interested persons." (Def.'. Mem. Opp'n Pl.'s Mot. Panial J. Pleading 11.) It is true that a

personal representative's temporary power is held "in trust ... for the benefit of the creditors and
other interested in the estate." LC. § 15-3-711. This creates a fiduciary duty. but contrary to
Gib on's as ertion. doc not limit the per onal representative's power to control the propcrt,.
Whether po · ession of property is "necessary for purposes of administration" i left to the sole
discretion of the personal rcpre entati\'e. whose requc t "i · conclusive evidence, in any action
against the heir .. . for possession thereof, that the pos. c. sion of the property by the per onaJ
representati c is nece::ssary for purpo es of administration." LC.

15-3-709. In other words. as

the comment note:: ·. an heir may be able to sue' for breach of fiduciary duty. but thi po sibility
hould not interfere with the per onal representative's admini trativc authorit) a it relates to
possession of the estate." Id cmt. o e en if Hillen might ·omehow violate hi fiduciary duty to
emon by ejecting Gibson. the proper course is for Vernon to ue I lillen for breach of fiduciary
duty. But Gib on has not claimed such relid: nor could he do o. as he i not an heir to Victoria' ·
estate.
Finally, Gib on argues that whether title v.ru ve ted in Hi llen instead of Vernon \i as not
litigated in the probate case or on appeal in In re Estate ofSmith, and so the Judgment does not
determine title. l3ut the Judgment clearly "vest[ed] in [llillenj .. . any and all real property of an)
k.ind or nature. including ... tthe Gowen Propcnyj" and specifically noted that "lsJuch esting is
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free and clear of any lien. claim or interest of lhe laimants." which included Vernon. Judgement
at II. Ex. 8 . Gib. on cannot. as a part of this case, collalerally attack the Judgment. See Srare v.

Heyrend. 129 Idaho 568. 57 l. 929 P.2d 744. 747 (

l.

App. 1996) (parties generally cannot

collaterally attack a judgmenl entered in another case unless the attack i based on lack of subject
matter jurisdiction). If. as Gib on claims. the Judgment could not ha,e done ,,hat it purported to
do. then Vernon should ha e mo ed in that case for relief from the judgment under I.R.C.P.
60(b). Gibson essentially requests that the oun act as an appellate court and o errule the
Judgment in the other case. something it cannot do. The Court grants J lillen 's motion for partial
judgment on the pleadings.

B.

Entry of judgment under LR. .P. 54(b)

I la ing granted his motion for partial judgment on the pleadings, the ourt next

addresse. Hillen' · request for entry of partial final judgment under I.R.C.P 54(b). If a complaint
contains multiple claim . the Coun "may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but
fewer than all, claims ... only if the court expres. ly detennine that there is no just rea on for
delay.' I.R.C.P. 54(b). Entering judgment under 1.R.C.P. 54(b) comes ,.vithin the Court's
di cretion. PHii .Wortg. Sen•:.. Corp.. 146 Idaho at 636. 200 P.3d at 1185 (quoting Brinkmeyer 1·.

Brinkmeyer. 135 Idaho 596, 599. 21 P.3d 918. 921 (200 I)).
ln the underlying probate of Victoria's estate, Hillen seeks to sell the Gowen Property as
part of his duties as a personal representative. (See Hillen Deel. ' - .) The probate court granted
hi motion to put up the Go,,en Property for sale. (id.
land has impeded this proce s, (id.

6. Ex. 8). but Gib on' pre enee on the

I0). Gibson has not presented any reason for wh) judgment

should not be entered at this time. nor has he opposed this part of Hillen's motion. The ourt
finds there is no just reason for delay and that enlry of partial final judgment on ount One i ·
warranted under I.R.C.P. 54(b).
Writ of a i ta nee

The Coun next tum · to I lillen s request for a writ of as i tance. Whether to grant a \.\Tit
of as i ·tance is made in the Court' di cretion. Pro lndivi. o, Inc. v. Mid-Mile Holding Tr., 131
Idaho 741. 745. 963 P.2d I 178. 1182 ( 1998) (ci ting cases). uch a ,wit "is a form of process
i sued by a court of equity to transfer the po " e ·ion of property. and more specifically land . the
title or right to,, hich it has pre\'iously adjudicated." Id. at 746. 963 P.2d at 1183 (quoting EaJ?.le

Rock Corp. v. ldamont Hotel Co.. 60 Idaho 639. 647, 95 P.2d 838. 841 ( 1939)). "The writ of
7
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assistance i an equitable remedy and the power to issue such writ terns from the need of the
court to enforce its own decrees." Curtis,·. Campbell. 105 Idaho 705. 707. 672 P.2d J035. 1037
( 1983) (citing US. Nat 'I Bank ofOr. v. Chm·e:. 574 P.2d 647 (Or. 1978)).
Whether to grant such a writ invol es 11 simple analysis: "The sole question to be
determined on the motion is whether applicant has a right. as again t the party in pos es ion to
u e the writ to obtain pos ession." Pro lndil'iso. Inc.• 131 Idaho at 746. 963 P.2d at 1183
(quoting Eagle. Rock Corp.. 60 Tdaho at 648. 95 P.2d at 841 ). "In the ab ence of any claim of an
independent paramount title, the only question on uch application is whether the decree has or
has not been complied "'ilh." Id
s di cussed abo,e, Hillen has the right to eject Gibson from the Gowen Property. This
leaves the question of" hether Gibson has complied with the order. The Court recognize that
the typical course would be to refrain from is uing a \.\-Tit of assistance until after the party fails
to comply with the j udgment. In this case. however. such a waiting period would be pointless. as
it seems likel) that Gibson will not comply in a timely manner. His future non-compliance eems
likcl) for two reasons: First. when at the hearing the Court a kcd Gib on whether he would
comply v. ith a j udgment against him. Gib on failed to give an unequi, ocal answer in the
affirmati,e. econd. Vernon's conduct in the underlying probate ca e reveals a dilatory pattern.
and the ' ourt is concerned that Vernon. as Gibson' counsel. v.ill continue this pancrn by
encouraging his client to not immediately comply with the judgment. A waiting period in this
instance ·eemingl would serve no purpo ·e but to further dcla, the probate of Victoria'. e tale
and ,,astc her c tale's resource b requiring it to again request a \.\Tit of assi tance after Gibson
fail to comply. To avoid such a waste of time. and believing a writ will likely be neces ·aT)' to
enforce the j udgment, the Court grants Hillen 's request for a \.\-rtt of assistance.

CO

L

' IO

I Ii lien's motion for partial judgment on the pleading i · GRA TED. Judgment and a \\Tit
of assistance will be entered separate!) .

IT I

O ORDERED.

Cf'
Dated this _/. ?.ciay of October, 20 19.
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FILED By: Tyler Atkinson 6'2/2017 at 2 36 PM Deputy Clerk
Fourth Judicial Dist rict, Ada County
CHRISTOPHER 0. RICH, Clerk

L THE DISTRICT COURT OF Tl I E FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAI IO. l

I

A . D FOR THE CO

I THE MATTER OF THl:. E TATE OF

TY OF ADA

Case o. CV- IE-201 4- 15352

I TORlA H. M ITII.
J 'OC M E. T Oi': IOTION

Deceased.

R LE 70(b) OF T H
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PROPERTY OF T H
PEru 0 1 L R£PRE.

R
E.
C
L
E I ' T HE
I VE

JUDGME TI E 'TERED A FOLLOW

r.

Per onal Property
The Court does hereby \est in

1

oah I lillcn. ai, the personal rcprescntati e of the

Estate ("Personal Rcprcscntath e''), a of tay 5. 2017. any and all personal property of any kind
or nature. whether choate or inchoate. whether tangible or intangible: any and all rights or
interests in ca h or cash equivalents: an} and all rights in any insurance policie ; any and all
rights in any exccutory contract . including but not limited to lca1;es of any kind or nature, or any
security agreement ,, hich con. tirutc a disguised lease under Idaho law: any rights and power of
Victoria H. mith under any personal property: and any and all proceed . product. offspring.
rent or pro fi ts of or from any personal property (" Personal Property"}.

Jt:0G\t F. T Oi' ~JOTJO'\ l '\ DER Rl'LE 70(h) Qt, l UE IDAHO Rl' I.E . OF l\'lL PRO EDLRE,
\'E 'Tl GALL RE L , D PER O ' L PROPERTY OF TII E E iTA IE IN TII F. PERSO~AL
REPRE. F.~T T l\'£ - 1
wom<i~
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Such vesting i free and clear of any lien, claim or intere t of the following parties
("Claimant " ):
I. Vernon K. Smith, Jr. individually:
2.

ernon K. mith. Jr.. m his capacity a the per onal representative of the
E. tates:

3. Vernon K. mith, Jr. in his capacity as an attorney-in-fact or agent or
fiduciary for Victoria H. mi1h:
4.

ernon K. Smith. Jr.. in any other capacity:

5.

ictoria L. Smith. in her personal and any other capacity:

6. VHS Properties. LLC'. an Idaho limned liability company:
7. Ri,crsidc Fanns. Inc .. an Idaho corporation:
8. S & S Tru ·1, LLC. in Idaho limitc::d liability company: and
9. Any entity controlled by any of the indi\iduals or entitie identified above (the
foregoing shall hereinafter be eollccti\cly referenced as the "Claimants··).
II.

Real Propert)

The Court docs hereby vest in the Personal Rcpresentati\·e as of May 5, 2017. any
and all real propert) of any kind or nature. including but not limited to: any fixtures,
appurtenances. add itions. easements, license ·, "ater rights, or similar rights of any kind or nature
appurtenant thereto: and any and all proceeds. product. oftspring. rent or prolits of or from any
real propcrt) (collccti\ cly --Real Property"), including but not limited to the following:
A.

Jeffer on County Propert~.

(i)
That certain Real Property A. commonly referenced as the Jefferson
County Pruptmy, and more specifically idcntilied on Exhibit A.
B.

da

(i)

ounty Property.

That certain Real Property B, commonly rt!fercnccd as the Ada County.
and more specifically identified on Exhibit 8 .

Jl DC I E~T 0~ \1 0 flON L '-'DER RL LE 70(h) Of' ·, II E 10 no Rt LE . OF l\'IL PROCEO RE,
\ 'E 'T l'-' , LL REAi. ~O PER 'O;'li I. PROPERTY OFTII E E .TATE 1'-' TII E PERSO
L
111022'1> 4
REPRE · £ 1 TATl\'E - 2
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Such Yesting i free and clear of any lien, claim or interest of the Claimants.
DATED thi. 2nd day of June, 2017.

The Honorable ~ . Copsey
Di trict Judge

JUDG I Ei TO MOTJO;\t: Dlm R LE70(b)O1-' THElD HOR LE OF CIVILPROCED . R.E.
VE. TL',G ALL REAL . D PERSO~AL PROPERTY OF T HEE TATF. IS THE PER O . L
REPR£ E TATI VE. 3
mom6 ~
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CLERK
s,.g,,60

CERTI FICATE OF ER ICE

6'2/2017 02 .la Pu

1 HEREBY ERTIFY that on this
day of June, 2017, I caused a true and correct copy of
the foregoing JUOGME T O MOTIO
NDER RULE 70(b) OF THE JDAHO R LE
OF C[VIL PROCED RE, VE Tl 1G LL RE L
D PERSO 1 L PROPERTY OF
THE ESTATE 1 THE PERSO L REPRE E TATJVE to be served by the method
indicated below, and addressed to the follow ing:

RA DALL A. PETERMA
ALEX DER P. MCLAUGHLI
Givens Pursley LLP
601 W. Bannock St.
P.O. Box 2720
Boi e, Idaho 83 70 I
Allomeysfor Noah G. Hil/e11, Special

[ ] .S. Mail
[ ] Facsimile: (208) 345- 11 29
[ ] Hand Deli very
[ ] Overnight Delivery
[XJ Email / i ou11:
rap@given pursley.coms

Adminislrator

VER O K. SMITH, JR.
Attorney at Law
1900 We. t Main Street
I3oise, Idaho 83702
Personal Represe111atfre ql £swte of Vc•mon K.
Smith, Sr. and atwmeysfor D(ll•id Gib 011
RORY JO ES and ERICA J DD

Jo,r:s, GLCDIIILL, FURMAI\ P.A.
225 orth 9th Street, #820
Boise, Idaho 83702
Attorneys for 1'e r11011 K. Smith, Jr.

ALLE I B. ELLIS
ELI IS LAW, PLLC

12639 West Explorer Drive
Boise, ldaho 83713
Allomeysfor Joseph 11. Smith
Ronald L. Swafford
Swafford La, , PC
655 S. Woodruff Ave.
Idaho Falls. Idaho 8340 I
Auorney sfor Sharon Bergma1111

[ ] U. . !ail

[ J
[ ]
[ )
[X)

Facsimi le: {208) 345-1129
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
Email I iCourt: vls59(a !live.com

[ ] .S. Mail
[ ] Facsimile: (208) 331-1529
[ ] Hand Deli ery
[ ] Ovt:mighl Del ivery
[X] Email / iCoun: rjoncs(a idalaw.com;
ciudd:a idala" .com
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[X]

.S. Mail
Facsimik: (208) 345-9564
Hand Ddi \t:ry
Overnight Deli\'ery
Email / iCoutt: aellis(a acllislaw.com

r ] ..

tail

f ] Facsimile: (208) 524-4 131

[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Overnight Ddivery
[X] Email / iCourt:
rons1a swa ffordlaw .wm

JuOG~IF. 'T 0~ MOTION ~OER R u LE 70(b) OF T fl E ID HO R ·u · OF Cl\'IL PRO CEO RE,
VF. TING ALL RF.AL XO PER O . AL PROPERTY OF THE ESTATE I ' THE PERSO
L
u1om6 4
Rl!:PRE E'.'ITATl\'I:: - 4
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Courtesy copy provided tu:

Victoria Anne Converse
I 0548 W Skyline Blvd.
Portland OR 97231

ROBERT MAY ES
Maynes Taggart, PLLC
P .O. Box 3005
Jdaho Falls, Idaho 83403
Allomeysfor Walker Land & /,fre lock. LLC
Oa1Tell G. Early
Office of the Attorney General
1410 . Hilton. 2nd Floor
Boise, Idaho 83 706
A11omeysfor State ofIdaho Department of
£11viro11me11tal Quality

[X]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[X]

U.S. Mail
Facsimile
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
.S. Mail

[ ] Facsimile: (208) 524-6095
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Overnight Delivery

[XJ U.S. Mail
[ ] Facsimile: (208) 373-0481
[ ] Hand Delh·ery
f l Overnight Delivery

JUUGME~T ON MOTIO ' t.: DER Rt:I.E 70(b) OF THE IDAHO R Ul.F. OF Cl\'IL PROCED RE,
VE Tf.\"C ALL REAL AN D PF:R O~AL PROPERTY OF 1·11 1:: E 'TATE IN THE PER. 0 AL
RF-PR~~S£NTAT(\'£- S
1110m64
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EXHIBIT A

legal Description - J efferson County Property
Parcel 1
lots 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15 in Block 5, Village and Townsite of Hamer, including and
joining vacated streets and alleys by Ordi nance No. 5, Jefferson County, Idaho.
Parcel 2
Township 7 North, Range 36 East of the Boise Meridian, J efferson County, Idaho.
Section 2: All
Section 11 : All

EXHIBIT A- I
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EXHIBIT B
Legal De cription - Ada ounty Property
Parcel 1 (Commonly known as: 1902 W Main St, Boise, 10 83702)
lot 6 In Block 29 of Fairview Addition, according to the official plat thereof, filed in Book 2 of Plats
at Page 73, and Amended by an Affidavit recorded January 14, 2009 as Instrument No. 109003860,
official records of Ada County, Idaho.
Parcel 2 (Commonly known as: 1900 W Main St. Boise, 10 83702)
lot 7 in Block 29 of Fairview Addition, according to the official plat thereof, filed in Book 2 of Plats
at Page 73, and Amended by an Affidavit recorded January 14, 2009 as Instrument No. 109003860,
official records of Ada County, Idaho.
Parcel 3 (Commonly known as: 110 N. 22nd St, Boise, ID 83702)
lot 5 in Block 29 of Fairview Addition, according to the official plat thereof, flied in Book 2 of Plats
at Page 73, and Amended by an Affidavit recorded January 14, 2009 as Instrument No. 109003860,
official records of Ada County, Idaho.
Parcel 4 (Commonly known as : 1807 W Idaho St, Boise, ID 83702)
The Northwesterly 32 feet of lot 11 in Block 23 of McCarty's Second Addition to Boise City, Ada
County, State of Idaho, according to the
official plat thereof recorded in the office of the County Recorder of Ada County, State of Idaho.
Parcel 5 {Commonly known as : 2001 N Raymond St, Boise, ID 83704)
lot 6 except the South 50 feet in Block 2 of A Resubdivision of lot 21 , and a portion of lots 6, 7
and 22, Oradell Subdivision, according to the official plat thereof, filed in Book 25, records of Ada
County, Idaho.
Parcel 6 (Commonly known as: 0 S Pleasant Valley Rd, Boise, 10 83705; 6259 S Pleasant Valley
Rd, Boise. 10 83705; 0 S Cole Rd, Boise. ID 83709)
Unit I:
The Southeast quarter of the Southeast quarter of Section 32, Township 3 North, Range 2 East of
the Boise Meridian, in Ada County, Idaho.
Unit II:
Parcel A
The West half of the Northwest quarter of Section 5, Township 2 North, Range 2 East of the Boise
Meridian. Also shown of record as lot 4 and the Southwest quarter of the Northwest quarter of
Section 5, Township 2 North, Range 2 East, of the Boise Meridian.
Parcel B
The East half of the Northwest quarter of Section 5, Township 2 North, Range 2 East. of the Boise
Meridian.

EXHIBIT 8- I
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Parcel C
The Southwest quarter of Section 5, Township 2 North, Range 2 East of the Boise Meridian.
Unit Ill:
The East half of the Northeast quarter of Section 7, and the West half of the Northwest quarter of
Section 8 all in Township 2 North of Range 2 East of Boise Meridian in Ada County, Idaho.
Parcel 7 (Commonly known as : 5933 N. Branstetter, Garden City, ID 83714j W. Chinden Blvd.,
Garden City, ID 83714j 9907 W. Chinden Blvd., Garden City, ID 83714)
Unit I:
Real property situated in the County of Ada, State of Idaho, consisting of 132 acres , more or less
to wit: Commencing at a point North 36°21 ' West distant 2.88 chains from the center of Section 26,
Township 4 North, Range 1 East, B.M., the real place of beginning, running thence South 73°15'
East a d istance of 1.40 chains to a point; thence North 18°48' East a distance of 64.53 chains to a
point ; thence North 60°42' West a distance of 2.75 chains to a point; thence South 68°00' West a
distance of 9.50 chains to a point; thence North 75° 00' West a distance of 12.00 chains to a point;
thence North 49°00' West a distance of 3.90 chains to a point; thence South 64°30' West a
distance of 3.70 chains to a point; thence South 72°00' West a distance of 8.50 chains to a point;
thence North 81°00' West a distance of 3.83 chains to a point; thence South 0°05' West a distance
of 14.92 chains to a point; thence North 80°30' East a distance of 2.00 chains to a point; thence
South 48°15' East a distance of 2.00 chains to a point; thence South 80°30' East a distance of 3.15
chains to a point; thence South 61°00' East a distance of 1.00 chains to a point; thence South
23°30' East a distance of 2.10 chains to a point; thence South 1000' West a 'distance of 3.60
chains to a point; thence South 26°00' West a distance of 1.80 chains to a point; thence South
27°00' East a distance of 3.70 chains to a point; thence South 1°45' East a distance of 1.50 chains
to a point; thence South 38°30' East a distance of 1.20 chains to a point; thence South 40°45' West
a distance of 2.80 chains to a point; thence South 3°45' West a distance of 4.30 chains to a point;
thence South 34°15' East a distance of 2.00 chains to a point; thence South 67°00' East a distance
of 1.40 chains to a point; thence South 49°15' East a distance of 2.50 chains to a point; thence
South 22°30' East a distance of 2.95 chains to a point; thence South 52°00' East a distance of 2.50
chains to a point; thence South 64°00' East a distance of 2.60 chains to a point; thence North
84°45' East a distance of 1.32 chains to a point; thence South 00°03' West a distance of 14.89
chains to the place of beginning ; together with all water, ditch and lateral rights appurtenant
hereto or used in connection therewith, including 132 shares in the Thurman Mill Ditch Co, LTD.,
and as said acreage is further identified in that Bargain and Sale Deed, dated December 20, 1954,
and recorded in the Records of the Ada County Recorder's Office, located in Book 440 at Page
104, copies of which are attached hereto, and incorporated herein; and
Unit II:
Real property situated in the County of Ada, State of Idaho, consisting of 44 acres, more or less,
to wit:
Commencing at a point 2 chains 88 links North 36°21 ' West from the Wash Boulder set in the
center of Section Twenty-six in Township Four North of Range One East of the Boise Meridian ;
thence North variation 18°48' East 18 chains and 70 links to a Slough ; thence North and Westerly
following the left and South Bank of the said Slough to the East boundary of Lot Nine in Section
Twenty-three in Township and Range aforesaid ; thence South following East Boundary of said Lot
Nine, 7 chains and 75 links to Southeast corner of said Lot Nine; thence South following the East
boundary of the West Half of the Northwest Quarter of said Section Twenty-six, 25 chains and 40
links to top of Bluff; thence South and Easterly following the edge of the Bluff to a point 2 chains
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and 88 links North 35°21 ' West from the Wash Boulder set in the center of said Section Twentysix, said point being the place of beginning. Together with all Certificates of Shares, including
Certificate No. 114 for 44 shares of the capital stock in the Thurman Mill Ditch Company, Ltd, and
as said acreage is further identified in that Warranty Deed dated March 18, 1958, and recorded in
the Records of the Ada County Recorder's Office as Instrument No. 805407, copies of which are
attached hereto and incorporated herein; and said parcels of real properties further identified in
the Tax Parcel Identification Numbers for further reference as set forth as:
(1 )

legal Description: Parcel #0995 in Flood District S2 of Sec 23 & N2 of Sec 26
4N IE #0990-B
Tax Parcel Number S0526120995
Property Address: 5933 N Branstetter St. Garden City ID 83714

(2)

legal Description: Parcel #4432 of SE4 SE4 NW4 Section 26 4N 1E #244430-S
Tax Parcel Number S0526244432
Property Address: 5933 N Branstetter St Garden City. ID 83714

(3)

Legal Description: Parcel #4434 of NE4 SE4 NW4 Section 26 4N 1E #244430-8
Tax Parcel Number S0526244434
Property Address 5933 N Branstetter SI. Garden City ID 83714

(4)

Legal Description: Parcel #2580 in Flood District Secs 23 & 26 4N 1E
Tax Parcel Number S0526212580
Property Address W Ch1nden Blvd .. Garden Crly ID 83714

(5)

Legal Description: Parcel #3600@ NW Comer SE4 NW4 Section 26 4N
1E 11244660-B
Tax Parcel Number. S0526243600
Property Address W Chtnden Blvd .. Garden City ID 83714

(6)

Legal Description: Parcel #3700 Por N2 SE4 NW4 Section 26 4N 1E #244660-8
Tax Parcel Number S0526243700
Property Address. W Ch1nden Blvd Garden City 10 83714

(7)

Legal Description: Parcel #4265 NR CTR SE4 NW4 Section 26
4N 1E 11244255-B
Tax Parcel Number S0526244265
Property Address; 9907 W Chmden Blvd. Garden City. ID 83714
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

d

I hereby certify that on this _l_ day of October. 2019. I emailed (served) a true and correct copy
of the within instrument to:

Jack W. Relf
Alexander McLaughlin
GIVE
PURSLEY
jackrel f@givenspursley.com
apm@givenspurslev.com

Vernon K mith Jr
Attorney at Law
vkslaw@live.com

PHIL MCGRA E
Clerk of the District Court

By: ~ -

fLLe

Deputy Court Clerk

•
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Electronically Filed
10/14/2019 1:18 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Phil McGrane, Clerk of the Court
By: Laurie Johnson, Deputy Clerk

VERNON K S:MITH
ATTORNEY AT LAW
1900 W. Main St.
Boise, Idaho 83702
Idaho State Bar No. 1365
Telephone: (208) 345-_l 125
Fax:
(208) 345-1129
vkslaw@live.com

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

NOAH G. IfilLEN, in his capacity as
Personal Representative of the Estate of
Victoria H. Smith,
Plaintif±:
. V.

DAVID R. GIBSON, an individual, d/b/a
BLACK DIAMOND COMPOST
PRODUCTS,
Defendant.

)
) Case No. CV0l-19-10368
)
) MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND
) JUDGMENT UNDER RULE
) 59(e), I.R.C.P .
)
)
)
)
)

COMES NOW The Defendant above named, David R. Gibson, by and through his
attorney of record, Vernon K. Smith, and does move this court to alter or amend the
judgment entered by this court on October 2, 2019, to be undertaken pursuant to Rule 59(e),
I.R.C.P., for the reasons to be identified and addressed in detail within the memorandum
to be filed hereafter in support of this motion, as the Judgment entered by this court is
contrary to the pleadings and the established statutory provisions and case law, as a court
can only grant a Plaintiff the relief requested upon a motion for judgment upon the
pleadings that is lawfully and factually contained within the pleadings, which, in this case,
has been limited to the allegations contained within Plaintiff's complaint. The proper
subject to any such relief is limited to the specific pleading, and neither party has gone
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outside of that pleading to invoke any summary proceedings. The narrow authority upon
which a court can grant any judgment upon this complaint filed by the Plaintiff is limited
to the allegations contained therein, as embraced within Plaintiffs motion as filed for
judgment upon the pleadings; that the allegations within Plaintiffs complaint did not
support the factual or legal basis within the judgment as entered by this court, as Plaintiff
never alleged he was, at any time, acting within any capacity as a trustee for the benefit of,
or on behalf of, the titled owners of the assets of the Decedent; rather Plaintiff wrongfully,
unlawfully, and falsely alleged that Plaintiff was the titled and vested owner of all of the
Decedent's assets, and alleged further, contrary to both the statute and the established case
law, that any heir of the Decedent had been divested of their titled, vested, and lawful
interest, contrary to the statute and case law that specifically vests title and the right to
possession with the heirs of a Decedent; that such allegations contained within the
complaint filed by Plaintiff cannot support the entry of the Judgment that has been entered
by this district court, as the Pleadings falsely allege the interest of Plaintiff, and falsely
allege the divesture of the heirs' interest in the assets of the Decedent, and this Judgment
defies the rights and interests of the heirs, as a matter oflaw.
That the entry of a judgm~nt by thi~ court, granted upon the allegations within the
complaint filed by the Plaintiff, erroneously alleging the actual ownership of the vested
interests of the Decedent's assets, cannot give rise to entry of a judgment as upon those
false allegations, as such allegations contained within Plaintiff's complaint are inconsistent
with and contrary to the statutes of the State of Idaho and the case law announced by the
Idaho Supreme Court, and the Order and Rule 70(b) Judgment of the magistrate court,
apparently entered without regard for or unfamiliar with the statute and case law, is inferior
and remains void, to the extent it violates the statute and case law, having exceeded both
the jurisdiction and authority of the magistrate to disregard and violate the statutory
provisions as to the exclusive ownerships interests of a decedent's heirs.
This judgment entered by this court is an erroneous reflection of the statutory
devolution of Decedent's vested and titled interests, and has been entered in contradiction
to the controlling law on such interests, and no such relief, upon Plaintiffs complaint, can
be granted by this court to Plaintiff, given the specific limitation to the allegations
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contained in Plaintiffs Complaint, as the controlling law on the subject of judgments upon
the pleadings.
This judgment, as entered, serves to perpetuate the defiance of the statutory and

case law of Idaho, and grants the Plaintiff a form of relief that is entirely unsupported by
the pleadings and outside the confines of the allegations contained within Plaintiffs
complaint, and the Judgment must be altered or amended, to which this court is afforded
the opportunity to alter or amend the judgment, and any decision that fails to grant
Defendant this relief under this motion to alter or amend will require Defendant to seek
judicial review to correct this erroneous entry of a judgment upon the pleadings, serving to
perpetuate a clear violation of the established law regarding the heirs' vested interests in a
Decedent's assets, and the limitations under the rules of civil procedure for ant grant of
relief upon Plaintiffs motion for judgment upon pleadings that are limited to the specific
allegations contained in Plaintiffs complaint,, as such a motion, as raised, is expressly
limited to the allegations, and the truth of Defendant's responses.
Defendant does request this court schedule a hearing in December, 2019, from
which the parties my then develop and submit their briefing pursuant to Rule
7(b)(3)(A)(B)&(C), I.RC.~. Defendant does request oral argument u o~ this motion to
alter or amend the Judgment entered by this cou
detailed memorandum in support of this
I.R.C.P. and pursuant to the scheduli

otion, consistent with Rule 7(b)(3)(D)&

from the establishe hearing date,

1

accordan

with Rule 7(b)(3)(A), I.R.C.P.
Dated this 14th day of October, 2

ernon K. Smith
Attorney for Defendant,
David R. Gibson
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the 14th day of October, 2019, I caused a true and
correct copy of the above and foregoing to be delivered to the following persons at the
following addresses:
U.S. Mail
(
)
Randall A. Peterman
Fax
208-388-1200
(
)
Alexander P. McLaughlin
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Givens Pursley, LLP
601 West Bannock Street
P.O. Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701
rap@givenspursley.com
apm@givenspursley.com

(
(

)
X

)

Hand Delivered
!court

ls/Vernon K Smith/s/- - - Vernon K. Smith
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Electronically Filed
10/16/2019 2:56 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Phil McGrane, Clerk of the Court
By: Katee Hysell, Deputy Clerk

Randall A. Peterman, ISB No. 1944
Alexander P. McLaughlin, ISB No. 7977
Jack W. Relf, ISB No. 9762
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP
601 West Bannock Street
Post Office Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720
Telephone (208) 388-1200
Facsimile (208) 388-1300
rap@givenspursley.com
apm@givenspursley.com
jackrelf@givenspursley.com
013683-0002
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

NOAH G. HILLEN, in his capacity as
Personal Representative of the Estate of
Victoria H. Smith,

Case No. CV0l-19-10368
MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEYS'
FEES AND COSTS

Plaintiff,
vs.
DAVID R. GIBSON, an individual d/b/a
BLACK DIAMOND COMPOST
PRODUCTS,
Defendant.

COMES NOW Plaintiff, Noah G. Hillen ("Plaintiff'), the duly appointed Personal
Representative of the Estate of Victoria H. Smith (the "Estate"), by and through his counsel of
record, and hereby submits this Memorandum of Attorneys' Fees and Costs ("Memorandum")
pursuant to Rules 54(d) and (e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and Idaho Code §§ 12-120(3)
and 12-121. The Memorandum is supported by the Declaration of Alexander P. McLaughlin in
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Support of Memorandum of Attorneys' Fees and Costs ("McLaughlin Declaration"). The
McLaughlin Declaration is incorporated herein by reference as though restated in full.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff seeks costs and fees related to Count One ofhis Complaint-the ejectment
claim-which the Court resolved via its Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Plaintiffs
Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings ("Memorandum Decision") and certified Judgment.
Plaintiff understands, however, that the entire controversy between Plaintiff and Defendant
David R. Gibson, d/b/a Black Diamond Compost Products ("Defendant") is not yet resolved. This
request for costs and fees is, therefore, not meant to address who is the prevailing party for the
remaining claims, or any entitlement to costs and fees related to the same. Those matters, and
potentially this fee request, will be resolved at a later date. Plaintiff solely wishes at this point to
preserve his ability to seek and obtain fees and costs with respect to Count One.
II.

RECAPITULATION OF COSTS AND ATTORNEYS' FEES
Plaintiff hereby submits the following recapitulation of the costs and attorneys' fees

incurred in the prosecution of this litigation brought against Defendant. To the best of Plaintiffs
knowledge and belief, the items herein are correct and the costs and fees claimed in this
Memorandum and the McLaughlin Declaration are in compliance with I.R.C.P. 54(d) and (e),
including, but not limited to, I.R.C.P. 54(d)(4), I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3), and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(5):
COSTS (Sections II and 111 2 In(!a}
I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(C) Costs as a Matter of Right:

$

283.63

I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D) Discretionary Costs:

$

0.00

TOTAL COSTS:

$

283.63

$

884.00

ATTORNEY FEES (Section IV2 In(!a}
Randall A. Peterman (partner) - 2.4 hours @ $335/hr
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III.

Alexander P. McLaughlin (partner)- 6.4 hours@ $245/hr

$

1,568.00

Jack W. Relf (associate)- 24.5 hours@ $185/hr

$

4,532.50

Keri A. Moody (paralegal) - 5 .2 hours @ $170/hr

$

804.00

TOTAL ATTORNEY FEES

$

7.788.50

TOTAL COSTS AND ATTORNEYS' FEES

$

8.072.13

I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(C) / COSTS-ITEMS ALLOWED-AS A MATTER OF RIGHT
1.

Court Filing Fees:

06/07/2019 - Filing Fee - Complaint
Total Court Filing Fees

2.

$
227.63
$_ _ _
22_7_.6_3

Actual Fees for Service of Process:

06/19/2019 - Service Fee to Tri-County Process Serving
(service of complaint/summons upon Defendant)

$

56.00

Total Actual Fees for Service of Process

$_ _ _5_6_.o_o

3.

Witness Fees: None

4.

Witness Travel Fees: None

5.

Certified Copies of Documents Admitted as Trial Exhibits: None

6.

Cost of Trial Exhibits: None

7.

Cost of Bond Premiums: None

8.

Reasonable Expert Witness Fees, not to Exceed $2,000 for Each
Expert Witness: None

9.

Charges for Reporting and Transcribing Depositions: None

10.

Charges for One Copy of any Deposition: None

TOTAL COSTS UNDER I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(C)

$======28==3-.6==3
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IV.

I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D) / DISCRETIONARY COSTS

Plaintiff is not seeking discretionary costs. Plaintiff recognizes that not all costs
incurred by Plaintiff were necessary and exceptional as required under I.R.C.P 54(d)(l)(D), e.g.,
costs expended for certain routine services, including copy and messenger fees.
V.

ATTORNEYS' FEES

Plaintiff requests $7,788.50 in attorneys' fees.

The fee arrangement between

Plaintiff and Givens Pursley was on a time and hour basis. The working attorneys, their fees, their
rates, and the time incurred in this matter are specifically listed and itemized in Exhibit A to the
McLaughlin Declaration.
VI.

LEGAL BASIS FOR AWARD OF FEES

Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit to, among other things, eject Defendant from the
subject property (the "Gowen Property"). Plaintiff moved for partial judgment on the pleadings as
to Plaintiffs ejectment count. The Court granted the motion. See Memorandum Decision at 1
(" ... the Court grants Hillen's motion for judgment on the pleadings. Following this order's entry,
the Court will enter partial final judgment under I.R.C.P. 54(b) and issue a writ of assistance.").
This Court then entered a Judgment requiring the Defendant to "immediately vacate and surrender
possession" of the Gowen Property. See generally Judgment (October 2, 2019). Plaintiff now asks
that this Court award Plaintiff his reasonable costs and attorneys' fees on the bases set forth herein.
A.

Plaintiff is Entitled to an Award of Reasonable Attorneys' Fees Under Idaho
Code Section 12-120(3).

Idaho Courts adhere to the "American Rule" regarding whether to award attorneys'
fees and costs. Hellar v. Cenarrusa, 106 Idaho 571,578,682 P.2d 524, 531 (1984). Under the
"American Rule," attorneys' fees are awarded when authorized by statute or contract. Id. Idaho
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Code Section 12-120(3) allows for the recovery of attorneys' fees by the prevailing party in cases
involving commercial transactions. The statute states:
In any civil action to recover on an open account, account stated,
note, bill, negotiable instrument, guaranty, or contract relating to the
purchase or sale of goods, wares, merchandise, or services and in
any commercial transaction unless otherwise provided by law, the
prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable attorney's fee to be
set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs.
LC. § 12-120(3).
Plaintiff is entitled to a fee award. First, Plaintiff is-currently, at least-the
prevailing party, having obtained judgment in his favor on the sole claim at issue. Accordingly,
there is little doubt that Plaintiff enjoys prevailing party status under I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B).
Second, the matter at bar arose from a commercial transaction. 1 Among other
things, Defendant's Answer to Verified Complaint asserts that the agreement by which he once
held possession of the property in question "was designed to be a mutual benefit, and business
engagement. ... " Answer to Verified Complaint at 23 (emphasis added). Defendant, therefore,

asserts that a contractual relationship existed of the type embraced by Section 12-120(3). That
"triggers the application of LC.§ 12-120(3) and a prevailing party may recover fees even though
no liability under a contract was established." H-D Transp. v. Pogue, 160 Idaho 428,436,374 P.3d
591, 599 (2016) (internal quotation omitted).
B.

Plaintiff is Entitled to Attorneys' Fees and Costs Under Idaho Code Section
12-121.

Idaho Code§ 12-121 states:
In any civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney's fees
to the prevailing party or parties when the judge finds that the case

1

Plaintiff understands that Section 12-120(3) was not raised as a possible ground for fee recovery in the
Complaint. That is immaterial under I.R.C.P. 54(e)(4).
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was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or
without foundation.
LC. § 12-121; see also Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(e)(2) (same). 2
The above standard is met where a party fails to set forth "any genuine issues of
law or legitimate issues of fact.. .. " Lamont v. Lamont, 158 Idaho 353, 362, 347 P.3d 645, 654-55
(2015) (awarding attorneys' fees on appeal) (citing Telford Lands LLC v. Cain, 154 Idaho 981,
993,303 P.3d 1237, 1249 (2013)). An award of fees is also warranted under Section 12-121 where
the non-prevailing party advocates a position that is "not fairly debatable." Assocs. Northwest,

Inc. v. Beets, 112 Idaho 603, 605, 733 P.2d 824, 826 (Ct. App. 1987). "When deciding whether
the case was brought or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation, the entire
course of the litigation must be taken into account." Idaho Military Historical Society v. Maslen,
156 Idaho 624, 631, 329 P.3d 1072, 1079 (2014) (stating, in part, that the assertion that a party set
forth at least one argument that has merit is no longer a basis to evade an award of fees and costs).
Here, this Court should award Plaintiff his reasonable fees under LC. § 12-121.
The main issue in this action was whether Plaintiff owns the Gowen Property occupied by
Defendant. However, such ownership was already decided in favor of Plaintiff via the Rule 70
Judgment the probate court entered (and which the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed). This relatively
straightforward dispute was complicated by Defendant's unfounded collateral attacks to upend the
probate court's judgment. As stated by the Court, Defendant "essentially requests that the Court
act as an appellate court and overrule the Judgment in the [probate] case, something it cannot do."

2

Idaho Code§ 12-121 is a discretionary attorneys' fees provision. Jim and Maryann Plane Family Trust v.
Skinner, 157 Idaho 927, _, 342 P.3d 639, 647 (2015). Thus, an award of fees under Section 12-121 "will not be
overturned absent an abuse of discretion." Garner v. Povey, 151 Idaho 462, 468, 259 P.3d 608, 614 (2011) (citing
Chavez v. Barrus, 146 Idaho 212,225, 192 P.3d 1036, 1049 (2008)).
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Memorandum Decision at 7. In any event, since Defendant defended this action without a basis in
fact or law, Plaintiff is entitled to an award of fees under Section 12-121.
C.

Plaintiff’s Attorneys’ Fees Are Reasonable.
I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) “sets forth the factors the court must consider to determine what

amount is reasonable” for an award of fees and costs. Zenner v. Holcomb, 147 Idaho 444, 459,
210 P.3d 552, 559 (2009). Those factors consist of the following:
(A) The time and labor required.
(B) The novelty and difficulty of the questions.
(C) The skill requisite to perform the legal service properly and the
experience and ability of the attorney in the particular field of law.
(D) The prevailing charges for like work.
(E) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
(F) The time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances
of the case.
(G) The amount involved and the results obtained.
(H) The undesirability of the case.
(I) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the
client.
(J) Awards in similar cases.
(K) The reasonable cost of automated legal research (Computer
Assisted Legal Research), if the court finds it was reasonably
necessary in preparing a party's case.
(L) Any other factor which the court deems appropriate in the
particular case.
Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(e)(3); Nalen v. Jenkins, 113 Idaho 79, 81, 741 P.2d 366, 368 (Ct. App. 1987)
(stating that the court is to consider each factor without placing undue weight on any given one).
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Here, a review of the above factors indicates the fees Plaintiff incurred and seeks
are reasonable. The reasonableness of the award is set out in detail in the McLaughlin Declaration.
Briefly, however, Plaintiff notes that he achieved a tremendous outcome-a Rule 54(b) judgment
ejecting Defendant from the Gowen Property. Counsel are experienced litigators and their rates
are reasonable. Further, while the labor involved in this matter was not intensive, the amount
Plaintiff seeks is commensurate with the labor involved and the result obtained. The record
supplies a more than adequate basis for the Court to award the attorneys' fees requested using the
factors set forth in Rule 54(e)(3).
II.

CONCLUSION

As demonstrated above, Plaintiff is the prevailing party in this action. Idaho Code
Sections 12-121 and 12-120(3) entitle Plaintiff to an award of reasonable attorneys' fees. The items
of costs and attorneys' fees stated in this Memorandum are correct, reasonable, and in compliance
with Rules 54(d) and 54( e). For these reasons, an award of costs in the amount of $286.63 and
fees in the amount of $7,788.50 (for a total amount of $8,072.13) is reasonable and warranted in
favor of Plaintiff against the Defendant.
DATED this 16th day of October, 2019.
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP

By Isl Alexander P. McLaughlin
Randall A. Peterman - Of the Firm
Alexander P. McLaughlin - Of the Firm
Jack W. Relf- Of the Firm
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 16th day of October, 2019, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS to be
served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Vernon K. Smith, Jr.
1900 W. Main St.
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Attorney for Defendant

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[X]

U.S. Mail
Facsimile (208) 345-1129
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
Email/iCourt: vkslaw@live.com

Isl Alexander P. McLaughlin
Alexander P. McLaughlin
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Electronically Filed
10/16/2019 2:56 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Phil McGrane, Clerk of the Court
By: Katee Hysell, Deputy Clerk

Randall A. Peterman, ISB No. 1944
Alexander P. McLaughlin, ISB No. 7977
Jack W. Relf, ISB No. 9762
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP
601 West Bannock Street
Post Office Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720
Telephone (208) 388-1200
Facsimile (208) 388-1300
rap@givenspursley.com
apm@givenspursley.com
jackrelf@givenspursley.com
013683-0002
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
NOAH G. HILLEN, in his capacity as
Personal Representative of the Estate of
Victoria H. Smith,
Plaintiff,
vs.
DAVID R. GIBSON, an individual d/b/a
BLACK DIAMOND COMPOST
PRODUCTS,

Case No. CV0l-19-10368

DECLARATION OF ALEXANDER P.
MCLAUGHLIN IN SUPPORT OF
MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEYS'
FEES AND COSTS

Defendant.

ALEXANDER P. MCLAUGHLIN, under penalty of perjury, hereby declares and
states as follows:
1.

I am one of the attorneys of record for Plaintiff, Noah G. Hillen, the duly

appointed Personal Representative of the Estate of Victoria H. Smith (the "Plaintiff'). I am a
partner with the law firm of Givens Pursley LLP ("Givens Pursley") and was principally
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responsible for handling the litigation 1 in the above-captioned matter. I am, therefore, well versed
as to the charges listed in Exhibit A2 to this Declaration and Plaintiffs Memorandum of Costs and
Attorneys' Fees (the "Memorandum"), each of which are by this reference incorporated herein as
though restated in full.
BASIS AND METHOD OF FEE AND COST COMPUTATION
2.

Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(d) and (e), Exhibit A to this Declaration sets forth:

(a) the names and rates of the attorneys and paralegal that worked on this matter; (b) the date on
which the attorneys and paralegal rendered services; (c) the actual services rendered; (d) the hourly
rates charged; and (e) the number of hours expended. Under the arrangement with Plaintiff, Givens
Pursley charged him on a time and hour basis. To the best of my knowledge and belief, the items
of costs and attorneys' fees stated in the Memorandum and Exhibit A are correct and in
compliance with Rules 54(d) and ( e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure including, but not
limited to, I.R.C.P. 54(d)(4), I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3), and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(5).
RULE 54(E)(3) FACTORS FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES AWARD
3.

As to the reasonableness of the amount of fees and costs sought, the

undersigned has properly taken into consideration the following factors with regard to the fees
requested: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) the
skill requisite to perform the legal service properly and the experience and ability of the attorney

1

The "litigation" referred to means the litigation surrounding the single cause of action-ejectment-for
which this Court issued a judgment and certification. The remainder of the claims are pending.
2

The matter history report is submitted in place of copies of the actual billing statements to reduce the amount
of pages actually filed with the Court. By submitting the matter history report to the Court, Plaintiff does not, nor do
he intend to, waive the attorney-client or work product privileges in any respect. Plaintiff also notes that for time
entries containing more than one matter within a single line item entry (e.g., drafting the complaint filed in this matter
simultaneously with drafting the complaint filed in the similar ejectment action pending in Ada County District Court
Case CV0I-19-10367), such entries were split in half, with only one-halfofthe entry apportioned to the instant action.
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in the particular field of law; (4) the prevailing charges for like work; (5) whether the fee is fixed
or contingent; (6) the time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances of the case;
(7) the amount involved and the results obtained; (8) the undesirability of the case; (9) the nature
and length of the professional relationship with the client; ( 10) awards in similar cases; and ( 11) the
reasonable cost of automated legal research. Each relevant factor will be discussed in tum.
TIME AND LABOR INVOLVED

4.

Relatively speaking, this case did not involve a great deal of time or labor.

The Court resolved this case based on a single motion brought by Plaintiff, with no discovery
conducted. However, while the time and labor involved may not have been significant, the charges
for such time and labor were commensurate with the amount of fees requested and the result
obtained.
SKILL NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE OUTCOME AND EXPERIENCE OF ATTORNEY/
PREVAILING CHARGES FOR LIKE WORK

5.

Randall A. Peterman has been a practicing attorney for over 40 years and is

a partner at Givens Pursley. In that time, he has been lead counsel on a number of complex, highdollar commercial litigation cases. He is named in Chambers and Partners for bankruptcy and
creditor's rights. He is also a member of the American College of Bankruptcy. Mr. Peterman's
rate of $335.00 is consistent and customary for attorneys of similar experience.
6.

The undersigned is also a partner at Givens Pursley. The undersigned has

practiced law for approximately 11 years. In that time, I have garnered a great deal of litigation
experience and have worked as lead attorney on many significant cases that involved multi-million
dollars in liability and/or have received a tremendous amount of local and national publicity. I
have represented clients before the Idaho Supreme Court, the Idaho Court of Appeals, the Ninth
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Circuit Court of Appeals, numerous federal courts, and am ranked as a Band 2 attorney in
Chambers and Partners for business litigation. My rate of $245 per hour is customary and
reasonable. If anything, it may be on the low end for partners at larger firms in Idaho, such as
Givens Pursley.
7.

Associate attorney Jack Relf also assisted in this matter. Mr. Relf has been

an attorney for over 3 years and has garnered significant litigation experience in a short time. Mr.
Relf graduated magna cum laude from the University ofldaho College of Law and was a law clerk
at the Idaho Supreme Court. Mr. Relfs hourly rate of $200 is consistent with the market for
attorneys of similar experience.
8.

Keri Moody has also aided in the representation of Plaintiff. Ms. Moody has

over 15 years' experience as a paralegal. She graduated in 2003 from Northwest Nazarene
University, magna cum laude, with a Bachelor of Arts in Public Communication, with a minor in
Business Administration. Ms. Moody's rate on this matter is $170.00 per hour.
THE RESULT OBTAINED

9.

The attorneys and paralegal identified above assisted in obtaining a

tremendous result in this case, namely, the ejectment of Defendant from the subject property.
CONCLUSION

Based on the points stated above and the relevant 54(e)(3) factors, the amount
Plaintiff requests as an award of fees is reasonable. Plaintiff respectfully asks that this Court award
Plaintiff the full amount of fees requested in the Memorandum, in the amount of $7,788.50, as
well as $283.63 in costs, for a total amount of$8,072.13.
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I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the state of Idaho that the
foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief.
Dated this 16th day of October, 2019.

Isl Alexander P. McLaughlin
Alexander P. McLaughlin
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 16th day of October, 2019, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing DECLARATION OF ALEXANDER P. MCLAUGHLIN IN
SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS to be served by the
method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Vernon K. Smith, Jr.
1900 W. Main St.
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Attorney for Defendant

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[X]

U.S. Mail
Facsimile (208) 345-1129
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
Email/iCourt: vkslaw@live.com

Isl Alexander P. McLaughlin
Alexander P. McLaughlin
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EXHIBIT A

000166

Givens Pursley LLP
Attorney Fees Listing

Noah G. Hillen v. David R. Gibson
Date

Attorney

05/23/2019
05/23/2019
05/23/2019

Hours

Amount

Rate

Narrative

KAD

0.3

51.00

170

Prepare documents for evictions of V.K. Smith, Ill and D. Gibson

APM
JWR

0.1

24.50

245

(.3);
Discuss issues in eviction/ejectment matters (.1);

0.4

74.00

185

I
Correspond with K. Moody regarding background information on
tenant to be evicted (.1); draft, revise, and edit complaints for
ejectment (.3);

JWR
KAD

0.1

18.50

185

Revise complaint for ejectment against D. Gibson;

05/28/2019

0.1

17.00

170

Correspondence to J. Relf regarding scope of ejectment action (.1);

05/29/2019

JWR

0.4

74.00

185

Revise complaint for ejectment, unjust enrichment, and other
relief;

05/31/2019

JWR

0.7

129.50

185

Further revise complaint for ejectment and other relief against D.
Gibson (.6); correspond with A. McLaughlin regarding the same

05/24/2019

(.1);
06/04/2019

KAD

0.3

51.00

170

Revise complaint against D. Gibson for ejectment and similar relief
(.3);

06/05/2019

APM

0.5

122.50

245

Analyze complaints, deposition transcripts, other documents
associated with unlawful detainer, and discuss the same with J.
Relf (.5);

0.1

17.00

170

Conference regarding ejectment action as to D. Gibson;

06/05/2019

KAD
JWR

0.7

129.50

185

Correspond with A. McLaughlin regarding ejectment action against
D. Gibson (.2); further review of complaint for expedited unlawful

06/06/2019

KAD

0.2

34.00

170

Finalize ejectment complaint against D. Gibson (.1);
correspondence to N. Hillen regarding the same (.1);
Finalize unlawful detainer complaint (.1);

06/05/2019

detainer (.5) .

06/06/2019
06/06/2019

APM
RAP

0.1

24.50

245

0.2

67.00

335

Review and approve ejectment complaint against lessee, and draft
email to K. Moody and A. McLaughlin regarding same (.2);

06/07/2019

APM

0.1

24.50

245

Correspond regarding status of filing unlawful detainer complaint

06/17/2019

KAD

0.1

17.00

170

(.1);
Correspondence to K. Vink regarding status of service of ejectment

06/18/2019

KAD

0.1

17.00

170

Conference with K. Vink regarding status of service of complaint

06/28/2019

APM

0.1

24.50

245

on D. Gibson (.1);
Correspond regarding notice of appearance and calendaring

07/03/2019

KAD

0.4

68.00

170

deadlines to take default (.1);
Review notice of appearance filed in D. Gibson ejectment case and

complaint on D. Gibson (.1);

discuss the same (.2); draft three day notice of intent to take
default in said case (.2);
07/05/2019
07/06/2019
07/12/2019

APM

0.1

24.50

245

Brief analysis of answer in the Gibson case and forward to the

APM
KAD

0.1

24.50

245

group along with comments;
Answer inquiry regarding Gibson case;

0.2

34.00

170

Review notice of status conference in D. Gibson ejectment and

APM
RAP

0.1

24.50

245

Discuss strategy associated with Gibson complaint (.1);

0.2

67.00

335

Review notice of status conference as to Gibson case (.2);

discuss stipulation for scheduling and planning (.2);
07/12/2019
07/12/2019
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Date

Attorney

Hours

Amount

Rate

07/13/2019
07/15/2019

Narrative

APM

0.1

24.50

245

Analyze multiple emails regarding strategy in Gibson ejectment

0.1

24.50

245

Correspond regarding next steps in ejectment action (.1);

07/15/2019

APM
JWR

2.5

462.50

185

Draft, revise, and edit memorandum in support of motion for
judgment on the pleadings (Gibson ejectment);

07/16/2019

JWR

1.7

314.50

185

Draft, revise, and edit motion for judgment on the pleadings
(Gibson ejectment);
Draft, revise, and edit briefing in support of motion for judgment

I
case and motion for an accounting (.1);

07/18/2019

JWR

0.9

166.50

185

JWR

1.8

333.00

185

on the pleadings in ejectment case (.9);
07/23/2019

Review and analyze legal claims raised in answer to complaint for
ejectment of Gibson from real property owned by the Estate (.6);
review and analyze authority governing legal claims raised in
answer (.6); draft, revise, and edit memorandum in support of
motion for judgment on the pleadings in ejectment case against
Gibson (.6);

07/24/2019

KAD

0.4

68.00

170

07/27/2019

RAP

0.7

234.50

335

Draft stipulation for scheduling and planning for D. Gibson
ejectment case (.4);
Review and revise motion for judgment on the pleadings prepared
by J. Relf, and draft letter to J. Relf regarding same (.7);

07/30/2019
07/30/2019

KAD
JWR

0.2
0.4

34.00
74.00

170

Correspondence regarding status of stipulation for scheduling and

185

planning in Gibson ejectment matter (.2);
Correspond with R. Peterman regarding status of ejectment case
against Gibson (.2); revise and edit brief in support of motion for
judgment on the pleadings in case for ejectment of Gibson (.2);

07/31/2019

APM

0.9

220.50

245

Discuss next steps in ejectment action (.1); edit and revise
Memorandum in Support of Motion Judgment on the Pleadings
(.8);

07/31/2019
08/01/2019

JWR
KAD

0.1
0.4

18.50
68.00

185

Correspond with A. McLaughlin and K. Moody regarding motion

170

for judgment on the pleadings in Gibson ejectment;
Revise stipulation for scheduling and planning in D. Gibson case
(.2); conference with Judge Hippler's chambers regarding motion
for judgment on pleadings in Gibson case (.2);

08/01/2019

APM

0.4

98.00

245

Address matters related to scheduling stipulation (.1); forward
Gibson briefing to K. Moody for review and offer comments
regarding proposed changes (.1); final edits to briefing and
circulate to group for comment (.2);

08/01/2019

RAP

0.7

234.50

335

APM

1.3

318.50

245

Aattend to scheduling order in Gibson case (.2); confer with K.
Moody regarding judgment on the pleadings hearing (.2); confer
with A. McLaughlin regarding same (.3);

08/02/2019

Final edits and revisions to judgment on the pleadings briefing and
draft supporting declaration of Noah G. Hillen (1.1); correspond
with court and counsel regarding pending matters, including
stipulation for scheduling (.2);

08/02/2019

JWR

0.3

55.50

185

Review and revise memorandum in support of motion for
judgment on the pleadings against Gibson;

08/02/2019

RAP

0.4

134.00

335

Review finalized motion for judgment on the pleadings as to
ejectment action pursued by personal representative against V.K.
Smith, Jr.'s client Gibson (.4);
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Date

Attorney

Hours

Amount

Rate

08/05/2019

Narrative

KAD

1.1

187.00

170

08/06/2019

KAD

0.2

34.00

170

08/07/2019

KAD

0.2

34.00

170

08/20/2019

KAD

0.3

51.00

170

09/12/2019

JWR

0.2

37.00

185

09/16/2019

JWR

2.0

370.00

185

09/17/2019

APM

0.2

49.00

245

09/17/2019

JWR

4.9

906.50

185

Draft, revise, and edit reply memorandum in support of motion for
judgment on the pleadings in ejectment case against Gibson (3.8);
review and analyze case law cited in opposing brief to develop
arguments that they are not controlling or simply inapposite (.4);
correspond with A. McLaughlin regarding strategy related to reply
brief (.1); review cases cited in reply brief to ensure they are
current and accurate law (.6);

09/18/2019

APM

1.4

343.00

245

09/18/2019

JWR

2.3

425.50

185

Edit and revise brief in support of motion for judgment on the
pleadings (1.4);
Draft, revise, and edit reply memorandum in support of partial
motion for judgment on the pleadings in Gibson ejectment (1.4);
review and analyze Gibson's opposition to motion for judgment on
the pleadings and read cases cited therein (.9);

09/19/2019

APM

0.2

49.00

245

Discuss hearing and arguments with J. Relf (.2);

09/19/2019

JWR

1.5

277.50

185

Correspond with A. McLaughlin and K. Moody regarding
agricultural exemption for property occupied by Gibson (.1); draft,
revise, and edit argument for upcoming hearing on motion for
judgment on the pleadings (.8); review and analyze cases cited by
both parties and draft summaries of legal arguments relevant to
cases and statutes cited therein (.6);

09/20/2019

APM

0.1

24.50

245

Discuss outcome of 12(c) hearing with J. Relf (.1);

09/20/2019

JWR

3.6

666.00

185

Prepare for and participate in oral argument for motion for
judgment on the pleadings in ejectment case against Gibson (3.4);
correspond with team and client regarding the same (.2).

09/22/2019

RAP

0.2

67.00

335

10/02/2019

APM

0.2

49.00

245

Review J. Relf report as to outcome of motion for judgment on
pleadings as to Gibson issue (.2);
Analyze and review court's memorandum decision and order and
judgment in Gibson matter and address next steps in case (.2);

I
Exchange correspondence regarding finalizing motion for
judgment on pleadings in Gibson ejectment action (.3); conference
with Judge Hippler's chambers regarding hearing issues (.2);
finalize motion for judgment on pleadings and supporting
documents in Gibson ejectment (.4); draft notice of hearing
thereon (.2);
Attend to deadlines regarding action as to motion for judgment on
pleadings in Gibson ejectment (.2);
Correspondence regarding status of scheduling stipulation in D.
Gibson ejectment case (.2);
Attend to court ordered deadlines in Gibson ejectment case from
scheduling order (.3);
Review and analyze opposing memorandum in opposition to
motion for partial summary judgment in case to eject Gibson from
Estate property;
Review and analyze Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings in Ejectment case against Gibson and
case law cited therein (1.1); draft, revise, and edit reply
memorandum in support of motion for judgment on pleadings in
ejectment case against Gibson (.9);
Correspond regarding arguments in opposition to 12(c) motion in
ejectment action and sale motion (.2);
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Date

Attorney

10/03/2019

KAO

Hours

Amount

Rate

0.4

68.00

170

Narrative

I
Exchange correspondence regarding judgment in favor of N. Hillen
in Gibson ejectment and further action to facilitate ejectment (.4);

10/04/2019

APM

0.1

10/07/2019

KAO
APM

0.2

34.00

170

Review issued writ of assistance for D. Gibson (.2);

0.2

49.00

245

Address whether to request award of fees in Gibson case (.2);

38.5

7,788.50

10/11/2019

Attorney

APM
JWR
KAO
RAP

24.50

245

Hours

Amount

6.4

1,568.00

245

24.5

4,532.50

185

Analyze terms of writ of assistance and circulate to group (.1);

Rate

5.2

884.00

170

2.4

804.00

335

38.5

7,788.50

I
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Givens Pursley LLP
Costs Listing
Noah G. Hillen v. David R. Gibson
Date
06/07/2019

Description
Filing Fees

Vendor
Givens Pursley -

Narrative
iCourt filing fee

Rev Amt
227.63

corporate card
06/19/2019

Serving Expense

Tri-County Process

Service of ejectment complaint and summons

Serving

on D. Gibson

56.00

283.63
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Electronically Filed
10/29/2019 3:50 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Phil McGrane, Clerk of the Court
By: Katee Hysell, Deputy Clerk

1

2
3
4

Vernon K. Smith
ATTORNEY AT LAW
1900 W. Main Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
ISB No. 1365
Tel. (208) 345-1125
Fax:(208) 345-1129
vkslaw@live.com

5

Attorney for Defendant.

6

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

7

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

8

9

NOAH G. HILLEN, in his capacity as
Personal Representative of the Estate of
Victoria H. Smith,
Case No. CV0l-19-10368

Plaintiff,
11

V.

12
13

David R. Gibson, an individual, d/b/a
BLACK DIAMOND COMPOST
PRODUCTS,

14

Defendant.

15

DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN OPPOSITION
TO PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OF
ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS

The Defendant Gibson submits this motion in objection to the Plaintiff's Memorandum o

16

Fees and Costs, as required by I.R.C.P. 54(d)(5). Scott Beckstead Real Estate Co. v. City of

17

Preston, 147Idaho 852, 856n.l, 216P.3d 141,145 n.l !..6:2~.,._............i..i...u~

18

accompanying memorandum which details th

19

provided by I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3)(D), the Defenda

20

provided by Fourth District, Ada County Local

21

22
23
24

Vernon K. Sm1
Attorney for Defendant
David R. Gibson, d/b/a Black Diamond

25

26

DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEYS' FEES
1
AND COSTS-PAGE
000172

1

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

2

I HEREBY CERTIFY on this 29th day of October, 2019, a copy of the foregoing

3

DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEYS'

4

FEES AND COSTS was served upon the following:
Randall A. Peterman
[X ]
[ ]
Alexander P. McLaughlin
[ ]
Jack W. Relf

5
6
7
8

9

11

12

GIVENS PURSLEY LLP

[

]

601 West Bannock Street
Post Office Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720
Telephone:
208-388-1200
Facsimile:
208-388-1300
Email: rap@givenspursley.com
apm@givenspursley.com
jackrelf@givenspursley.com

[
[

]

E-filed thru !Court
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overm~·~........,...__

ernon K. Smith
Attorney for Defendant
David R. Gibson, d/b/a Black Diamond

13

14
15
16
17
18
19

20
21

22
23

24
25
26

DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEYS' FEES
AND COSTS-PAGE
2
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Electronically Filed
10/29/2019 3:50 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Phil McGrane, Clerk of the Court
By: Katee Hysell, Deputy Clerk

1
2

3

4
5

Vernon K. Smith
ATTORNEY AT LAW
1900 W. Main Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
ISB No. 1365
Tel. (208) 345-1125
Fax:(208) 345-1129
vkslaw@live.com
Attorney for Defendant.

6
7

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

8

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

9

10

NOAH G. Ill.LEN, in his capacity as
Personal Representative of the Estate of
Victoria H. Smith,
Case No. CV0l-19-10368

11

Plaintiff,
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S
MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEYS' FEES
AND COSTS

V.

12

13

David R. Gibson, an individual, d/b/a
BLACK DIAMOND COMPOST
PRODUCTS,

14

Defendant.
15
16

I.

17

STATUS OF THE PROCEEDING

18

On October 2, 2019, partial judgment on the pleadings in the nature of a summary

19

judgment was entered for the Plaintiff Hillen on a single count for ejectment as contained within

20

a four-count complaint. A Rule 54(b) Certificate was issued with this judgment. On October 16,

21

2019, the Plaintiff Hillen submitted a Memorandum of Attorneys' Fees and Costs, as arising out

22

of the entry of the October 2, 2019 judgment.

23

As further argued below the Defendant Gibson objects to, and opposes, the Plaintiff

24

Hillen's requests for an award of costs and fees on the basis that: (1), at this point in the

25

proceeding no prevailing party can be determined who would be entitled to any award of costs

26

and fees; (2), Idaho Code §12-120, (3), does not provide a basis for an award of fees arising out

DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S
MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS- PAGE

1
000174

1

of a claim requesting ejectment; and (4) an award of attorney's fees under LC. §12-121 can only

2

to be made at the conclusion of the entire action, not at the time any single motion has been

3

determined. Therefore, Plaintiff Hillen' s request for an award of costs and fees should be denied

4

in its entirety.

5

n

6

ARGUMENT

7

A.

Hillen Cannot Be Declared the Prevailing Party in The Action

8

As clearly stated on the face of the Plaintiff Hillen's supporting memorandum, "Plaintiff

9

solely wishes at this point to preserve his ability to seek and obtain fees and costs with respect to

10

Count One." Fees & Cost Memo at pg. 2. The prevailing party analysis provided by Rule 54(d)

11

is based only upon a determination of which party prevailed on the main issue of the entire

12

action, and not upon a determination of which party has prevailed on any single issue within the

13

action. As recently stated by the Idaho Supreme Court in Thornton v. Pandrea, 161 Idaho 301,

14

385 P.3d 856 {2016):

15

18

"Rule 54(d)(l)(B) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure guides the prevailing
party analysis: In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and
entitled to costs, the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider the final
judgment or result of the action in relation to the relief sought by the respective
parties." The Court stated in Hobson that "the issue ... is not who succeeded on
more individual claims, but rather who succeeded on the main issue of the
action." 154 Idaho at 49, 294 P.3d at 175. 161 Idaho at 315, 385 P.3d at 870.

19

The application of this entire proceeding prevailing party analysis is not altered by the

16
17

20

entry of a Rule 54(b) Certificate rendering as final an otherwise interlocutory judgment. A

21

Rule 54(b) Certificate does not in any manner alter the applicable prevailing party analysis that

22

is based upon a determination of the outcome of the entire case, as was stated by the Court in

23

Steel Farms, Inc. v. Croft & Reed, Inc., 154 Idaho 259, 297 P.3d 222 (2012):

24
25

26

"[T]his appeal arises from an I.RC.P. 54(b) certified judgment which resolved
some, but not all, of the parties' claims. Since each claim in an action must be
resolved before a court may determine the prevailing party, the identity of the
prevailing party in this case will not be known until proceedings at the trial level
are complete". I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l); Bagley v. Thomason, 149 Idaho 799, 804-05,

DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S
MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS- PAGE

2000175

1
2

241 P.3d 972, 977-78 (2010) (citing MBNA Am. Bank, NA. v. Fouche, 146 Idaho
1, 4, 189 P.3d 463, 466 (2008)). Upo~ the district_ court'~ entry of a final ju~gment
deciding each claim below, the court is to determme which p~rty has prevailed
and whether that party is entitled to attorney fees related to this appeal. 154 Idaho
at 269, 297 P.3d at 232.

3
4

Because an award of costs can only be made to a prevailing party, as determined under

5

Rule 54(d)(l), and that determination cannot be made by the Court at this early stage of the

6

proceedings, the Plaintiff Hillen' s request for an award of costs, as a matter of right, as arising

7

out of the determination of the ejectment claim, must be denied at this time.

8

No award of any attorney's fees can be made to Hillen in the absence of a prior

9

determination of his status as a prevailing party, inasmuch as both of the requested basis for an
award of fees cited in support ofHillen's memorandum - J.C. §§12-120(3) and 12-121 - only

11

permit an award to be made to a prevailing party. Therefore, Hillen's request for the award of

12

fees must be denied in their entirety at this juncture of the proceedings. Because independent

13

grounds exist as well to further support a denial ofHillen's request for an award of fees under

14

both J.C. §§12-120(3) and 12-121, those additional independent grounds will be further stated in

15

the argument set out below.

16

B. Attorney's Fees Cannot Be Awarded Under I.C. §12-120(3) On A Claim for Eiectment

17

Hillen has requested an award of attorney's fees upon the "commercial transaction" basis

18

ofl.C. §12-120(3). There is a long-recognized exception to an award of attorney's fees under

19

the commercial transaction provision ofl.C. § 12-120(3) for those claims in which the gravamen

20

of the action is a property dispute, rather than a claimed commercial action. This property

21

dispute exclusion has been summarized as follows by the Idaho Supreme Court in C & G, Inc. v.

22

Rule, 135 Idaho 763, 25 P.3d 76 (2001):

23
24

25

26

The present action is primarily a dispute over whether the properties in
question were conveyed in fee simple or as easements. As such, this case does
not fall within the meaning of a commercial transaction as defined in I.C. § 12120(3). The present situation is instead more analogous to situations involving the
determination of property rights where this Court and the Court of Appeals have
uniformly denied an award of attorney fees. See Jerry J. Joseph C.L. U. Ins.
Assoc. v. Vaught, 117 ldaho 555, 789 P.2d 1146 (Ct.App.1990) (denying attorney
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4

5
6

7
8

fees under I.C. § 12-120(3) in an action where property owner sought a judgment
compelling adjoining property owners to reimburse it for irrigation assessments,
to record an instrument establishing an access easement, and to remove a fence
hindering its use of the easement and where after settlement, adjoining property
owners breached the settlement agreement); Chen v. Conway, 121 Idaho 1006,
829 P.2d 1355 (Ct.App. 1991) (determining that a quiet title action involving
dispute over the existence of a prescriptive easement was not a commercial
transaction under I.C. § 12-120(3)); Durrant v. Christensen, 117 Idaho 70, 785
P.2d 634 (1990) (holding that an action in which landowners sought adjudication
of water rights and a permanent restraining order prohibiting the defendant from
interfering with their diversion and use of water determined was not based on a
commercial transaction as defined in I.C. § 12-120(3)); Sun Valley Hot Springs
Ranch, Inc. v. Kelsey, 131 Idaho 657, 962 P.2d 1041 (1998) (stating that an action
to determine ownership and easement rights did not fall within the meaning of a
commercial transaction under I.C. 12-120(3) and therefore attorney fees were
properly denied). Accordingly, we decline to award fees to Union Pacific under
I.C. § 12-120(3). 135 Idaho at 769, 25 P.3d at 82.

9

See also, Bedke v. Pickett Ranch and Sheep Co., 143 Idaho 36, 42, 137 P.3d 423,429
11

(2006) (Denying an award of §12-120(3) attorney's fees in reliance upon the same grounds as

12

summarized in the just-cited C & G, Inc. v. Rule decision).

13

The Court in issuing the C & G, Inc. v. Rule opinion specifically included quiet title

14

actions within the property dispute exception to commercial transaction claims made under I.C. §

15

12-120(3). The relief requested in both quiet title and ejectment actions is closely related and

16

frequently those two actions must proceed in conjunction for purposes of the determination of

17

the entire action. Ada County Highway Dist. v. Total Success Investments, LLC, 145 Idaho 360,

18

369, 179 P.3d 323, 332 (2008) ("We note it was necessary to determine the quiet title portion of

19

the suit before reaching the issue of ejectment."). In this proceeding the Plaintiff Hillen also

20

included a quiet title claim within his complaint upon which this Court has now granted his

21

request for an ej ectment of the Defendant Gibson.

22

There are at least two Idaho appellate decisions involving ejectment actions in which the

23

Idaho Supreme Court has denied a request for an award of attorney's fees under I.C. §12-120(3)

24

on the basis of the property dispute exception stated above. In Black Diamond Alliance, LLC v.

25

Kimball, 148 Idaho 798, 229 P.3d 1160 (2010), in which the central claim was for the issuance

26

of a writ of ejectment, the Court rejected the prevailing party's §12-120(3) attorney fee request.
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1

In doing so the Court relied upon its earlier decision in, PHH Mortg. Services Corp. v. Perreira,

2

146 Idaho 631, 200 P.3d 1180 (2009), in which PHH had requested an ejectment of the Perreiras

3

from a residence. In both of these opinions the Court held ejectment actions could not be

4

characterized as commercial transactions for the purpose of the recovery of attorney's fees under

5

I.C. §12-120(3). 148 Idaho at 802,229 P.3d at 1164.
Here, Hillen has mis-stated the law to this court in an attempt to bootstrap his request for

6
7

fees, as arising out of the ejectment action, as being a commercial transaction arising out of an

8

underlying contract. Fees & Cost Memo at pg. 5. This is the very argument for which an award

9

of §12-120(3) attorney's fees was rejected in both the Kimball and Perreira opinions. The

10

gravamen ofHillen's claim, as decided by this Court on the motion for entry of partial judgment

11

on the pleadings, was clearly for ejectment, which was the relief granted by this Court.

12

Therefore, because of the application of the property dispute exception as specifically

13

incorporating ejectment claims, Hillen has no right to even claim a basis for an award of

14

attorney's fees under I.C. § 12-120(3). This behavior of misstating the law is but a continuation

15

of what has been his false claim in this case: that he is the vested and titled owner of the

16

Decedent's property interests, and that the heirs have been divested of their interests.

17

C.

18

Practice; Gibson's Opposition to Hillen's Claim to the "Ownership" Of Estate Property on

19

A Basis Other Than That Provided by The UPC Was Not Frivolous

20

The Award of Attorney's Fees Under I.C. §12-121 Does Not Apply to Motion

An award of attorney's fees under I.C. §12-121 is to be determined only after all claims

21

in the action have been decided. Consequently, §12-121 does not provide a basis for an award o

22

attorney's fees arising out the decision of a single motion. Walker v. Boozer, 140 Idaho 451,

23

457, 95 P.3d 69, 75 (2004) ("I.C. §12-121 applies to cases as a whole and not to individual

24

motions."). Although the basis for an award of §12-121 attorney's fees has been modified by

25

Idaho Military Historical Society v Maslen, 156 Idaho 624, 631-32, 329 P.3d 1072, 1079-1080

26

(2014), as cited in support ofHillen's request for §12-121 attorney's fees, the Maslen decision
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1

did not alter the timing for the evaluation of such an award of fees, which remains at the time all

2

claims made within an action have been determined. Therefore, Hillen' s request for an award of

3

§12-121 attorney's fees must also be denied on the basis that such an award is not appropriate as

4

applied to a decision arising out of motion practice prior to the time all claims within an action

5

have been determined.

6

This Court's decision on Hillen's motion for ejectment was ultimately based only upon

7

that authority granted to a personal representative by I.C. §15-3-711 ("[A] personal

8

representative has the same power over the title to power of the estate that an absolute owner

9

should have, in trust however, for the benefit of the creditors and other interested in the estate.").
The basis for the Court's decision on this motion is clearly indicated by reference to this Court's

11

12
13

14
15

16
17
18

19
20

21
22
23

declaration, as set out on page 6 of its Amended Memorandum Decision:
Gibson also argues that a personal representative's power is limited, and
can be used only "to the extent necessary for the administration of that property in
the interests of creditors and other interested persons." (Def.' s Mem. Opp'n
Pl.'s Mot. Partial J. Pleadings 11.) It is true that a personal representative's
temporary power is held "in trust ... for the benefit of the creditors and others
interested in the estate." LC. § 15-3-711. This creates-a fiduciary duty, but
contrary to Gibson's assertion, does not limit the personal representative's
power to control the property. Whether possession of property is "necessary
for purposes of administration" is left to the sole discretion of the personal
representative, whose request "is conclusive evidence, in any action against the
heir ... for possession thereof, that the possession of the property by the personal
representative is necessary for purposes of administration." I.C. § 15-3-709. In
other words, as the comment notes, an heir may be able to sue "for breach of
fiduciary duty, but this possibility should not interfere with the personal
representative's administrative authority as it relates to possession of the estate."
Id. cmt. So even if Hillen might somehow violate his fiduciary duty to Vernon
by eiecting Gibson, the proper course is for Vernon to sue Hillen for breach
of fiduciary duty. But Gibson has not claimed such relief, nor could he do so, as
he is not an heir to Victoria's estate. Amended Memorandum Decision at pg. 6
(italicized/bold emphasis in original; bold/underlined emphasis added).
By that declaration of the court, Hillen is on notice that Vernon has a cause of

24

action for Hillen's breach of fiduciary duty, and he has not been insulated from such

25

claims. In opposing Hillen's motion, Gibson has taken strong exception to this Court's

26

conclusion, as highlighted in the above-quoted excerpt from the Memorandum Decision,
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1

that the existence of the fiduciary duty does not limit the personal representative's power

2

to control the estate property. The travesty that is currently taking place within this

3

probate proceeding is Hillen' s declared intention to completely liquidate the estate in

4

contravention of the express standards of the UPC for the preservation of estate property.

5

The existence of the fiduciary duty, as a consequence of the personal representative only

6

having possession of the estate property - holding only a power over the title, but not

7

holding the actual title itself- functions as an inherent restraint upon the actions of the

8

personal representative. In the proceeding on this ejectment claim, Hillen did not merely

9

seek confirmation of his status as the trustee of the estate property, but instead he

10

requested a declaration as based upon the Rule 70(b) Order that he was the actual sole

11

owner of the estate property. Such an outcome would have eliminated Hillen' s

12

statutorily-created trust relationship with the heirs, and as a consequence would have also

13

extinguished his fiduciary duty to the heirs.

14

In other words, the relief that Hillen requested on this motion - and the relief that Gibson

15

opposed - was for a declaration to be made by this Court that the probate court's Rule 70(b)

16

Order, claimed as being affirmed by the Idaho Supreme Court on appeal, established Hillen's

17

sole and absolute ownership of the estate property, which ownership interest excluded and

18

eliminated any trust interest retained by the heirs and as protected by the personal

19

representative's fiduciary duty to the heirs. This requested relief was much broader, and in fact

20

was in excess of, the statutorily-granted authority over estate property provided to the personal

21

representative by I.C. §15-3-711, which statutory authority was ultimately the basis upon which

22

this Court relied in rendering its decision. Hillen's intentions were unequivocally stated on the

23

face of the memorandum that he submitted to this Court in support of his motion for partial

24

judgment on the ejectment claim in which he declared the basis for his requested relief as

25

follows:

26

The Rule 70 Judgment is unambiguous. It vests all right, title, and interest in
the Gowen Property to Hillen. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the Rule 70
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2

3
4

5
6
7
8

9

Judgment following Vernon's appeal. In re Estate of Smith, 164 Idaho at 482,
432 P.3d at 31. Vernon asserts that the Rule 70 Judgment has no effect because it
somehow conflicts with his "vested" ownership right in the Gowen Property as a
2/3 heir of the Estate. Defendant (through Vernon) claims Vernon's partial
interest in the Gowen Property became "vested" pursuant to Idaho Code Section
15-3-101 upon her death.
This argument lacks merit. First, Section 15-3-101 does not mention
permanently vesting interests nor pre-emption of future orders or judgments.
Second, the Rule 70 Judgment expressly states that Hillen's ownership of the
Gowen Property "is free and clear of any lien, claim or interest of the Claimants
[which includes Vernon.]" The Rule 70 Judgment was, fittingly, entered pursuant
to Rule 70(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. That provision allows courts
to "enter a judgment divesting any party's title and vesting it in others." I.RC.P.
70(b ). Therefore, any interest Vernon once had in the premises was divested
by the Rule 70 Judgment and vested in Hillen, the current sole owner.
Memorandum in Support of Partial Judgment, at pg. 5 (bold/underlined emphasis
added).
There is a potentially huge difference in outcome if this Court had granted Hill en's

11

requested relief declaring him, by virtue of the Rule 70(b) Order, to be the sole actual owner of

12

the estate property to the exclusion of Vernon (and by extension Joseph), whose interest under

13

I.C. §15-3-101 allegedly had been entirely divested as a result of the entry of that Rule 70(b)

14

Order. In the normal course of events Hillen's "power" exercised in trust under I.C. §15-3-711

15

only permits him to divest the heirs' title, as acquired by operation oflaw, when necessary to

16

satisfy estate claims.

17

With all due respect to the conclusions reached by this Court, under I.C. §15-3-101 title

18

to estate property passes to the heirs at the time of death, as a matter oflaw, subject only to

19

subsequent divestiture if necessary in the administration of the estate by the exercise of the

20

power granted to the personal representative by I.C. §15-3-711. ("Estates descend at death to

21

successors identified by any probated will, or to heirs if no will is probated, subject to rights

22

which may be implemented through administration." Official Comment, ,r 1). The heirs obtain .

23

and retain title, subject only to divestment of their title by the personal representative's exercise

24

of the §15-3-711 power, as limited by a required determination that such divestment of the heir's

25

ownership interest in estate property is necessary for the administration of the estate for the

26

benefit of creditors or other interested parties.

DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S
MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS-PAGE

8
000181

1

What Hillen has wrongfully attempted to accomplish in his motion for partial judgment

2

on the ejectment claim was to reverse the existing statutory mandate and in its place vest in him

3

(instead of the heirs) the sole title to the estate property, apparently subject only to a possible

4

reconveyance to the heirs at the end of estate administration, if at that time, any property subject

5

to distribution still remained. If this Court had declared Hillen to be the sole owner of the estate

6

property in conjunction with the divestment of Vernon's entire interest in that estate property,

7

then the §15-3-711 trust relationship would have been extinguished along with the associated

8

right of the heirs to bring a claim for breach of fiduciary duty. In other words, if Hillen were no

9

longer required to act only by the exercise of a statutorily-conferred power, but instead was

10

declared the actual absolute sole owner of the property, then there no longer would be any

11

fiduciary interest to protect, and neither Vernon nor Joseph would have had any standing to

12

challenge the actions of Hillen, as the personal representative, because their entire interest in the

1'.3

estate would have been determined to have been extinguished by the entry of this erroneously

14

worded Rule 70(b) Order.

15

As based upon the above-cited excerpt from the Court's Amended Memorandum, it

16

appears to Defendant Gibson this Court in its decision did not intend to eliminate Hillen's trust

17

relationship to the estate property, nor to either extinguish or eliminate, the right of the heirs to

18

challenge Hillen's actions as being a breach of his fiduciary duty that arises out of the statutorily-

19

imposed trust relationship. Although this Court granted Hillen's request for ejectment, it did so

20

only in reliance upon the statutory authority ofl.C. §15-3-711, and not by granting Hillen's

21

requested relief, as based upon the Rule 70(b) Order, that Hillen perceives to have granted him

22

the sole actual ownership of the estate property, which is statutorily and legally impossible.

23

Regrettably, this Court's decision, by confirming the alleged effect of the Rule 70(b)

24

Order, and in also confirming the continued existence of a potential breach of fiduciary action

25

arising out of the statutorily-imposed trust relationship, has the appearance of a conflict.

26

Consequently, in the context of the ownership claims that were actually raised by Hillen on his

DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S
MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS-PAGE

9
000182

1

motion - but upon which ownership claims he obtained no relief - it cannot be deemed frivolous

2

for Gibson to have challenged Hillen's ownership claims and request for relief. Those

3

ownership claims, on their face, is a fallacious attempt by Hillen to establish his sole and

4

absolute ownership of estate property. That outcome would have granted Hillen authority in

5

excess of that which is statutorily-granted to a personal representative by I.C. § 15-3-711.

6

Therefore, even if it were appropriate to consider a request for an award of§ 12-121 attorney's

7

fees arising out of motion practice, that request must be denied on the basis that Gibson's actions

8

in opposing Hillen's requested ownership claims were well founded, as based upon the existing

9

law, statutory authority, and standards of the Idaho Uniform Probate Code (UPC).

10

ill.

11

CONCLUSION

12

Because a prevailing party cannot be determined at this stage of the proceeding, Hillen's

13

request for an award of costs and attorney's fees must be denied in their entirety. In any event,

14

Hillen cannot prevail in a request for fees under LC. § 12-120(3) arising out of claim for

15

ejectment, which is a property dispute to which that section does not apply. Furthermore, in-as-

16

much as Hillen predicated his motion for relief upon a belief that the Rule 70(b) Order had made

17

him both the sole owner of the estate property and also had divested,__::al~l~·~........,~

18

that property. Such a finding would have been in excess

t

19

to a personal representative over estate property. Therefo

t ti

20

oppose Hillen's motion, such that Hillen's request for an a

21

be denied in its entirety.

22

Dated this 29th day of October, 2019.

23

24

orney for

25
26
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

NOAH G. HILLEN, in his capacity as
Personal Representative of the Estate of
Victoria H. Smith,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. CV0l-19-10368
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S
MOTION IN OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OF
ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS

DAVID R. GIBSON, an individual d/b/a
BLACK DIAMOND COMPOST
PRODUCTS,
Defendant.

COMES NOW Plaintiff, Noah G. Hillen ("Plaintiff' or "Hillen"), the duly
appointed Personal Representative of the Estate of Victoria H. Smith (the "Estate"), by and through
his undersigned counsel of record, and hereby submits this Response to Defendant's Motion in
Opposition to Plaintiffs Memorandum of Attorneys' Fees and Costs ("Response").

RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S
MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS - 1
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By filing his Memorandum of Attorneys' Fees and Costs ("Memorandum") within
14 days of the Court's judgment-rendered final under Rule 54(b)-Hillen has preserved his
ability to argue that he is entitled to "ejectment fees" at the conclusion of this action. It makes
sense then to hold Hillen' s fee request in abeyance until such time as this Court has entered a final
judgment addressing all of Hillen's claims. 1 Hillen, therefore, agrees with Defendant David R.
Gibson ("Gibson") that it is premature to decide Hillen's fee request at this time. Hillen
respectfully requests that the Court refrain from ruling on Hillen's fee petition and Gibson's
objection until such time as the Court enters a final judgment on all counts, so the Court can
determine, at that time, prevailing party status and entitlement to an award of fees and costs.
DATED this 15th day of November, 2019.
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP

By Isl Alexander P. McLaughlin
Randall A. Peterman - Of the Firm
Alexander P. McLaughlin - Of the Firm
Jack W. Relf- Of the Firm
Attorneys for Plaintiff

1

In fact, the undersigned sent a letter to Gibson's counsel on November 14, 2019, requesting that he sign a
stipulation that holds our fee request and his objection thereto in abeyance. In response, Gibson's counsel set his
objection for hearing.
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by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Vernon K. Smith, Jr.
1900 W. Main St.
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Attorney for Defendant
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

8

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

9

1O

NOAH G. HILLEN, in his capacity as
Personal Representative of the Estate of
Victoria H. Smith,
Plaintiff,

11
12

V.

13

DAVID R. GIBSON, an individual, d/b/a
BLACK DIAMOND COMPOST
PRODUCTS,
Defendant.

14

Case No. CV0l-19-10368

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO RECONSIDER COURT
DECISION AND MOTION TO AMEND
JUDGMENT UNDER RULE 59(e),
I.R.C.P.

15

I.
16

17

STATUS OF PROCEEDINGS
On October 3, 2019 this Court filed its Amended Memorandum Decision and Order

18

Granting Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings. In that decision this Court

19

acknowledged the basis of the request of Plaintiff, Noah Hillen, (hereafter "Hillen"), as founded

20

on his asserted interest as the "sole owner" of the Decedent's property, but despite that

21

acknowledgement, this Court never clearly declared that Hillen was, in fact, the sole owner of

22

Decedent's Property as a result of the entry of the Rule 70(b) Order.

23

In addition to the Court's statement made, as made in the single full paragraph found on

24

page six (6) of its Memorandum Decision, the Court reasoned the power conferred by LC. § 15-

25

3-711 was adequate, on its face, to grant Hillen's request for an order ejecting Gibson from the

26

Gowen Field property, of which Gibson occupied only a small portion of the 520 acres.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT -PAGE -1 000188

In the last sentence of the second full paragraph appearing on page 5 of the Decision the
2

Court concluded:

5

So contrary to Gibson's position, the fact that the statute gives a "power" instead
of "title" does not matter-even without holding title, Hillen would still have the
power of an absolute owner over the Gowen Property, which includes
determining who can occupy it. Amended Memo. Dec., p. 5, (bold/underlined
emphasis added).

6

Defendant and his counsel take strong exception to this Court's statement that it

3
4

7

simply "does not matter" whether Hillen is determined to be an "owner" of the property,

8

or determined only to be in "possession" of the property with the grant of a "power" over

9

that property, as the exercise of a power is limited by Hillen's trust obligations to the

10

heirs under the Uniform Probate Code (UPC).

11

This false premise Hillen has relied upon for an order this requested ejectment, claiming

12

the "ownership" of the property interests, will be repeatedly relied upon by Hillen in subsequent

13

proceedings in which the distinction between "ownership" and mere "possession" will be highly

14

significant to the determination of the particular cause then presented.

15

Defendant Gibson does argue on this pending motion for reconsideration and amendment

16

of the Judgment that significant distinctions arise out of the statutory limitations placed upon the

17

exercise of a "power" by a personal representative, as opposed to Hillen's fictitious claim that he

18

is the sole "owner" of the Decedent's property. If Hillen is declared by this Court to be the "sole

19

owner", to the exclusion of any trust interest in the heirs, then he would be free to do with that

20

property as he pleases, completely unrestricted by any of the limitations otherwise imposed upon

21

his actions by the UPC. If Hillen would be the "sole owner" of the property, to the exclusion of

22

the Decedent's heirs, he would no longer be subject to the statutory trust obligation to the heirs,

23

nor would he remain subject to the heirs' corresponding statutory right to restrain his

24

unauthorized actions (I.C. § 15-3-607), or statutorily authorized to seek damages for Hillen's

25

breach of fiduciary duty (I.C. § 15-3-712).

26
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These outcomes would be a defense for Hillen if Hillen is deemed to be the sole owner
2

of the Decedent's property, because as a result of such a determination, the heirs' trust interest

3

will have been effectively extinguished, and the heirs would no longer have the required standing

4

to seek an order of restraint against Hillen, or to seek the damages for his breach of fiduciary

5

duty, inasmuch as those statutory obligations will have been eliminated by this Court's erroneous

6

Order.

7

In contrast to ownership, Hillen being granted possession, in trust, for the benefit of the

8

heirs, then his actions remain subject to review under UPC provisions as cited in the paragraph

9

just above. 1

10

II.

11

LEGAL STANDARD APPLICABLE TO
A MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND
In Noreen v. Price Development Co. Limited Partnership, 135 Idaho 816, 819-820, 25

12
13

P.3d 129, 132-33 (Ct.App.2001) the Idaho Court of Appeals addressed the respective purposes

14

and distinctions that are served by a motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory judgment, as

15

currently provided by I.R.C.P. 11.2(b), and by a motion for the reconsideration and amendment

16

of a final judgment made under Rule 59(e), I.R.C.P .. In this matter the entry of a Rule 54(b)

17

Certificate with this Court's entry of judgment renders that judgment final for purposes of

18

reconsideration and amendment as requested under I.R.C.P. 59(e) ("Motion to alter or amend a

19

judgment"). Idaho First Nat'! Bank v. David Steed & Assoc., Inc., 121 Idaho 356,361, 825 P.2d

20

79, 84 (1992).

21

22
1

23
24
25

26

In addition, the Defendant Gibson observes that this Court's reliance upon the "conclusive evidence" standard of
I.C. § 15-3-709 is misplaced. See, Amended Memorandum Decision at pg. 5. That statutory conclusive evidence
standard is only intended to apply to a personal representative's claim to the "possession" of the estate propertynot to a claim to the "ownership" of estate property. Here Hillen' s claim has been squarely based upon his alleged
right to "ownership" of Decedent's property, not mere "possession." Therefore, a question arises as to whether that
statute has any application to the decision of this matter as based upon a claim of ownership instead of mere
possession. In a larger sense, it is the very application of the UPC statutes, and the remedies and restrictions they
provide concerning the unauthorized actions of a personal representative, which is at the center of Defendant
Gibson's Motion and objection.
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The Idaho Supreme Court in, City ofPocatello v. State ofIdaho, 152 Idaho 830,275 P.3d
2

845 (2012), has explained the function served by a motion to reconsider a final judgment made

3

under Rule 59(e):

4

12

"The purpose of motions under that rule is 'to allow the trial court ... to
correct errors both of fact and law that had occurred in its proceedings.'
Consideration of LR. C .P. 59( e) motions must be directed to the status of the case
as it existed when the court rendered the decision upon which the judgment is
based." First Sec. Bank of Idaho, NA. v. Webster, 119 Idaho 262, 266, 805 P.2d
468, 472 (1991) (citations omitted). "A Rule 59(e) motion may not be used to
raise arguments or present evidence for the first time when they could reasonably
have been raised earlier in the litigation." Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop,
229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir.2000); accord Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S.
471, 486, 128 S.Ct. 2605, 2617, 171 L.Ed.2d 570, 581-82 (2008); 11 C. Wright &
A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2810.1, pp. 127-28 (2d ed. 1995); 47
Am.Jur.2d Judgments § 658 (2006). Such motion cannot be used to present new
information that the trial court did not have before it rendered its judgment.
Marcher v. Butler, 113 Idaho 867, 870, 749 P.2d 486, 489 (1988). A Rule 59(e)
motion cannot be used to raise issues and offer evidence that, in hindsight, the
litigant wishes it would have presented prior to the entry of a final judgment. 152
Idaho at 837, 275 P.3d at 852.

13

A motion to reconsider made under Rule 59(e) is addressed to the discretion of the court

5
6
7

8
9

10
11

14

and an order of the court denying such motion is appealable only upon the question of whether

15

there has been an abuse of discretion. Pandrea v. Barrett, 160 Idaho 165, 171, 369 P.3d 943,

16

949 (2016).

17
18
19

20
21

22
23
24
25

26

III.
LEGAL QUESTIONS RAISED ON DEFENDANT
GIBSON'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
1. Was this Court's October 3, 2019 decision based upon a specific finding that Hillen is the
sole owner of the Gowen Field property - and of all other Decedent's property - as a
direct consequence of the entry of the Rule 70(b) Order?
2. Alternatively, did this Court's decision constitute a direct repudiation and denial of
Hillen's claim to be the "sole owner" of Decedent's property as a result of the Rule 70(b)
Order on the basis this Court has declared Hillen to have the "same power" as that of an
absolute owner under LC. § 15-3-711, as being necessary to permit Him to eject Gibson
from the Gowen Field property?
3. If Hillen is deemed to be the sole owner of Decedent's property, as a consequence of the
Rule 70(b) Order, then on what basis does Hillen remain subject to the statutorily-stated
trust obligations he owes to Decedent's heir whose interest in the estate has now been
allegedly divested as result of the entry of the Rule 70(b) Order?
4. If Hillen is deemed to be the sole owner of Decedent's property as a consequence of the
Rule 70(b) Order, then on what basis does the "divested" heir, Vernon K. Smith, retain
any standing or right to challenge or seek restraint of the unauthorized actions attempted
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by Hillen, which unauthorized actions otherwise can be challenged under authority
conferred by the UPC?
2

IV.
ARGUMENT

3

The October 2, 2019 Decision of this Court resulted in the grant of a writ of assistance to
4

Hillen for the purpose of terminating the "occupation" by David Gibson, (d/b/a Black Diamond
5

Compost Products), of the Gowen Field property. Gibson's arguments, as made in support of
6

this Motion for Reconsideration/Motion to Amend Judgment, are primarily directed to the
7

respective legal rights and obligations of Hillen, as the Estate's personal representative, and of
8

Vernon K. Smith, as an estate heir, with whom Gibson has a venture arrangement since 2004.
9

10

The question concerning whether this Court was correct in ordering Gibson's ejectment from the
Gowen Field property largely depends upon whether Hillen has been determined to be the sole

11

12

owner of the Gowen Field property, and therefore entirely free to deal with that property,
unrestrained by any requirements of the UPC. In the alternative, if Hillen, as the personal

13

representative, has no ownership interest in the estate property, but instead holds only the right o
14

possession, in trust for the benefit of the Estate heirs, then Hillen's exercise of his statutorily15

conferred powers is constrained by the limitations imposed upon him by the UPC. Among these
16

limitations is the required existence of an objective necessity for taking possession of the
17

property for the benefit of estate creditors and other interested persons (LC. § 15-3-711). In the
18

exercise of these powers under the UPC, Hillen remains subject to the issuance of restraining
19

20

orders as direct at his actions taken in excess of his statutory authority (LC. § 15-3-607), and he
personally remains liable in money damages for breach of his fiduciary duties (LC. § 15-3-712).

21

22
23
24

A.

This Court's Decision Is Internally Inconsistent If It Both Recognizes That Hillen Is
An "Owner" Of The Estate Property As A Result Of The Entry Of The Rule 70(b)
Order, And That He Also Remains Subject To The Statutory Obligations Of A
Trustee, The Existence Of Which Trust Obligations Are Not Consistent With A
Declaration That Hillen Is The Sole Owner Of Decedent's Property

25

On its face, the only intended function to be served by the issuance of the Rule 70(b)
26

Order in the earlier proceedings in the magistrate court was the voidance of the transfer of
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Decedent's assets and the return to Decedent, who then being deceased went to the estate. No
2

question was ever raised, placed at issue, or actually decided concerning the matter now

3

presented to this Court that the effect of that Rule 70(b) Order was to vest "actual" sole

4

ownership of the estate assets in the Personal Representative, Hillen, and correspondingly to

5

fully divest an intestate heir, Vernon K. Smith, of his interest in the estate, (now 2/3rds) which

6

interest arose as a matter oflaw under LC. § 15-3-101. The law of unintended consequences is

7

clearly implicated by Hillen's expressly-stated objective to completely liquidate the Estate of

8

Victoria H. Smith as if his duties as a personal representative under the UPC are no different tha

9

his duties as a Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee.

10

It appears - but still remains unclear, thus prompting this motion for

11

reconsideration/amendment- that this Court's decision on Hillen's motion for Partial Judgment

12

on the Pleadings (for ejectment) was ultimately based only upon that authority granted to a

13

personal representative by LC. § 15-3-711 ("[A] personal representative has the same power over

14

the title to power of the estate that an absolute owner should have, in trust however, for the

15

benefit of the creditors and other interested in the estate."). The basis for the Court's decision

16

on Hillen's motion is expressly set out on p. 6 of this Court's Amended Memorandum Decision:

17
18
19

20
21

22
23
24
25

26

Gibson also argues that a personal representative's power is limited, and
can be used only "to the extent necessary for the administration of that property in
the interests of creditors and other interested persons." (Def. 's Mem. Opp'n
Pl. 's Mot. Partial J. Pleadings 11.) It is true that a personal representative's
temporary power is held "in trust . . . for the benefit of the creditors and others
interested in the estate." LC. § 15-3-711. This creates a fiduciary duty, but
contrary to Gibson's assertion, does not limit the personal representative's power
to control the property. Whether possession of property is "necessary for
purposes of administration" is left to the sole discretion of the personal
representative, whose request "is conclusive evidence, in any action against the
heir . . . for possession thereof, that the possession of the property by the
personal representative is necessary for purposes of administration." LC. § 15-3709. In other words, as the comment notes, an heir may be able to sue "for breach
of fiduciary duty, but this possibility should not interfere with the personal
representative's administrative authority as it relates to possession of the
estate." Id. cmt. So even if Hillen might somehow violate his fiduciary duty to
Vernon by ejecting Gibson, the proper course is for Vernon to sue Hillen for
breach of fiduciary duty. But Gibson has not claimed such relief, nor could he do
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so, as he is not an heir to Victoria's estate. Amended Memorandum Decision at p.
6 (italicized/bold emphasis in original; bold/underlined emphasis added).
2

Hillen' s motion was predicated upon him being the "sole owner" of the estate
3

property, not upon any statutory right of "possession." This Court neither expressly
4

rejected, nor expressly adopted, the stated-ownership-basis for Hillen's request for
5

ejectment relief.
6

In opposing Hillen's motion, Gibson has taken strong exception to this Court's
7

conclusion, as highlighted in the above-quoted excerpt from the Memorandum Decision, that the
8

existence of the statutory fiduciary duty imposed by the UPC does not limit the personal
9

representative's power to control estate property. Hillen's declared intention to completely
10

liquidate the estate, is in direct contravention of the express UPC standards requiring the
11

preservation of estate property. I.C. § 15-3-906. Because the personal representative is only
12

granted possession of the estate property - holding only a power over the title, but not holding
13

the actual title itself - there is an inherent restraint imposed upon his actions as a result of the
14

statutorily-declared fiduciary duty he owes to the estate heirs.
15

In this proceeding on this ejectment claim, Hillen did not seek confirmation of his status
16

as the trustee of the estate property, but instead he requested a declaration, as based upon the
17

Rule 70(b) Order, that he is the actual sole owner of the estate property. Such an outcome serves
18

to eliminate Hillen's statutorily-created trust relationship with the heirs, and as a consequence,
19

would also extinguish his fiduciary duty to the heirs, which cannot be allowed to occur.
20

In other words, the relief that Hillen requested on this motion - and the relief that Gibson
21

opposed- is the declaration made by Hillen that the probate court's Rule 70(b) Order, not
22

addressed by the Idaho Supreme Court on appeal, has actually established Hillen to be the sole
23

and absolute owner of the estate property, which ownership interest serves to eliminate any trust
24

interest retained by the heirs and as protected by the personal representative's fiduciary duty to
25

the heirs.
26
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Hillen's request exceeds the statutory authority, and in fact is substantially in excess of,
2

the statutorily-granted authority over estate property provided to a personal representative by I.C.

3

§ 15-3-711. Although this Court cited I.C. § 15-3-711 as the basis upon which it relied in

4

rendering its decision, it is not clear whether this Court accepted or rejected Hillen' s claim to

5

absolute and sole ownership of the estate property. Hillen's intentions were unequivocally stated

6

on the face of the memorandum he submitted to this Court to support his motion for partial

7

judgment on the ejectment claim, in which he expressly stated the basis for the relief he was

8

requesting:
The Rule 70 Judgment is unambiguous. It vests all right, title, and
interest in the Gowen Property to Hillen. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed
the Rule 70 Judgment following Vernon's appeal. In re Estate of Smith, 164
Idaho at 482, 432 P .3d at 31. Vernon asserts that the Rule 70 Judgment has no
effect because it somehow conflicts with his "vested" ownership right in the
Gowen Property as a 2/3 heir of the Estate. Defendant (through Vernon) claims
Vernon's partial interest in the Gowen Property became "vested" pursuant to
Idaho Code Section 15-3-101 upon her death.
This argument lacks merit. First, Section 15-3-101 does not mention
permanently vesting interests nor pre-emption of future orders or judgments.
Second, the Rule 70 Judgment expressly states that Hillen's ownership of the
Gowen Property "is free and clear of any lien, claim or interest of the Claimants
[which includes Vernon.]" The Rule 70 Judgment was, fittingly, entered pursuant
to Rule 70(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. That provision allows courts
to "enter a judgment divesting any party's title and vesting it in others." I.R.C.P.
70(b ). Therefore, any interest Vernon once had in the premises was divested
by the Rule 70 Judgment and vested in Hillen, the current sole owner.
Memorandum in Support of Partial Judgment, at pp 4-5 (bold/underlined
emphasis added; bracketed/ parenthetical references in original).

9

10
11

12
13
14
15
16

17
18

There is a huge difference in outcome if this Court has granted Hillen's requested

19

20

relief by declaring him, by virtue of the Rule 70(b) Order, to be the sole actual owner of

21

the estate property, to the exclusion of Vernon (and by extension, to the other heir,

22

Joseph), whose interests as heirs under I.C. § 15-3-101 allegedly have been entirely

23

divested as a result of the entry of that Rule 70(b) Order. 2 In the normal course of events

24
25

26

2

The language used on the face of the Rule 70(b) Order was only directed at the interests associated with Vernon
K. Smith. Nonetheless, if Hillen is now the sole owner of the all the estate property, then there exists no other
remaining estate interest that could have passed to Joseph H. Smith, by operation of law under LC.§ 15-3-101, and
consequently Joseph's interest as an heir also has been eliminated.
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Hillen's "power" exercised in trust under I.C. § 15-3-711 only permits him to divest the
2

heirs' title, as acquired by operation of law under I.C. § 15-3-101, when such divestment

3

has been determined to be necessary to satisfy estate claims.

4

With all due respect to the conclusions reached by this Court, under I.C. § 15-3-101, title

5

to estate property passes to the heirs at the time of a decedent's death, as a matter oflaw, subject

6

only to the possible subsequent divestiture if necessary in the administration of the estate by the

7

exercise of the power granted to the personal representative by I.C. § 15-3-711. ("Estates

8

descend at death to successors identified by any probated will, or to heirs if no will is probated,

9

subject to rights which may be implemented through administration." Official Comment I.C. §

10

15-3-101, ,r 1). The heirs obtain and retain title, subject only to divestment of their title by the

11

personal representative's exercise of the§ 15-3-711 power, as limited by a required

12

determination that such divestment of the heir's ownership interest in estate property is necessa

13

for the administration of the estate for the benefit of creditors or other interested parties.

14

What Hillen is attempting to accomplish by his motion for partial judgment on the

15

ejectment claim is to reverse the existing statutory mandate, and in its place, provide that title to

16

the estate property vests in him (instead of the heirs), apparently subject only to some possible

17

reconveyance to the heirs at the end of estate administration, apparently at his sole discretion

18

since the UPC has no provision addressing such circumstances.

19

If this Court has declared Hillen to be the sole owner of the estate property, in

20

conjunction with the divestment of Vernon's entire interest in that estate property, then the§ 15-

21

3-711 trust relationship has been effectively extinguished along with the associated right of the

22

heirs to bring their claims for a breach of fiduciary duty by Hillen. If Hillen is no longer require

23

to act only under the exercise of a statutorily-conferred power, but instead the actual absolute

24

sole owner of the property, then there no longer is any fiduciary interest to protect, and neither

25

Vernon nor Joseph would have had any standing to challenge Hillen's actions as the personal

26

representative because their entire interest in the estate has been determined to have been
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extinguished by the entry of the Rule 70(b) Order. This was never the intention of the Order, as
2

to be such is without statutory authority or the magistrate's exercise of its jurisdiction.
As based upon the above-cited excerpt from the Court's Amended Memorandum, it

3
4

appears this Court, in its Decision, did not intend to eliminate Hillen's trust relationship to the

5

heirs, nor to either extinguish or eliminate the right of the heirs to challenge Hillen's actions as

6

being a breach of his fiduciary duty that arises out of the statutorily-imposed trust relationship.
Although this Court granted Hillen's request for ejectment, it appears it intended to do so

7

8

only in reliance upon the statutory authority ofl.C. § 15-3-711, and not by granting Hillen's

9

requested relief, as based upon the Rule 70(b) Order, that he is the sole actual owner of the estate

1o

property. Nonetheless, this remains uncertain because this Court, in its Decision, neither

11

expressly rejected, nor expressly adopted, Hillen's ownership argument as the basis for his

12

ej ectment claim.

13
14
15
16

17
18
19

20
21

22
23
24

B.

The Probate Court Had No Authority, By Use Of The Rule 70(b) Order, To
Completely Oust Vernon K. Smith's Ownership Interest In All Estate Property,
Including The Interest He Obtained As A Matter Of Law Under I.C. § 15-3-101

Even though the Idaho Supreme Court's opinion did not address or decide any question
concerning the construction and application of the Rule 70(b) Order, the language of that Order on its face - does not support Hillen's contentions it conferred upon him sole ownership to the
estate property. Judge Cherie Copsey intended only to restore to the Decedent (estate) all of the
property of the decedent, Victoria H. Smith, which prior to her death had been transferred to
VHS, LLC by the use of a power of attorney. In issuing that Rule 70(b) Order, the transfers
made to Plaintiff Hillen were conditioned upon the recognition of his capacity "as personal
representative of the Estate." This conditional reference serves to confirm Hillen was only to
take possession of the estate property, and that he was only authorized to exercise a "power"

25

26
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over that property, as consistent with the provisions of the Idaho UPC concerning the authority
2

and powers of a personal representative. 3

3

The personal representative, in his actions in the administration of the estate, is bound by

4

the limitations imposed by the UPC. The Official Comment to LC. § 15-3-703 notes the specific

5

statutory constraints placed upon a personal representative's actions by declaring that, "[A]

6

personal representative's authority is derived from appointment by the public agency known as

7

the Court. But the Code also makes it clear that the personal representative, in spite of the source

8

of his authority, is to proceed with the administration, settlement and distribution of the estate by

9

use of statutory powers and in accordance with statutory directions. See Sections 3-107 and 3-

10

704 ..... " Here, Hillen is attempting to act in excess of his statutorily-conferred authority by

11

claiming falsely claiming the effect of the Rule 70(b) Order was to make him the sole "owner" o

12

the estate property, and to divest the heirs of all statutorily-conferred title in the estate property.
Somewhat more problematic is the language that appears within the Rule 70(b) Order

13
14

concerning the divestment of the property interest of Vernon K. Smith. On p. 2 of that Copsey

15

Order, Judge Copsey referenced the scope of this divestment as extending to Vernon K. Smith's

16

capacity, "individually," "as personal representative," (which he never was) "as attorney-in-fact

17

or agent or fiduciary," and "any other capacity." The use of this all-encompassing language by

18

Judge Copsey necessarily raises the question whether it was her intention to entirely eliminate

19

Vernon K. Smith's interest as an intestate heir of the estate as established under LC. § 15-3-101?

20

If it were, she is facing a serious Judicial Cannon of Ethics complaint, as Judge Copsey had no

21

authority to actually eliminate the interest of an intestate heir derived under LC.§ 15-3-101, then

22
23
24
25

26

3

Rule 821 of the Idaho Family Law Rules is the rule that corresponds to Idaho Civil Rule 70. The last sentence of
Rule 821 specifically addresses the issuance of an order for the transfer of "possession," as opposed the Rule 70' s
singular focus only upon a transfer of "title." ("When any order or judgment is for the delivery of possession, the
party in whose favor it is entered is entitled to a writ of execution or assistance upon application to the clerk.").
Although the family law rule has no application here, it is being cited for the proposition that a distinction between
"possession" and "title" has been recognized in other contexts. Even in the absence of corresponding "possession"
language in Rule 70, in this matter Judge Copsey' s Rule 70(b) Order must be construed as a conveyance of title to
the estate - and not to Hillen individually - which construction is consistent with the existing statutory restrictions
placed upon a personal representative's exercise of only a "power" over the property of the estate. I.C. § 15-3-711.
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to be viewed as a gross violation of the Idaho Code of Judicial Conduct and the Judicial Cannon
2

of Ethics.
If this Court were so-inclined to accept Hillen's proposed construction of the Rule 70(b)

3
4

Order, and to the effect that J. Copsey intended to divest Vernon of his interest, then does Joseph

5

H. Smith- Vernon's brother- become the sole intestate heir of the estate? Is it to be construed

6

that Hillen's sole ownership of the estate property necessarily operates to also eliminate Joseph's

7

intestate share in the estate. 4 It is doubtful that Judge Copsey - or any judicial officer - has the

8

authority to rule to eliminate an heir's intestate share without any specific grant of statutory

9

authority allowing such an action5 - such an outcome constitutes an absurd result. By analogy to

10

the rules of contract construction, as to be relied upon in the interpretation of court orders, no

11

effect should be given to a court order that would lead to such an absurd result. Schieche v.

12

Pasco, 88 Idaho 36, 41, 395 P.2d 671, 673 (1964).
The question of a court acting in excess of statutorily-conferred authority has been most

13
14

prominently addressed by the Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. Armstrong, 146 Idaho 372, 195

15

P.3d 731 (Ct. App. 2008) where that Court laid out and addressed the issue as follows:

16

[C]ourts and lawyers sometimes say that a court lacked jurisdiction when they
really mean simply that the court committed error because the action that was
taken did not comply with governing law. For example, our appellate courts have
referred to a lack of "jurisdiction" when perhaps more precisely meaning that a
motion or complaint was not timely filed, that a condition precedent to the right to
file the action was not satisfied, or that governing statutes or court rules did
not authorize the particular decision made by the court. (citations omitted)
146 Idaho at 375, 195 P.3d at 734 (bold/underlined emphasis, and parenthetical
reference to "citations omitted," added).

17
18
19

20
21

22
23
24
25

26

4

Vernon's sister, Victoria Converse, assigned her 1/3 intestate share to Vernon, such that he holds 2/3 share in the
intestate estate and his brother Joseph holds a 1/3 interest under the current state of the probate proceedings. If J.
Copsey' s Rule 70(b) Order is so-construed, so as to eliminate Vernon's intestate share in the estate, then as the sole
remaining intestate heir whose interest has been neither assigned nor expressly eliminated by court order, Joseph
allegedly would become the sole intestate heir of the estate, a most absurd result that never could have been J.
Copsey's intended purpose in issuing the Rule 70(b) Order, assuming she adheres to the ICJC.
5
The "Slayer's Act," as codified at I.C. § 15-2-803, would constitute one such example of specific statutory
authority that permits the elimination of an intestate heir's interest in an estate.
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The Court in Armstrong went on to cite California's Supreme Court decision in People v.
2

American Contractors Indemnity Co., 33 Cal.4th 653, 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 76, 93 P.3d 1020 (2004)

3

for the proposition that, when a court acts contrary to the authority conferred by statute, it has

4

acted in excess of its jurisdiction. 146 Idaho at 376, 195 P.3d at 735.
The Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Hartwig, 150 Idaho 326, 329 n.3, 246 P.3d 979, 982

5
6

n.3 (2011) acknowledged the rationale of Idaho's Court of Appeal's decision in Armstrong, as

7

differentiating between the concepts of a court's jurisdiction and a court's authority, without

8

adopting or rejecting that formulation of Idaho law, as announced by the Idaho Court of

9

Appeals. 6 The Idaho Court of Appeals continues to authoritatively cite and rely upon its

10

Armstrong decision subsequent to the Idaho Supreme Court's comment on Armstrong, as made

11

in the 2011 Hartwig decision. See e.g., State v. Vaughn, 156 Idaho 13, 15, 319 P.3d 497,499

12

(Ct.App.2014) and State v. Steelsmith, 154 Idaho 577, 580 n.2, 288 P.3d 132, 135 n.2

13

(Ct.App.2012).
It is most unlikely J. Copsey ever intended her Rule 70(b) Order to have the effect Hillen

14
15

advocates, nor does it appear the Magistrate had any authority to enter an order to that effect,

16

even if it were to be an intentional act (a clear violation of the ICOJC). Consequently, Hillen's

17

request for relief in this action, as based upon his misplaced construction of the Rule 70(b)

18

Order, that permits unrestrained action as a sole owner of estate property, to allow him to

19

proceed with the entire liquidation of estate property, must be summarily rejected.

20
21

C.

22

Considering the construction Hillen is attempting to place upon the Rule 70(b) Order in

23
24

No Question Alleging The Rule 70(b) Order Constituted A Complete Transfer Of
The "Ownership" Of The Estate Property To The Personal Representative Was
Either Placed At Issue, Or Decided, On The Appeal To The Idaho Supreme Court

this matter, as a consequence of the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in, Matter ofEstate of

25
6

26

Until superseded by a decision of the Idaho Supreme Court, as issued upon the same question, opinions of the
Idaho Court of Appeals are binding precedent upon all lower Idaho courts. State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 986-87,
842 P.2d 660, 665-66 (1992).
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Smith, 164 Idaho 457,466,432 P.3d 6, 15 (2018), it is no surprise to this Court that Defendant
2

Gibson, and his legal counsel, Vernon K. Smith, have become hyper-attentive about, and

3

opposed to, Hillen's malicious allegations that he is the "sole owner" of the Estate's property,

4

and that as a consequence, he is authorized to proceed with a full liquidation of the Estate's

5

property in the same manner as if he were acting as Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Trustee.
Only two issues were presented to, and decided by, the Idaho Supreme Court in Matter o

6
7

Estate of Smith, 164 Idaho 457,466,432 P.3d 6, 15 (2018): (1) Did the probate court err in

8

finding the February 14, 1991 holographic will of Victoria H. Smith to be invalid due to undue

9

influence? and (2) Did the probate court err in setting aside July 4, 2012 power of attorney

10

transfers of Victoria H. Smith's property to an LLC, because the power of attorney did not

11

specifically authorize gifting? On both questions the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the

12

probate court.
Although it is recognized the property was returned to the Estate, no issues were raised

13
14

nor decided on that appeal construing the Rule 70(b) Order, itself, as the return to the Decedent

15

was perceived to be made upon the trust provisions of the UPC, despite what is being

16

maliciously now contended by Hillen. On the Supreme Court appeal no issues were raised or

17

decided to the effect that:

►

18

Hillen was made the sole "owner" of the Estate property, as opposed to being

19

granted a power and possession, in trust, for the benefit of the Estate's heirs, as provided by the

20

UPC;

21

►

The "divestment" language of the Rule 70(b) Order was intended to accomplish

22

anything more than a mere transfer back to the Decedent those properties that had been earlier

23

subject to the power of attorney transfers;

24
25

►

Vernon K. Smith was divested of all of his interest in the property of the estate,

which he received as a matter oflaw under LC. § 15-3-101;

26
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►

As a result of the entry of the Rule 70(b) Order Hillen was no longer subject to

2

any of the constraints, as otherwise imposed under the UPC, upon his actions as a personal

3

representative; and

4

►

As a result of the entry of the Rule 70(b) Order Hillen was free to proceed with a

5

full liquidation of the Estate property, without reference to any necessity for the disposition of

6

that property in the interest of creditors and others who might have a legitimate interest in the

7

administration of the Estate.

8
9

10
11

The following statement, as included within the Idaho Supreme Court's recitation of the

factual and procedural background of this case, constituted that Court's only express reference
within its opinion to the probate court's Rule 70(b) Order:
In June 2017, the court entered a judgment pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 70(b), which vested title to all of Victoria's real and personal property
in the personal representative who had been appointed.

12

16

V emon appealed these decisions, and this Court granted Joseph's motion
for acceptance of appeal directly from the magistrate court pursuant to Idaho
Appellate Rule 44. This appeal follows the parties' stipulation to bifurcate the
appeal to first address any matters occurring up to and including the post-trial
judgment under Rule 70(b) before considering any matters occurring thereafter.
The personal representative of the estate, Intervenor-Respondent Noah Hillen, is
not participating in this portion of the appeal. 164 Idaho at 466, 432 P.3d at 15
(emphasis added).

17

Hillen construes the above-cited and highlighted statement as establishing his status as

13
14
15

18

the sole owner of the estate property. See, Supporting Memo at pp. 4-5. Because no issue was

19

raised or decided by the Idaho Supreme Court as to the effect of the Rule 70(b) Order in

20

confirming an actual ownership interest in Hillen, the Court's statement is nothing more than

21

obiter dictum. See e.g., Smith v. Angell, 122 Idaho 25, 35, 830 P.2d 1163, 1173 (1992) (Bistline,

22

J, concurring in the reversal of the judgment below and the remand for further proceedings)

23

("' [A] remark by the way;' that is, an observation or remark made by a judge in pronouncing an

24

opinion upon a cause, concerning some rule, principle, or application of law, or the solution of a

25

question suggested by the case at bar, but not necessarily involved in the case or essential to its

26

. .
. . . .") .
determmatlon;
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Long-standing Idaho authority supports the interpretation of Idaho appellate decisions by
2

differentiating between those issues that were actually raised and decided by the Court, and other

3

matters which were simply referred to in the decision. Bashore v. Adolf, 41 Idaho 84, 88, 238 P.

4

534, 534 (1925) ("'There is a pronounced line of demarcation between what is said in an opinion

5

and what is decided by it." (citation omitted; italicized emphasis added)). See also, Idaho

6

Schools For Equal Educational Opportunity v. Evans, 123 Idaho 573, 586, 850 P.2d 724, 737

7

(1993) (McDevitt, C.J., concurring and dissenting); North Side Canal Co. v. Idaho Farms Co.,

8

60 Idaho 748, 758, 96 Idaho 232, 235-36 (1939); and Stark v. McLaughlin, 45 Idaho 112, 123,

9

261 P. 244, 245 (1927).

10

This long-standing principle of interpretation as applied to Idaho appellate opinions, and

11

as based upon the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in Bashore v. Adolf, supra, has been most

12

recently applied by Idaho's U.S. District Court in, AMX Intern., Inc. v. Battelle Energy Alliance,

13

744 F.Supp.2d 1087, 1091-92 (D. Idaho 2010); and Hash v. U.S., 454 F.Supp.2d 1066, 1072 (D.

14

Idaho 2006) ("The Idaho Supreme Court itself has stated that its opinions "must be considered

15

and construed in the light of the rule that they are authoritative only on the facts on which they

16

are founded. General expressions must be taken in connection with the case in which those

17

expressions are used. "There is a pronounced line of demarcation between what is said in an

18

opinion and what is decided by it." (Citation omitted).' Bashore v. Adolf, 41 Idaho 84,238 P.

19

534 (1925) (emphasis in original).").

20

Furthermore, Hillen's proposed construction of the Idaho Supreme Court's decision as

21

claimed by him to confirm a conferral of actual ownership of estate property in him, is entirely

22

inconsistent with the provisions of the UPC which only confer upon the personal representative a

23

right of possession and a "power" over estate property. See e.g., Lemp v. Lemp, 32 Idaho 397,

24

401, 184 P. 222, 223 ( 1919) ("The administrator or executor is not the owner of any part of the

25

26
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estate. He, in his official character, only holds it in trust for the parties entitled to it, subject to
2

the purposes of administration."). 7 That case law remains the authority in Idaho.
Court judgments and decrees are subject to the same rules of interpretation that apply to

3
4

the construction of contracts. McKoon v. Hathaway, 146 Idaho 106, 109, 190 P.3d 925, 928

5

(2008). A prominent rule of contract interpretation is that contracts must be interpreted in

6

respect to the then-existing law. Path to Health, LLP v. Long, 161 Idaho 50, 57, 383 P.3d 1220,

7

1227 (2016) ("'This Court has held that "it is axiomatic that extant law is written into and made

8

part of every written contract.""' (citations omitted). This rule was expressly applied to the

9

interpretation of an appellate decision in, Application ofKaufman, 69 Idaho 297, 306-07, 206

10

P.2d 528, 533 (1949) ("What the court said, therefore, must be taken in connection with the

11

statutes as they then existed and applied, .... "); and in, In re Anderton 's Estate, 67 Idaho 160,

12

163, 174 P.2d 212, 213 (1946) (noting that an executor must act "in strict compliance with the

13

law .... "). Therefore, the UPC, as in effect at the time of the referenced appeal in, Matter of

14

Estate of Smith, supra, is incorporated within and applies to the interpretation of the Rule 70(b)

15

Order and to the interpretation of the Idaho Supreme Court's opinion on appeal.
The Rule 70(b) Order must be interpreted and applied as consistent with the applicable

16
17

UPC statutes, which statutes only confer upon a personal representative a "power" over title,

18

with a concurrent right to obtain "possession" of that property when necessary for the

19

administration of the estate for the benefit of creditors and other interested persons. LC. § 15-3-

20

711.
Hillen's argument to the effect the Rule 70(b) Order, as referenced by the Idaho Supreme

21
22

Court, has made him sole owner and to permit him to completely liquidate the estate is without

23

merit in reference to the actual issues raised and decided by the Idaho Supreme Court on appeal,

24

and therefore his arguments must be rejected, and his motion should have been denied, as it was

25

26

7

Although Lemp was decided under the 1864 Idaho Probate Code, this principle of law was not in any way altered
by Idaho's 1971 adoption of the Uniform Probate Code.
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framed, and this court's Memorandum Decision and Judgment must be reconsidered and
2
3
4

amended.

V.
REQUESTED RELIEF

This Court's reliance upon the authority ofl.C. § 15-3-711, which grants to Hillen the

5

same "power" as an owner in dealing with estate property, while at the same time neither

6

adopting nor rejecting Hillen's contention he is, in fact, the sole and absolute owner of the estate

7

property, creates conflict and uncertainty. If Hillen is to be held by this court as the absolute

8

sole owner of the estate property under the Rule 70(b) Order, then arguably the estate heirs no

9

longer have standing, nor any legal basis, upon which to challenge Hillen's actions and to secure

10

recovery for his fiduciary breaches. On the other hand, if this Court did not intend to adopt

11

Hillen's argument, it must then be expressly clarified, and this court must reject his "ownership"

12

contentions, confirm that the estate heirs continue to have the right to challenge Hillen's actions

13

on all grounds provided by the Idaho Uniform Probate Code, and declare Hillen only has a right

14

to exercise a "power" over "possession" of the property, as expressly authorized by the UPC, for

15

the benefit of creditors and other interested persons.

16

Dated this 29th day of November, 2019.

17
18
19

20
21

Vern
.
Attorney for Defe
David R. Gibson,

-

22
23
24
25

26
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
2
3

I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 29th day of November, 2019 a copy of the foregoing
MEMORANDUM was served upon the following :

4

5
6
7

8
9
10

Randall A. Peterman
Alexander P. McLaughlin
Jack W. Relf
givens pursley llp
601 West Bannock Street
Post Office Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720
Telephone:
208-388-1200
Facsimile:
208-388-1300
Email: rap@givenspursley.com
apm@givenspursley.com
jackrelf@givenspursley.com

[X ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

E-filed thru !Court
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Other - - - - - - - -

11

12

13
14

15

16
17
18
19

20
21

22
23
24
25

26
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success. "When a district court decide · a motion to reconsider, 'the district court mu t apply the
same tandard of review that the court applied when deciding the original order that i being
recon idered. "' Westby, .. Schaefer, 157 Idaho 616, 62 I, 338 P.3d 1220, 1225 (20 I4) (quoting
Frag11ella , .. />ctro,·ich. I 53 Idaho 266, 276, 281 P.Jd I03. 113 (2012)). Here, the challenged

order granted a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Section 11 of that order recites the
tandard for such a motion, which the Court applies again on reconsideration.
Although titled a a motion to reconsider. the main thrust of Gib on· motion is to seek
clarification a to what the order actually accomplished. (See Mcm. Supp. Mot. Amend 6. .)
Specifically, Gib on ay · "it is not clear whether this Court accepted or rejected Hillen·s claim
to ab olute and sole ownership of thee tate property." (Id. 8.) Gib on claims that if the ourt
detennined that Hillen was the sole owner, then Hillen is "entirely free to deal wi th that property.
unre trained by any requirement · of the [Cnifom1 Probate Code)." (Id. 5.) But if the Court
detennined that Hillen ·'has no ownership intcrc tin the estate property." then Gib on argue that
"Hillen' exercise of his statutorily-conferred power is constrained by the limitation imposed
upon him by the [ niform Probate Code]." (Id.) Gibson's concern is that the Court's order may
have "declared Hillen to be the ·ole owner of the estate property." which. according to Gib on.
would mean that Vernon mith-Gib ·on's attorney and an heir of Victoria mith- and
Vernon' brother would not ha,c "an)' ·tanding to challenge Hillen·s actions as the personal
repre ·entative becau. c their entire interest in thee talc ha~ been detennined to have been
extinguished by the entry of the Ruic 70(b) Order" entered in the underlying probate case for
Victorica mith (the --Judgment''\ (Id. 9-10.)
Gibson'· motion present a false bifurcation, gi, ing only 1,, o option~ for ,, hal the
Court's order could ha\'e meant. , either option is entirely correct. To help clarify the i ·ue, the
Court summari1;es its prior order: Based on the Judgment. the Court held that "Hillen ha.
owner hip of the Go,,en Property as the personal representative of ictoria's estate.'' (Am.
Mem. Decision & Order Grnnting Pl.' Mot. Partial J. Pleadings 4.) In responding to Gib on'
argument that Vernon held title to the Gowen Property. the Court nOLed that Hillen, as the
per onal repre ·entattve, had the "same power o, er the title to property of thee tale thal an
absolute owner would ha,·e." (Id. 5 (quoting t.C. § 15-3-711 ).) Ba ed on this "power over title:·
Hillen had an ownership interest that, at the very least. gave him authority to eject Gibson from
1

This Judgment is attached Lo the Court · · amended order entered October 3, 2019.
2
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the Gowen Property. (Id.) The Court went on to note that although Hillen's temporary "power
over title" was held in trust, this fiduciary duty "docs not limit the personal representative 's
power to control the property." (Id. 6.) If Hillen, iolate<l thi fiduciary duty, the remedy would
be for emon

not Gib on

to bring a claim for breach of fiduciary duty. (Id.)

The upshot i · that the prior order dctcnnined that Hillen, a the per·onal repre entative.
had an owner hip intere t- based on the Judgment

that gave Hillen authority to eject Gibson

from the Gowen Property. This-and not one of the two option pre cntcd by Gib on-i what
the Court' order meant. The CJectmcnt claim was the ·ole claim at issue. The prior order did
not extingui h Vernon' intcre tin thee tate or pre,ent him from bringing a suit for breach of
fiduciary duty. Those is uc were not presented to the C'ourt. nor could they have been decided,
a Vernon and the other heir would have been nccc~ ar} partie · and had not been joined.
Beyond asking for clarification. Gibson pre. en!. no real argument as to why the Court·s
order wa. incorrect. He ays that the Court's order create an incon ·i ·tcncy by recognizing that
1lillen is the owner of Gowen Property while also rccogniLing that Hillen has fiduciary duties
regarding the management of Victoria' c. tate. But this argument rests on the idea that Hill en
own the Gowen Property personally. and not in his capacity as a personal representative. As is
evident from the above explanation. this i not what the Court held in its prior order. The Court
ne,·cr understood Hillen's motion as seeking to establish that Hillen owned the Gowen Property
in his personal capacity, nor can hi motion be reasonably read as ceking such relief. And to the
extent Gibson argue · that there is an inconsistency,, ith Hillen' "power over the title" of the
Gowen Property and his fiduciary duty. the ·ourt ' prior order already addrcs ed thi issue. (See
id. 6 ("[A]n heir may be able to sue' for breach of fiduciary duty. but this po ibility should not

interfere with the per onal representative· administrative authority as it relate to posse ·sion or
thee tale."') (quoting I. . § 15-3-709 cmt.).) The two are clearly not inconsistent under Idaho
law. as thi situation wa ex pre. sly add re!., ed in the comment · to 1.C.

~

15-3-709.

Gib ·on once again collaterally attacks the Judgment. contending that it could not have
granted Hillen an o,, nership intcrc t in the Gowen Property. This issue" as dealt with in the
prior order. (see id. 6-7), and need not be reiterated here. A. there is no basi · for granting
Gib on·s motion to reconsider, it i~ denied.
The Court next addrcssc Gibson 's motion to alter or amend the judgment. Whether to
grant such a motion is left to the Court' discretion. See Pandrea ,.. Barrell. 160 Idaho 165. 171,
3
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369 P.3d 943,949 (2016) (quoting Barmore , .. Perrone, 145 Idaho 340,344, 179 P.3d 303,307
(2008)). The motion to alter or amend the judgment depended on a successful outcome on the
motion to reconsider or at least relied on the amc argument . Given that the motion to
reconsider is denied, and that the argument had no merit, the Court denies Gibson's motion to
alter or amend the judgment.
Thi leave Gibson's motion to di. allow Hillen's costs and attorney fees. Gibson's
frontlinc argument is that ··at this point in the proceeding no prevailing party can be detennined."
(Def.' Mcm. Opp·n Pl.'s Mem. Atl'y Fees & Co t I.) In re pon e, Hillen reque ts that the
Coun hold his reque t for costs and fees. as well as Gibson's motion to di allow. in abeyance
until the Court enters final judgment on all other pending claims in this matter. The Court agrees
with Gib. on that detennining the prevailing party at this point would be premature, and so hold
hi motion to disallow and Hillen' request for co t and attorney fees in abeyance until final
resolution of thi , ca ·e.
Accordingly,
IT JS ORDERED that Gibson's motion to reconsider and motion to alter or amend the
judgment arc DE I lED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Hillen's request for attorney fees, as well as Gib on'
related motion to disallow co. t and fee -, hall be held in abeyance pending entry of final
judgment on the remaining claims.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the hearing scheduled for December 17.2019. is
ACATED.

/ &

Dated thi

_b_

day
c of December.2019.
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Electronically Filed
12/31/2019 5:59 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Phil McGrane, Clerk of the Court
By: Laurie Johnson, Deputy Clerk

VERNON K. S1\1ITH
ATTORNEY AT LAW
1900 W. Main St.
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Idaho State Bar No. 1365
Telephone: (208) 345-1125
Fax:
(208) 345-1129
vkslaw@live.com

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

NOAH G. HILLEN, in his capacity as
Personal Representative of the Estate of
Victoria H. Smith,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

V.

DAYID R. GIBSON, an individual, d/b/a
BLACK DIAMOND COMPOST
PRODUCTS,
Defendant-Appellant.

Case No. CV0I-19-10368
NOTICE OF APPEAL

TO: THE ABOVE NAMED PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, NOAH G. HILLEN,
acting in the capacity as the Personal Representative of the Estate of Victoria H. Smith, and
Plaintiff-Respondent's attorneys, Jack W/ Relf and Alexander P. McLaughlin, of the law firm
of Givens-Pursley, LLP, Boise, Idaho, 83701-2720, and the Clerk ofthe above entitled Court
of Ada County, Idaho.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above-named Appellant, David R. Gibson, through his attorney ofrecorc:t,

Vernon K. Smith, does appeal against the above-named Plaintiff-Respondent, Noah G. Hillen,
from that ORDER DENYING MOTION TO AMEND OR ALTER JUDGMENT, entered
December 6, 2019, concerning that MEMORANDUM DECISION, ORDER and

NOTICE OF APPEAL

P. I
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JUDGMENT granting Plaintiff's MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS,
entered December 2, 2019, and thereafter amended on December 3, 2019, said appeal taken
pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule ll(a)(3) and Rule 14(a), I.AR, the Honorable Steven
Hippler, District Judge presiding, with copies thereof attached hereto as provided for by Idaho
Appellate Rule 17(e)(l)(C).
2.

That the above-named Appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme

Court from that Judgment entered on the Motion for Judgment On The Pleadings, described
in paragraph 1 above, as was certified as provided by Rule 54(b ), I.RC.P., and is an appealable
Order/Judgment pursuant thereto and following the denial of the motion to amend as provided
for by Rule 14(a), I.AR.
3.

A preliminary statement of the issues to be presented on appeal, which

Appellant intends to assert, but not preventing Appellant from asserting other issues on appeal,
do include, but not limited to, the following:
a. In the absence of any established need for the liquidation of assets in the
administration of an estate, as determined under I. C. §15-3-711, does a personal
representative have any authority within the general provisions of the Idaho Uniform
Probate Code, I. C. §§15-1-101 et seq. (UPC), to eject a venture participant (Appellant
Gibson) from his otherwise lawful possession of property that by law (I. C. §15-3-101) is
vested in the heirs of the Estate?
b. Under the UPC, can a personal representative ever "own" estate property,
as opposed to taking and holding "possession" of that property in trust for the benefit of
creditors in satisfaction of their claims?
c. Does a magistrate in a probate proceeding have any authority to transfer
"ownership" of property to a personal representative by means of a Rule 70(b), I.R C.P.
order?
d. Does the "conclusive evidence" standard announced in I. C. §15-3-709
apply to a personal representative's pleading, made upon alleged "ownership" of property,
as opposed to a pleading to obtain "possession" of property, for satisfaction of creditor
claims as a estate necessity, to which the "conclusive evidence" standard was intended to
apply under that section?
THE NATURE OF THIS APPEAL

NOTICE OF APPEAL

P.2

000213

Appellant Gibson is a long-time operator-venture participant of a composting
business operation located in the Gowen Field Area south of Boise, operating on property
owned by the heirs of the Estate of Victoria H. Smith. The personal representative of the
Estate, Noah G. Hillen, filed a complaint for ejectment, which was granted, entering a Rule
54(b) judgment ejecting Gibson from the property he occupied, upon the sole claim Hillen
was the "owner" of the property. Hillen's ejectment pleading was exclusively premised
upon Hillen' s (acting as a personal representative) controversial allegation he has exclusive
"ownership" of the property, as arising out of a transfer of "ownership" made to him, as
personal representative, by a Rule 70(b) I.R.C.P. Order entered by Magistrate Cheri Copsey
in the probate proceeding.
This appeal arises out of the district court's entry of a 54(b )certified judgment and
determination no distinction exists between a personal representative's "power over the title
to property," as granted by, and limited in its exercise under the Idaho Uniform Probate
Code (UPC), and the alternative alleged "actual ownership of property", as arising out of
the magistrate's Rule 70(b) I.R.C.P. Order, which Order simultaneously would effectively
operate to divest Estate heirs of their titled and vested interest in that property.
The Personal Representative (Hillen) relies upon a single sentence, as included
within the statement of facts within an opinion issued in the appeal of the Matter of Estate

of Smith, 164 Idaho 457, 432 P.3d 6 (2018), in support of his alleged "ownership" and
unrestricted authority to dispose of the property. That single sentence stated the following:
"In June 2017, the court entered a judgment pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure
70(b), which vested title to all of Victoria's real and personal property in the personal
representative who had been appointed." 164 Idaho at 466, 432 P.3d at 15.
Consequently, as based upon this alleged statement of "ownership" of the Smith
Estate property, Hillen is attempting to liquidate the entire Smith Estate in the same fashion
he typically liquidates an estate in his work as a Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee.
The Estate of Victoria H. Smith had no creditors, and Federal estate taxes were
paid, and no illustrate obligation was identified in the complaint to justify further
possession and liquidation in the administration by the Personal Representative to require
further liquidation of remaining property in satisfaction of a lawful purpose recognized
under the provisions of the UPC, specifically I. C. §15-3-711.

NOTICE OF APPEAL
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This property is also involved in an appeal pending before the Supreme Court
concerning the regulatory authority of the Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ)
regarding Gibson's composting operation upon this same property, which appeal has been
briefed and argued, currently awaiting decision from the Idaho Supreme Court. See, Idaho
Department of Environmental Quality v. Gibson et al, Idaho Supreme Court No. 46217.

4.

No order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record.

5.

Is a reporter's transcript requested? No, just the Clerk's Record pertaining

to the documents and disposition taken in this matter identified below.
6.

Appellant does specifically request the Clerk's Record to include all filed

and lodged documents currently identified to be as follows:
a. Verified Complaint for Ejectment and Other Relief (6/7/19)
b. Answer to Verified Complaint (7/5/19)
c. Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings (8/5/19)
d. Memorandum in Support of Motion (8/5/19)
e. Declaration of Noah G. Hillen (8/5/19)

f. Memorandum in Opposition to Motion (9/12/19)
g. Reply Memorandum (9/18/19)
h. Decision and Order (10/2/19)
i. Amended Memorandum Decision (10/3/19)
j. Motion to Alter or Amend (10/14/19)
k. Memorandum in Support of Motion to Alter or Amend (11/29/19)
I. Decision and Order on Motion to Alter or Amend (12/6/19)

m. The Estate Tax Return, if not of record, to be augmented or submitted in
appendix.
n. Hillen v. Vernon K Smith III (4th Dist., Ada County Case No.CV0l-1910367) (J. Hoagland) Complaint for Ejectment and Other Relief
(6/7/19).
o. Hillen v. Law Office of Vernon K Smith, et al (4th Dist., Ada County
Case No.CV0I-19-20686) (J. Reardon) Complaint for Ejectment and Other
Relief(l 1/13/19).
7.

I certify:

NOTICE OF APPEAL
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a. No Reporter's Transcript has be requested, so no notice has been sent to
the Reporter;
b. No estimate fee for any Reporter's Transcript, as none is requested;
c. That the Clerk of the District Court will be paid the estimated fee for the
preparation of the Clerk's Record, when requested.
d. That the required filing fee has been paid in conjunction with the I-Court
filing system in the amount of$129.00.
e.

That service has been made u

pursuant to Rule 20, I.AR.
Dated this 31 st day of December, 2019.

Vernon K. Smith
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant,
David R. Gibson
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the 31 st day of December, 2019, I caused a true and
correct copy of the above and foregoing to be delivered to the following persons at the
following addresses:
Jack W. Relf
Alexander P. McLaughlin
Givens Pursley, LLP
60 I West Bannock Street
P.O. Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701
j ackrelf@givenspursley.com
apm@givenspursley.com

NOTICE OF APPEAL

(
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(
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)
)
)
X

U.S . Mail
Fax 208-388-1200
Hand Delivered
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OCT O2 2019
PHIL McGRANE, Clerk

H · DISTRICT CO R OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF Ti·-- y

Y

TATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TH E COUNTY OF ADA
OAH G. HILLEN, in his capacity as Personal Case No. CV0l-19-10368
Representative of the Estate of Victoria II.
mith
Plaintifl:

DAVID R. GIB O
Bl.A K DIAM

an indi idual d/b/a
D OMPO T

PRODUCTS,
Defendant.

I.

I TRO
oah Hillen. as personal representative of Victoria Smith's estate, seeks to eject David

Gibs. n and his business. Black Diamond Compost Products, from propeny owned by Victoria's
estate th

~

Gowen Property.' defined below). Hillen also seeks to quiet title to the Gowen

Property and asserts claims for trespass and unjust enrichment against Gibson.
Hillen now moves for summary judgment on the ejectment count, claiming that
Victoria's estate owns the Gowen Property, that Gibson is in possession of it, and that Gibson
refuses to surrender possession. I lillen also asks the Court to enter partial final judgment under
LR. .P. 54(b) on his ejectment claim and issue a writ of assistance.
The Court took the motion under advisement after the hearing held on September 30.
2019. For th r

n that follow the Court grants llillen's motion for judgment on the

pleadings. Following this order's entry, the Court will enter partial final judgment under I.R.C.P.
54(b) and issue a writ of assistance.
II.

part may move for _judgment on the pleadings once "the pleadings are closed.

0

l.R.C.P. I 2(c). Such motions are decided according to the rules for summary judgment. Union

Bank. :A. v. .n· LL .• 163 Idaho 306,311,413 P.3d407, 412 (2017)(quoting Trimble v.
Enge/Icing.. 130 Idaho 300, 302, 939 P.2d 1379. 1381 (1997)). In the event the Court

li son
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materials outside of the pleadings, the motion for judgment on the pleadings converts into one
for summary judgment. requiring the Coun to give the parties "a reasonable opponunity to
present all the material that is pertinent to the motion." I.R.C.P. l2(d).
wnmary judgment is proper "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." 1.R.C.P. 56(a). To
ohtain swnmary judgment against a claim or defense of the nonmovant. the movant must show
that the! evidence docs not suppon an element of the challenged claim or defense. E.g., llo/duwuy

v. Brcmlim ·s upermarlcet. 158 Idaho 606,611. 349 P.3d 1197, 1202 (2015). That can be done by
offering evidence disproving that element, by demonstrating that the nonmovant is unable to
offer evidence proving that element, or in both of those ways. Id.; see also I.R.C.P. 56(c)( 1). The
movant then is entitled to summary judgment unless the nonmovant "respondrsl ... with specific
facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial." Wright v. Ada Cty. ., 160 Idaho 491 , 495,376
P.3d 58, 62 (2016). By contrast. "[al mere scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt as to the facts
is not sufficient" to avoid summary judgment. Id In deciding whether to grant summaty
judgment. the trial coun must construe the record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant,
drawing all reasonable inferences in the nonmovant's favor. Id.
Ill.

LEG TIO

This action centers on the Gowen Property, which is "real property located in Ada
County, described as Ada County Assessor's Parcel No. SI 505220000, in the Northwest ¼ of
ection 5. Township 2N, Range 2E, Boise Meridian, located off Pleasant Valley Road southwest
of its intersection with West Gowen Road." (Compl. 19.) The parties appear to agree that
Victoria owned the Gowen Property at some point before her death. (See Compl. 112, 9
(alleging I lillen owns the Gowen Property, ostensibly via the Rule 70(b) order entered in the
probate case); Answer ,i 4 (claiming Vernon Smith owns a two-thirds interest in the Gowen
.. as one of Victoria's heirs).) Victoria died September 11, 2013. (Answer 14.)
Gib · n currently occupies the Gowen Property. (Compl.

11, 19; Answer

11 , 19.)

On it. Gib n operates what the panies variously describe as a ''solid waste processing
operation..'' (Compl. ,i 12), or an ''agricultural composting facility;" (Answer11 I 2). Gibson says
he has permission from one of Victoria's heirs, Vernon Smith. to operate this business on the

Gowen Property. (Id.

I0.)

2
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On June 2. 2017. in the probate case for Victoria's estate, Judge Cheri Cop
order ..,convey[ing] the properties to Mr. I lillcn in his status a.~ a Personal Rcprc ntati

entered an
.

(Compl. Ex. A. at 2.) The order does not list what ~roperties'" were conveyed, but the
4

subsequently-entered judgment ("Judgment") lists property ~ith descriptions matching that of
the Gowen Property. Compare Judgement on Mot. Under Ruic 70(b) Ihereinafter "Judgment"),
Ex. B, at Parcel 6, Unit 11. Parcels A & B, In re Estate of mith. Ada County Case No. CV-IE2014-15352 (Idaho Oist. Ct. judgment entered June 2, 2017), 1 with Compl. 19 (Gowen Property

d scriptiun matching Parcel 6. Unit 11. Parcels A & B described in the Judgment). The Judgment
e ti

I in the Personal Representative as of May 5. 2017, any and all

real property of any kind

or nature, including ... [the Gowen Property). S uch vesting is free and clear of any lien, claim or
interest of the C laimants." one of whom was Vernon. Judgement at · II Ex. B. This Judgment
was affinned on appeal after Vernon challenged the underlying grant of summary judgment.

In re Estate of mith, 164 Idaho 457A66, 482, 432 P.3d 6. 15, 31 (2018).
On December 21. 2019. llillcn sent a notice of termination of occupancy demanding that
Gibson cease perations and leave the Gowen Property by January 31. 2019.(Compl. 1 13. Ex.

A; Answer 1 13.) Gibson did nut vacate, and refuses to s urrender possession of the Gowen
Propeny. (Compl.

14. 20: Answer

14, 20.)

After this r fusal to vacate, I lillen filed suit against Gibson. asserting the following
claims: Count One for j .c tment. Count Two for declaratory judgment to quiet title to the Gowen
Property. Count Three for trespass. and Count Four for unjust enrichment.
s noted above. Hillen now moves for partial judgment on the pleadings on Count One.
The main dispute is over who owns the Gowen Property. Based on the Judgment. Hillen claim
he has authority to eject Gibson from the Gowen Property. Gibson argues that Vernon owns lhe
Gowen Propcny as one of Victoria's heirs. leaving Hillen without authority to eject Gibson.
1

Per Hillen's request, the Court takes judicial notice of the Judgment under I.R.E. 201. It is
attached to this order. Because llillen's complaint contains an exhibit-which is "part of the
pleading for all purposes.." I.R.C.P. I O(c)-------that references the Judgment, (Compl. Ex. A. at 2).
and the Judgment is central to Hillcn's claim. considering the Judgment does not convert
11 i Ilen' s motion into one for summary j udgmcnt, see, e.g.• Citadel Grp. Ltd v. Wash. Reg 'I Med
tr. 692 F.3d 5 • ~5,1 (7th Cir. 2012) (citingBrownmark Films, LLC v. Comedy Partne~ 682
F.3d 687,690 7th ir. 2012)) (applying federal version ofl.R. ".P. l2(h)). In any event, whether
the present motion hould be treated as one for judgment on the pleadings or for summary
judgment is immaterial, as the standard is the same and the parties have had "a reasonable
opportunity to pres nt all the material that is pertinent to the-motion." I.R.C.P. 12(d).
3
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I •
ount One: F..jectment
To succeed on his ejectment claim. Hillen must prove '~(I) ownership, (2) possession by
the delendant[l. and (3) refusaJ of the defendant(] to surrender possession." PHH Morlg. Sen,s.

( ·orp. v. Perreira, 146 Idaho 631, 63 7. 200 P .3d 1 180, 1186 (2009) (quoting Ada Cry. I lighway
Dist. ,. Total . uccess lnvs.. LLC. 145 Idaho 360, 369, 179 P.3d 323, 332 (2008)). Gibson admits
the s

nd and third elements. ( Answer

I

I I , 14, 19-20.) The parties' disagreement centers on

the first element of ownership.
The Judgment clearly gives Hillen ownership of the Gowen Property, as it "vest[s] in
[llillenl ... any and all real property of any kind of nature. including ... (the Gowen Property] ..,
Judgment at§ II. Ex. B. This Judgment was upheld on appeal. In re £stale o/Smith. 164 Idaho at
466.. 482. 432 P.3d at I 5. 31. It conclusively shows Hillen has ownership of the Gowen Property
a~ the personal representative of Victoria's estate.
Gibson disagrees with this conclusion. Although he admits that the Judgment meant that
" (t)he possession of the Gowen (Property), for the purposes of administration of the Estate, was
restored to Victoria." (Def.'s Mem. Opp'n Pl.'s Mot. Partial J. Pleadings 10-11), he argues that
title immediately pa'ised from Victoria's estate to her heirs. And as one of the heirs. Vernon has
the right to detennine who may possess the Gowen Property, not Hillen. This, Gibson claims, is
utlicient to defeat Hillcn's motion.
In support of his argument. Gibson points out that "[u]pon the death of a person," a
decedent's property "devolves to ... (the] heirs." J.C. § 15-3-101. Idaho courts have interpreted
this to mean that ultlhe legal title to estate property vests in the heirs or devisees upon the death
of the decedent." Ellmalcer v. Tabor, 160 Idaho 576,580, 377 P.3d 390,394 (2015) (quoting

Pierce v. Franci.'f, 194 P.3d 505. 510 (Colo. Ct. App. 2008)); see also Fairchild v. Fairchild, 106
Idaho 147. 150. 676 P.2d 722. 725 (Ct. App. 1984) (trial court correctly concluded that heirs
became cotenants upon decedent's death).
Gibson is correct that property immediately devolves to the heirs upon the decedent's
death. See I.C. § 15-3-101. But Gibson gives only the general rule, which like many legal rules is
subject to exceptions. The statute Gibson points to clearly states that "the rights of ... heirs to (a
d~cedenC~ j propeny are subject to the restrictions and limitations contained in this code to

facilitate the prompt settlement of estates." Id. One of those restrictions is a personal
4
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rt!presentative's .... right (and ohligation] to ... take po

sion or control of ... the decedent'

property." LC. § 15-3-709. The personal representative's right is the "same power over the title
to property of the estate that an ahsolute owner would have. in trust however, for the benefit of
the creditors and others interested in the estate." LC.§ 15-3-711 (emphasis added). This power
continues '' (uJntil tennination of(the personal representative'sJ appointment!' Id.
Gibson argues that the "power" given by statute is not the same as giving "title," and that
I fillen does not have power to eject Gibson because Vernon holds title. Gihon's interpretation is
not supported by the official comments. This "power over title of an absolute owner is conceived
to emhrace all possible transaction.,.. including those resulting ..'in a change of rights of
possession." Id. cmt. The comment explains that the rea.~10 for giving the personal representative
a ....power" instead of '--iitle" is ..'because the power concept eases the succession of assets which
arc not po.
termination. i

sed by the personal representative. Thus, if the power is unexercised prior to its
lapse clears the title of ... heirs." Id.

ThL " lapse" noted in the comment stems from the rule that a personal representative is
not rc-.uired to take possession of all the estate's assets. as "any real property or tangible
personal property m·

be left with or surrendered to the person presumptively entitled thereto.'

I.C. § 15-3-709 (emphasis added). If so left .. title passes immediately to the heir, a.5 the personal
representative has not exercised his statutory power over the property. See I.C. § 15-3-101. On
the other hand. the personal representative can decide, in his own judgment, that the "possession
of the property hy him will he necessary for purposes of administration.'' I.C. § 15-3-709. The
persona! representative's di

tion in this matter is absolute, a.5 "[t]he request by a personal

representative for delivery of any property possessed hy an heir or devisee is £Q.ncl~ty~
e i n
1

t in any action against the heir or devisee for possession thereof.. that the possession of

the property by the personal representative is necessary for purposes of administration." Id
(emphasis added). So contrary to Gihson's position, the fact that the statute gives a "power"
instead of"title" does not matter-even without holding title. Hillen would still have the power
of an absolute owner over the Gowen Property. which includes determining who can occupy it.
The c

. cited hy Gibsen do not compel a different result. They stand for the general

rule that a decedent's propeny immediately des ends to an heir upon the decedent's death. hut
neither one addressed the language in J.C.§ 15-3-101 that an heir's right to a decedent's property
"arc subjl.-ct to restrictions and limitations." See generally, El/maker, 160 Idaho 576, 377 P.3d

5
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390; Fairchild. 106 Idaho 147, 676 l'.2d 722. In those cases. there was no need to consider a
personal representative's temporary power over the property. and its effect on an heir's right to
immediate vesting of title. In El/maker "'there was no probate of [the decedent's] estate." 160
Idaho at 580, 377 P.3d at 394. so there would not have been a personal representative. And
although in Fairc·hildthe estate had been probated. the issue in that case was whether one heir
had adversely possessed the property or instead was a cotenant with the other heirs by common
inheritance. 106 Idaho at 150. 676 P .2d at 725. It had nothing to do with the personal
representative's temporary power to control the property. ee id. Because neither El/maker or

Fairchild addressed any sort of""restriction" mentioned in J.C.§ 15-3-101. their holdings are no
more than reiterations of the general rule. They do not help in deciding the scope of a personal
representative's temporary statutory power over a decedent's property.
Gibson also argues that a personal representative's power is limited. and can be used only
the extent neces.c;ary for the administration of that property in the interests of crediton· and

other interested p rson . (Oef. 's Mem. Opp'n Pl. 's Mot. Partial J. Pleadings 11.) It is true that a
personal representative's tempomry power is held "in trust ... for the benefit of the creditors and
others intere ·ted in the estate." I.C. § 15-3-711 . This creates a fiduciary duty, hut contrary to
Gibson's assertion. does not limit the personal representative's power to control the property.
Whether possession of property is "'necessary for purposes of administration" is left to the sole
discretion of the personal representative. who · request His conclusive evidence, in any action
against the heir ... for pos · · i n thereof: that the possession of the property by the personal
representative is necessary for purposes of administration." I.C. § 15-3-709. In other words. as
the comment notes. an heir may be able to sue "'for breach of fiduciary duty. but this possibility
should not interfere with the personal representative •s administrative authority as it relates to
possession of the estate.n Id. cmt. So even if flillen might somehow violate his fiduciary duty to
Vernon by ejecting Gibson. the proper course is for Vernon to sue Hillen for breach of fiduciary
duty. But Gibson has not claimed such relief. nor could he do so, as he is not an heir to Victoria's
estate.
Finally, Gibson argues that whether title was vested in Hillen instead of Vernon was not
litigated in the probate case or on appeal in In re Estate ,~fSmilh. and so the Judgment does not
determine title. But the Judgment clearly ~"\•cst[ed] in [1 lillen] ... any and all reaJ property of any
kind or nature. including ... [the Gowen Propeny]" and spt:cificaJly noted that "'(s]uch vesting is
6
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fn.-e and clear of any Iien, claim or interest of the Claimants," which included Vernon. Judgement
at § II, Ex. 13. Gibson caMot.. as a part of this case, collaterally attack the Judgment. See Stale v.

lleyrend. 129 Idaho 56R, 571. 929 P.2d 744. 747 (Ct. App. 1996) (parties generally cannot
colloternlly attack o judgment entered in another case unless the attack is ha~d on lack of subject
matter jurisdiction). If. a~ Gihson claims. the Judgment could not have done what it purported to
do, then Vernon h uld have moved in that case for relief from the judgment under I.R.C.P.
60(h). Gihson essentially requests that the Court act as an appellate court and overrule the
Judgment in the other case. something it cannot do. The Court grants Hillen's motion for partial
judgment on the pleadings.
B.

F.n111· of judgment under I.R.C.P. 54(b)

Having granted his motion for partial judgment on the pleadings, the Court next
addresses I lillen 's request for entry of partial final judgment under I.R.C.P 54(b). If a complaint
4

contains multiple claims. the Court ' may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but
fewer than all, claims ... only if the court expressly detennines that there is no just reason for
delay.'' I.R.C.P. 54(b). Entering judgment under I.R.C.P. 54(b) comes within the Court's
discretion. PHH MorlK. Ser,•s. Corp., 146 Idaho at 636. 200 P.3d at 1185 (quoting Brinkmeyer v.

Brinkmeyer, 135 Idaho 596. 599, 21 PJd 918,921 (2001 )).
In the underlying prohate of Victoria's estate. Hillen seeks to sell the Gowen Property as
part of his duties as a personal representative. (See Hillen Deel. 1 5.) The prohate court granted
his motion to put up the Gowen Property for sale. (id 16. Ex. B), but Gibson's presence on the
land has impeded this process, (id.

I0). Gibson has not presented any reason for why judgment

should not be entered at this time, nor has he opposed this part of Hillen's motion. The Court
finds there is no just rea"on for delay and that entry of partial final judgment on Count One i
warranted under I.R.C.P. 54(h).

C.

\\ ril of

is lane~

The Court next turns to I lillen's request for a writ of assistance. Whether to grant a \\Tit
of assi stance is made in the Court's discretion. Pro Jndivisu, Inc. "'· Mid-Mile /lo/din,: Tr., 131
Idaho 741. 745. 963 P.2d 1178, 1182 ( 1998) (citing cases). Such a writ His a form of proce
issued hy a court of equity to trans for the possession of propcrt)\ and more specifically lands. the
title or right to v. hich it has previously adjudicated." Id. at 746~ 963 P.2d at 1183 (quoting Ea,:le

Rcx:k urp. v. ldamunt /Imel Co., 60 Idaho 639,647, 95 P.2d 838, 841 (1939)). "The writ of
7
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assistance is an equitable remedy and the power to issue such writ stems from the need of the
coun to enforce its own decrees.•• Curti.'i ,,. Campbell. 105 Idaho 705. 707. 672 P.2d I 035. 1037
( 1983)(citing US.

at 'I Bank of Or. , .. Chuvez, 574 P.2d 647 (Or. 1978)).

Whether to grant such n '\\Tit involves a simple analysis: "The sole question to be
determined on the motion is whether applicant has a right. as against the party in possession to
use the writ to obtain possession." Pro Jndi\·iso. Inc.• 131 Idaho at 746 .. 963 P.2d at 1183
(quoting Eagle. Rock (~orp .• 60 Idaho at 648. 95 P.2d at 841 ). "In the absence of any claim of an
independent paramount title. the only question on such application is whether the decree has or
has not hccn complied with." Id
As discussed above. I lillen has the right to eject Gibson from the Gowen Property. This
leaves the question of whether Gibson has complied with the order. The Court recognizes that
the typical course would he to refrain from issuing a writ of assistance until after the party fail
to comply with the judgment. In this case. however. such a waiting period would be pointless~ a~
it seems likely that Gibson will not comply in a timely manner. I tis future non-compliance seems
likely for two reasons: First. when at the hearing the Court asked Gibson whether he would
comply with a judgment against him. Gibson failed to give an unequi\•ocal answer in the
affirmative. Second. Vernon's conduct in the underlying probate case reveals a dilatory panem.
and the Coun is concerned that Vernon. as Gibson's counset will continue this pattern hy
encouraging his client to not immediately comply with the judgment. A waiting period in this
instance s

min I) would serve no purpose but to further delay the probate of Victoria's estate

and wHste her estate '"s resources by requiring it to agafo request a writ of assistance after Gibson
fails to Comply. To avoid such a waste of time, and believing a writ will likely be necessary to
enforce the judgment, the Coun grants llillen's request for a writ of assistance.

\'.

0

t,

10

I lillen 's motion for panial judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED. Judgment and a writ
of as i lance will he entered separately.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this

L~Y

of October. 2019.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that on this

1.

rJ

day of October. 2019. I emailed (served) a true and correct copy

of the within instrument to:

Jack W. Relf
Alexander McLaughlin

GIVENS PURSLEY

Vernon K Smith Jr
Attorney at Law
V

·I

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
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-,~,~;bb!!'"r"~~~----

NO
ut _ _ _ _ p_ _ _ _ __

OCT O2 2019
PHIL McGRANE, Clett<

IN THE DI TRICT COUR OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL.. DISTRICT OF

Tlt&MUTCHIU>
~J>,.JN

STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR TIIE COUNTY OF ADA
OAH G. HILL :. in his capacity a.c; Personal
Representative of the Estate of Victoria 11.
mith,

Case

o. CV0l-19-10368

JUDGMENT
Plaintiff.
V.

DA VIO R. GIB O an individual d/b/a
BLACK DIAMO D COMPOST

PRODUCTS,
L>efendant.

JUDGMENT I ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:
Judgment is granted in favor of Noah G. Hillen, as personal representative of the estate of
Victoria II. Smith on Count One of his complaint. David R. Gibson d/b/a Black Diamond
Compost Products shall immediately vacate and surrender possession of the premises des ri

d

below:
Ada ounty Assessor's Parcel

o.

1505220000, in the Northwest¼ of Section 5.

Township 2 ' Range 2E. Roisc Meridian. located off Pleasant Valley Road southwest of its
intersection with West Gowen Road.

Dated this

~~

of October, 2019.

000227

RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATE
With respect to the i ssucs determined by the above partial judgment it is hereby
CERTIFIED in accordance with Rule 54(b), I.R.C.P., that the court has determined that there is
no just reason

for delay of the entry of o final judgment and that the court has and does hereby

direct that the above partial j udgment is a final judgment upon which execution may issue and an
appeal may be taken

Dated this

as

provided by the Idaho Appellate Rules.

l%y of October. 2019.

District Judge
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C[RTIFICAT[ OF MAILING

"J

I hereby cenify that on this_)__ day of October. 2019. I emailed (served) a true and correct copy
of the within instrument to:

Jack W. Relf
Alexander McLaughlin
GIVEN PURSLEY
I

Vernon K Smith Jr

.,

,

..·.

•.

CERTIFICATE OF MAIUNG
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Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
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success. "When a district court decide · a motion to reconsider, 'the district court mu t apply the
same tandard of review that the court applied when deciding the original order that i being
recon idered. "' Westby, .. Schaefer, 157 Idaho 616, 62 I, 338 P.3d 1220, 1225 (20 I4) (quoting
Frag11ella , .. />ctro,·ich. I 53 Idaho 266, 276, 281 P.Jd I03. 113 (2012)). Here, the challenged

order granted a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Section 11 of that order recites the
tandard for such a motion, which the Court applies again on reconsideration.
Although titled a a motion to reconsider. the main thrust of Gib on· motion is to seek
clarification a to what the order actually accomplished. (See Mcm. Supp. Mot. Amend 6. .)
Specifically, Gib on ay · "it is not clear whether this Court accepted or rejected Hillen·s claim
to ab olute and sole ownership of thee tate property." (Id. 8.) Gib on claims that if the ourt
detennined that Hillen was the sole owner, then Hillen is "entirely free to deal wi th that property.
unre trained by any requirement · of the [Cnifom1 Probate Code)." (Id. 5.) But if the Court
detennined that Hillen ·'has no ownership intcrc tin the estate property." then Gib on argue that
"Hillen' exercise of his statutorily-conferred power is constrained by the limitation imposed
upon him by the [ niform Probate Code]." (Id.) Gibson's concern is that the Court's order may
have "declared Hillen to be the ·ole owner of the estate property." which. according to Gib on.
would mean that Vernon mith-Gib ·on's attorney and an heir of Victoria mith- and
Vernon' brother would not ha,c "an)' ·tanding to challenge Hillen·s actions as the personal
repre ·entative becau. c their entire interest in thee talc ha~ been detennined to have been
extinguished by the entry of the Ruic 70(b) Order" entered in the underlying probate case for
Victorica mith (the --Judgment''\ (Id. 9-10.)
Gibson'· motion present a false bifurcation, gi, ing only 1,, o option~ for ,, hal the
Court's order could ha\'e meant. , either option is entirely correct. To help clarify the i ·ue, the
Court summari1;es its prior order: Based on the Judgment. the Court held that "Hillen ha.
owner hip of the Go,,en Property as the personal representative of ictoria's estate.'' (Am.
Mem. Decision & Order Grnnting Pl.' Mot. Partial J. Pleadings 4.) In responding to Gib on'
argument that Vernon held title to the Gowen Property. the Court nOLed that Hillen, as the
per onal repre ·entattve, had the "same power o, er the title to property of thee tale thal an
absolute owner would ha,·e." (Id. 5 (quoting t.C. § 15-3-711 ).) Ba ed on this "power over title:·
Hillen had an ownership interest that, at the very least. gave him authority to eject Gibson from
1

This Judgment is attached Lo the Court · · amended order entered October 3, 2019.
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the Gowen Property. (Id.) The Court went on to note that although Hillen's temporary "power
over title" was held in trust, this fiduciary duty "docs not limit the personal representative 's
power to control the property." (Id. 6.) If Hillen, iolate<l thi fiduciary duty, the remedy would
be for emon

not Gib on

to bring a claim for breach of fiduciary duty. (Id.)

The upshot i · that the prior order dctcnnined that Hillen, a the per·onal repre entative.
had an owner hip intere t- based on the Judgment

that gave Hillen authority to eject Gibson

from the Gowen Property. This-and not one of the two option pre cntcd by Gib on-i what
the Court' order meant. The CJectmcnt claim was the ·ole claim at issue. The prior order did
not extingui h Vernon' intcre tin thee tate or pre,ent him from bringing a suit for breach of
fiduciary duty. Those is uc were not presented to the C'ourt. nor could they have been decided,
a Vernon and the other heir would have been nccc~ ar} partie · and had not been joined.
Beyond asking for clarification. Gibson pre. en!. no real argument as to why the Court·s
order wa. incorrect. He ays that the Court's order create an incon ·i ·tcncy by recognizing that
1lillen is the owner of Gowen Property while also rccogniLing that Hillen has fiduciary duties
regarding the management of Victoria' c. tate. But this argument rests on the idea that Hill en
own the Gowen Property personally. and not in his capacity as a personal representative. As is
evident from the above explanation. this i not what the Court held in its prior order. The Court
ne,·cr understood Hillen's motion as seeking to establish that Hillen owned the Gowen Property
in his personal capacity, nor can hi motion be reasonably read as ceking such relief. And to the
extent Gibson argue · that there is an inconsistency,, ith Hillen' "power over the title" of the
Gowen Property and his fiduciary duty. the ·ourt ' prior order already addrcs ed thi issue. (See
id. 6 ("[A]n heir may be able to sue' for breach of fiduciary duty. but this po ibility should not

interfere with the per onal representative· administrative authority as it relate to posse ·sion or
thee tale."') (quoting I. . § 15-3-709 cmt.).) The two are clearly not inconsistent under Idaho
law. as thi situation wa ex pre. sly add re!., ed in the comment · to 1.C.

~

15-3-709.

Gib ·on once again collaterally attacks the Judgment. contending that it could not have
granted Hillen an o,, nership intcrc t in the Gowen Property. This issue" as dealt with in the
prior order. (see id. 6-7), and need not be reiterated here. A. there is no basi · for granting
Gib on·s motion to reconsider, it i~ denied.
The Court next addrcssc Gibson 's motion to alter or amend the judgment. Whether to
grant such a motion is left to the Court' discretion. See Pandrea ,.. Barrell. 160 Idaho 165. 171,
3
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369 P.3d 943,949 (2016) (quoting Barmore , .. Perrone, 145 Idaho 340,344, 179 P.3d 303,307
(2008)). The motion to alter or amend the judgment depended on a successful outcome on the
motion to reconsider or at least relied on the amc argument . Given that the motion to
reconsider is denied, and that the argument had no merit, the Court denies Gibson's motion to
alter or amend the judgment.
Thi leave Gibson's motion to di. allow Hillen's costs and attorney fees. Gibson's
frontlinc argument is that ··at this point in the proceeding no prevailing party can be detennined."
(Def.' Mcm. Opp·n Pl.'s Mem. Atl'y Fees & Co t I.) In re pon e, Hillen reque ts that the
Coun hold his reque t for costs and fees. as well as Gibson's motion to di allow. in abeyance
until the Court enters final judgment on all other pending claims in this matter. The Court agrees
with Gib. on that detennining the prevailing party at this point would be premature, and so hold
hi motion to disallow and Hillen' request for co t and attorney fees in abeyance until final
resolution of thi , ca ·e.
Accordingly,
IT JS ORDERED that Gibson's motion to reconsider and motion to alter or amend the
judgment arc DE I lED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Hillen's request for attorney fees, as well as Gib on'
related motion to disallow co. t and fee -, hall be held in abeyance pending entry of final
judgment on the remaining claims.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the hearing scheduled for December 17.2019. is
ACATED.
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Parcel
ot 7, 8, 9t 10 1 , 12, 13. 14 and 15 · Block 5 V'tlage and ownsit.e of amer.
joining vacated streets a d al ey by Ord·nance o . 5, Jefferson County, Idaho.

clud ·n

and

Parcel 2
Town hip 7 North, Range 36 ._ast of the Boise Meridian Jefferson County, Idaho.
Secfo 2: A I
Section 1: AJ

I

o•• 7(1 I

000248

ny
Pa c

1 Commont

Lot 6 in loC' 29 of Fairview Add tion according tot e officia p t I ereof fi ed ·n Book 2 of P·fa
at Page 73, and Amended by an Affidavit reco,rded January 14 2009 s Instrument o. 109003860,
officia record o Ada Co n y , Idaho.
f:"a_rcel· 2

known as : 1900 W Ma'n St BQise ID 83702

Lot 7 in tock 29 of airv ew AddTon, aceord ·ng to the offidat pat thereof, fed ·n Book 2 of P ts
ary 14, 2009 as nstrument o. 09003860,
at Page 73 and Amended by an Affidavit record d J
official r cord of Ad Co nty, Idaho.

P rce 3 Commonl lq,_o wn as: 110 N . 22nd St Boise O 83702
, ot 5 in Block 29 of Fairview Add"tion , accordi ng to the official ptat thereof filed ·n Book 2 of Plat
at P ge 73 and Amended by an A 1dav t recorded Ja ary 4, 2009 a Ins r
ent o. 109003860
offcial records of Ada Co ,n ty, daho.

Parcel 4 Common

known as : 1807 W Ida

orthwesterly 32 fee of ot 1 in

oise O 83702

lock 23 of McCarty' Second Add t.ion to Boi e c ·ty, Ada

Coun y State of Ida o according t,o the
offic'al plat thereof recorded in the office of the County Recorder of Ada County State of Idaho.
P refit 5 Commonl known .as: 2001

ond St Boise 10 83704

ot 6 except t e So t 50 feet ·n loc 2 of A Re ubdivi io of Lo 21 , and .portion o o s, 6, 7
and 22 Orade S b Vsion , accord 'ng o he officia pat her of fi ed ·n oo 25 records of Ada
County, d ho .
arcet 6 Commo _t known as : 0 S Pea
8d Boise ID 83705· 0 S Cole Rd
1

Boise ID 83705· 6259 S Pleasant Va' le

Unit :
he Southe s qu rter of the Sout east qua e of Section 32 Town•sh p 3
the Boise Meridian, in Ada County, Idaho.

orth, Range 2 East of

Unit 11:
Parcel A
The West ha of th
·orthwe quarter of S ction 5, own hip 2 North, Range 2 ast oft " e Bose
er'd;ian. Also shown of record s ot 4 and e So t west qu rter of the o·r thwes quarter of
Section 5, own hip 2 North, Range 2 East of the Bai e erid ian.
Paree
-- he ,_as h f of t e
erid'an.

orthwest quarter of Sec io

5 Town

ip 2

orth, Range 2

ast of the Boi e
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arce C
The Southwest quarter of Section 5, Township 2

orth, Range 2 East of the Boise Meridian.

Un t I:
e Ea t ha of e ort eas q, rter of Sect' on 7
d the West ha ,f o the Northwest quarter of
Sectio 8 aU ·n Townsh p 2 orth of Range 2 East of Boi e er'dian ·n Ada County daho.

p

8371_4· W. Ch' d n B vd .

U it I:
eal property situ ted ·,nth Cou ty of Ada , State o Id ho consi ting of 132 acres, ore or les
to wit: Commencing at a point ort 36°21 We t distant 2.88 chai s from the center of Section 26,
Town ·p 4 North Range
ast, B.M. , the real place of beg·nning runn ·ng thenc South 73°15'
ast a d's
ce of .40 cha·ns to a poi t; thence orth 8°48 ' E st a ·st ce of 64.53 ch ·ns o a
point; thence orth 60°42' West a distance of 2.75 chains to a point; thence South 68°00 We t a
distance of 9.50 chains to a ,p oint · thence North 75° 00' West a distance of 2.00 ch ins to a point;
t ence ort 49°00 Wes
d ·sta ce of 3.90 chains to a po·n ; the ce Sou h 64°30' W t a
di tance of 3.70 chain to a point· thence Sou h 72°00 West a distance of 8.50 cha·ns to a point ;
thence North 81°00' We ta distance of 3.83 c ins o a po nt; the ce Sou h 0°05' West d·i stance
of 14.92 cha·ns to a point · t e ce orth 80°30 '
st a d·i tance of 2.00 cha 'ns to a point; th nee
South 48°15 ast a dist nee of 2.00 chain to a po'nt ; thence South 80°30 a ta dist nee of 3.15
chains to a point· thence Sout 61 °00' as a d 'stance of 1.00 ch · s o a point· the.nee Sout
23°30' as a d. tance of 2.10 cha'ns to a point ; thence South 000 We t a 'distance of 3.60
chai s to a point; thence South 26°00 West a distance of 1.80 ch ins to a point; thence South
27°00' l:as a dista ce of 3.70 cha ns to
o;i t ; hence Sou 1°45' ast a. dis ·a ce of .50 c ins
to a po nt; thence South 38°30 , ast distance of 1.20 ch ·ns to a point; thence South 40°45' West
distance of 2.80 chains to a point; thence Sou h 3°45 West a distance of 4.30 c ins to point;
henc So h 34°15' ast d t nc of 2.00 c ains to po ; t e ce Sout 67°00' East
st nc
of 1.40 chains to a point ; thence South 49°15 a t distance of 2.50 ch ins to a point· hence
nee of 2.50
South 22°30 ast a dist nee of 2.95 chain to a po·nt; thence South 52°00' · ast a di
chains to a point·
ence Sou h 64°00' ast a di tance of 2.60 chains to a point· thence .N orth
84°45' a t a distance of 1.32 c a.ins to a po'nt; thence South 00°03 W s a distance of 14.89
cha' s to the place of beg ·nni g · togeth r with n water, ditch and I te a right app rtenant
hereto ·o r used ·n connect' on therewith , · cud ng 132 shares .'n the Thurman MUI Ditch Co, , 0.,
and as aid creage ·s fu her identif ed in that Bargai.n and Sate O ed, dated December 20, 1954,
y Record r's Offce, ocate
ook 440 at Page
a d recorde in the Records of e Ada Co
104 copies of wh ch are at ached hereto and incorporated herein· and

Real property si.tuated ·n the County of Ada, State of Id ho, co s ·s ing of 44 acres, more or le _ ,
to w·t:
Comm.e c·ng at a point 2 chains 88 f,ink No h 36°21 ' West , om the Wa h oulder set In
ce ter of Sectio,n Twenty-six in ownship our orth of Range One East of the oise Meridian;
thence North variation 18°48 East 18 chains and 70 link to a Slough ; thence North nd West rly
follow ng the left a d South B n o the s id S o h o the ast bo dary o -Ot :ne ·,n Sectio
wenty-three i'n ownship and Range afore a,i d; thence South following ast Boundary of said Lot
ine, 7 chains and 75 ti,nks to Southeast corner of said Lot N'ne· thence South following he ast
bo dary of the West · a f oft e orthwe t Q arter of s -'d Secfon wenty-s ·x 25 c ain
n 40
inks o top of luff· thence South and Easterly following the edge of the uff to a point 2 ch ins
1

I\

2. t, I

000250

and 88 inks North 35°2 Wes from the Wash Bould set n the ce ter of s id Section wentysix, sa·d poi t being the pace of beginning . Together with an Certificates of Shares, ,including
Certificate No. 114 for 4 shares of he cap·t stock n the Thurman ii Ditch Comp - ny, ltd and
rch 18, 1958, and recorded in
as said acreage is further ide tified ·n t t W rranty Dee d ted
the Record of the Ada County Recorder's Office a nstrument o. 805407, copies of which a e
attach d ereto
d ·ncorporated here' n; nd s fd arcels of rnal propert·es further :i dent fled in
the Tax P reel Identification umbers for further reference as set forth as:
1

•

I De cription: Parcel

(1)

Prope

95 in Flood District S2 of Sec 23 & , 2 of See 26

ber SO
s: 5933

er S . Gar en C1 • ID 837

(2)

SE4 SE4
Ta Parcel
Prope Ad

(3)

( )

r S Garden Ct . ID 837

933

Legal D
Tax Par
Property

. ·on: Pa
ber S
s. 593

egal

· ·on: Par

Ta P
Prope

ber SOS
Cht

E 244430-B
S . Garden C1 • 10 83

580 in lood ·strict Secs 23

2580
Bl d.. Garden C,

on: Parcel 36

(S)

Sec ion 26 , 1: 24443 ·S

r. SO

26

1E

ID 837

Come SE4

4 Section 26

u be . S05262 3600
C 1nden 81 d . Garden C1 y ID 837
6

Legal Oescription: Parcel #3700 Por N2 SE4 W4 Section 26
Ta arcel u r S05262 3700
Propert A dress. Chm en 81 d Garden C, . 10 837

(7)

Lega
Ta
Pro

ion: Parcel
-8

60-B

265 R CT SE N 4 Section 26

ber:S05262 2 5
ss 9907

, 1,

Chin en 81 d., Garden

c, y. ID 837
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Electronically Filed
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Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Phil McGrane, Clerk of the Court
By: Laurie Johnson, Deputy Clerk

Randall A. Peterman, ISB No. 1944
Alexander P. McLaughlin, ISB No. 7977
Jack W. Relf, ISB No. 9762
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP
601 West Bannock Street
Post Office Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720
Telephone (208) 388-1200
Facsimile (208) 388-1300
rap@givenspursley.com
apm@givenspursley.com
jackrelf@givenspursley.com
013683-0002
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

NOAH G. HILLEN, in his capacity as
Personal Representative of the Estate of
Victoria H. Smith,

Case No. CV0l-19-10368
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL
TRANSCRIPT AND RECORD

Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.
DAVID R. GIBSON, an individual d/b/a
BLACK DIAMOND COMPOST
PRODUCTS,
Defendant/Appellant.

TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED APPELLANT AND HIS ATTORNEYS OF RECORD AND THE
CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN, that Plaintiff/Respondent Noah G. Hillen, in his
capacity as Personal Representative of the Estate of Victoria H. Smith ("Hillen"), hereby requests,
pursuant to Rules 19, 25, and 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules, the inclusion of the following
Reporter's Transcript and material in the Clerk's Record on Appeal in addition to that required to

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL TRANSCRIPT AND RECORD - 1

14960263.1

000253

be included by the Idaho Appellate Rules and Defendant/Appellant David R. Gibson's Notice of
Appeal:
1. Reporter's Transcript, compressed format: Hearing before Judge Steven Hippler held
on September 20, 2019, on Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings
and Motion to Certify Judgment Under I.R.C.P. 54(b), reported by Christie Valcich.
2. Clerk's Record:
a. Memorandum of Attorneys' Fees and Costs, filed October 16, 2019;
b. Declaration of Alexander P. McLaughlin in Support of Memorandum of
Attorneys' Fees and Costs, filed October 16, 2019;
c. Defendant's Motion in Opposition to Plaintiffs Memorandum of Attorneys'
Fees and Costs, filed October 29, 2019;
d. Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Memorandum of
Attorneys' Fees and Costs, filed October 29, 2019; and
e. Response to Defendant's Motion in Opposition to Plaintiffs Memorandum of
Attorneys' Fees and Costs, filed November 15, 2019.
I certify that a copy of this Request for Additional Transcript and Record has been
served upon Christie Valcich, Court Reporter, Ada County Courthouse, c/o TCA Department,
200 W. Front Street, Ste. 4172, Boise, Idaho 83702. The number of additional reporter's transcript
pages requested is approximately 20.
I further certify that a copy of this Request for Additional Transcript and Record
has been served upon the Clerk of the District Court and upon all parties required to be served
pursuant to Rule 20 of the Idaho Appellate Rules.
DATED this 14th day of January, 2020.
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP

By Isl Alexander P. McLaughlin
Randall A. Peterman - Of the Firm
Alexander P. McLaughlin - Of the Firm
Jack W. Relf- Of the Firm
Attorneys for Plaintiff

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL TRANSCRIPT AND RECORD - 2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 14th day of January, 2020, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL TRANSCRIPT AND RECORD
to be served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Vernon K. Smith, Jr.
1900 W. Main St.
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Attorney for Defendant

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[X]

U.S. Mail
Facsimile (208) 345-1129
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
Email/iCourt: vvs 1900@gmail.com

Christie Valcich
Court Reporter
Ada County Courthouse
clo TCA Department
200 W. Front Street, Ste. 4172
Boise, Idaho 83 702

[X]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

U.S. Mail
Facsimile
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
Email/iCourt:

Isl Alexander P. McLaughlin
Alexander P. McLaughlin

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL TRANSCRIPT AND RECORD - 3
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Filed: 03/04/2020 09:24:50
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Phil McGrane, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Wegener, Kelle
IN THE

SUPREME

COURT OF

THE

STATE OF

IDAHO

Supreme Court No.

4 7 687-2020

NOAH G. HILLEN, in his capacity as
Personal Representative of the
Estate of Victoria H. Smith,
Plaintiff/Respondent,

v.
DAVID R. GIBSON, an individual
d/b/a BLACK DIAMOND COMPOST
PRODUCTS,
Defendant/Appellant.

NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT LODGED

Notice is hereby given that on March 3, 2020, I
lodged a transcript, 19 pages in length, for the
above-referenced appeal with the District Court Clerk of
Ada County in the Fourth Judicial District.

Christie Valcich, CSR-RPR
March

Dates:

September

20,

3,

2020

2019
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
NOAH G. HILLEN, in his capacity as
Personal Representative of the Estate of
Victoria H. Smith,

Supreme Court Case No. 47687
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

DAVID GIBSON, an individual, dba
BLACK DIAMOND COMPOST
PRODUCTS,
Defendant-Appellant.

I, PHIL McGRANE, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the
State of Idaho in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify:
There were no exhibits offered for identification or admitted into evidence during the
course of this action.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said
Court this 4th day of March, 2020.

CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
NOAH G. HILLEN, in his capacity as
Personal Representative of the Estate of
Victoria H. Smith,

Supreme Court Case No. 47687
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
DAVID GIBSON, an individual, dba
BLACK DIAMOND COMPOST
PRODUCTS,
Defendant-Appellant.
I, PHIL McGRANE, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have
personally served or mailed, by either United States Mail or Interdepartmental Mail, one copy of
the following:
CLERK'S RECORD AND REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT
to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows:

VERNON K. SMITH

RANDALL A. PETERMAN

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT

BOISE, IDAHO

BOISE, IDAHO

Date of Service:

MAR O4 2020

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
NOAH G. HILLEN, in his capacity as
Personal Representative of the Estate of
Victoria H. Smith,

Supreme Court Case No. 47687
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD

Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

DAYID GIBSON, an individual, dba
BLACK DIAMOND COMPOST
PRODUCTS,
Defendant-Appellant.
I, PHIL McGRANE, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of
Idaho, in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing record in the aboveentitled cause was compiled under my direction and is a true and correct record of the pleadings and
documents that are automatically required under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules, as well as those
requested by Counsel.
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the Notice of Appeal was filed in the District Court on the 31st
day of December, 2019.

CERTIFICATE TO RECORD
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